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ABSTRACT
Discrete event system methods for control problems arising in cyber-physical
systems
by
Eric Dallal
Chair: Ste´phane Lafortune
This thesis considers two problems in cyber-physical systems. The first is that of
dynamic fault diagnosis. Specifically, it is assumed that a plant model is available in
the form of a discrete event system containing special fault events whose occurrence
we would like to diagnose. Furthermore, it is assumed that there exist sensors that can
be turned on or off (for example, to save energy) and capable of detecting some subset
of the system’s non-faulty events. The problem to be solved consists of constructing a
compact structure, called the most permissive observer (MPO), containing the set of
all sequences of sensor activations that ensure that any fault event’s occurrence will
be correctly diagnosed within some finite number k of event occurrences. We solve
this problem by defining an appropriate notion of information state summarizing the
information obtained from the past sequence of observations and sensor activations.
The resulting MPO has a better space complexity than that of the previous approach
in the literature.
The second problem considered in this thesis is that of controlling vehicles through
an intersection. Specifically, we wish to obtain a supervisor for the vehicles that is safe
xii
(i.e., collision-free), non-deadlocking (i.e., ensures that all vehicles eventually cross the
intersection, never reaching a state where the supervisor allows no control actions)
and maximally permissive (i.e., allows any control action that does not violate safety
or non-deadlockingness). Furthermore, we solve this problem in the presence of un-
controlled vehicles, bounded disturbances in the dynamics, and measurement uncer-
tainty. Our approach consists of discretizing the system in time and space, obtaining
a discrete event system (DES) abstraction, solving for maximally permissive super-
visors in the abstracted domain, and refining the supervisor to one for the original,
continuous, problem domain. We provide general results under which this approach
yields maximally permissive memoryless supervisors for the original system and show
that, under certain conditions, the resulting supervisor will be maximally permissive
over the class of all supervisors, not merely memoryless ones. Our contributions are
as follows. First, by constructing DES abstractions from continuous systems, we can
leverage the supervisory control theory of DES, which is well-suited to finding maxi-
mally permissive supervisors under safety and non-blocking constraints. Second, we
define a number of relations between transition systems and their abstractions: state
reduction, exact state reduction, state estimate reduction, and exact state estimate
reduction. These are general notions which allow for the characterization of obtained
supervisors as maximally permissive among the class of memoryless supervisors, or
maximally permissive among all supervisors.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
This Ph.D. thesis considers two problems in Cyber-Physical System (CPS)s, namely
that of dynamic sensor activation for diagnosis, and that of vehicle control at an in-
tersection. Before describing these two problems, we briefly describe what a CPS is.
From a high-level perspective, a CPS is a collection of cooperating computational
elements that control physical components. Such systems are typically characterized
by the distributed nature of their physical components, which are tightly linked to the
computational elements. These systems may have centralized or decentralized control
architectures, where the choice of one over the other results in trade-offs involving
algorithm complexity, processing speed, communication system complexity, etc. Ex-
amples of CPSs include wireless sensor networks, autonomous automotive systems,
and distributed robotic systems.
The first problem under consideration in this thesis is that of dynamic sensor
activation for diagnosis. Briefly, it is assumed that we possess an accurate model of
possible system behavior, including that of fault occurrences, along with a limited
number of sensors that can provide information about the system’s transitions. The
goal in this work is to find strategies that allow for the timely diagnosis of any fault
occurrence, while minimizing sensor utilization. Minimizing sensor utilization may be
desirable for reasons of energy (if the sensors operate with limited access to a power
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source), bandwidth (if the sensors readings must be transmitted to other devices), or
security (if the sensor readings may reveal sensitive tactical information, such as in
unmanned aerial vehicles).
The second problem under consideration is that of supervising vehicles at an inter-
section. This problem is examined in the presence of uncontrolled vehicles (vehicles
whose behavior cannot be restricted or in any way altered by the control system), dis-
turbances representing unmodeled dynamics, and measurement error. The goal is to
design a supervisor that ensures that the vehicles fully cross the intersection without
collisions. The supervisor must also be minimally restrictive, in the sense that it only
interferes with driver behavior when necessary. The last decade has seen a number of
commercially available systems designed to assist drivers. Examples of these include:
collision detection systems to either warn the driver or stop the car when an object is
spotted in the vehicle’s path; parking assist systems; and lane change assist systems
that warn drivers of vehicles in or entering their blind spot.
Our solutions to both problems are developed using the theory of Discrete Event
Systems (DES), and specifically of supervisory control. A DES is a system whose dy-
namics (i.e., its state transitions) are determined by event occurrences. An example
of a discrete event system is a text editor software program. In this example, inputs
are obtained from the mouse or the keyboard and generate responses from the soft-
ware. Thus, a mouse click or a key stroke would constitute an event in this example.
Notably, the state of the program does not change in between these events, and the
time that passes between consecutive events doesn’t affect its final state. Thus we
can say that such a system is event-driven, rather than time-driven.
DES theory uses elements also found in computer science, such as languages and
automata, and adds a control element in the form of supervisory control theory.
Specifically, supervisory control theory is the problem of restricting the set of behav-
iors of a system (given by a language) to some subset of those behaviors, given that
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some events may be uncontrollable (i.e., cannot be prevented), unobservable (i.e., are
not seen by the system), or both. In the context of this thesis, the dynamic diag-
nosis problem is formulated directly within the DES formalism. The vehicle control
problem, on the other hand, is formulated within the context of classical control of
systems represented by differential equations. Our solution to the vehicle control
problem translates the problem to one of supervisory control through a technique
called abstraction.
This Ph.D. thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapters II, III, and IV describe,
respectively, our work on dynamic diagnosability, our work on the vehicle control
problem in the case of perfect measurement, and our work on the vehicle control
problem in the case of imperfect measurement. Chapter I is this introduction and
is divided into three sections. Because both problems being worked on are in the
domain of DES, we begin by presenting preliminaries that are necessary to the un-
derstanding of this research (Sec. 1.1). We proceed by giving a high-level description
of both research problems that make up this work (Sec. 1.2). Following this, we
provide an overview of the related literature for both problems under consideration
(Sec. 1.3). Finally, we provide an overview of our solution methodology and contri-
butions (Sec. 1.4). It should be noted that there will be overlap between the contents
of this introduction and that of Chapters II, III, and IV, particularly in the introduc-
tion of the respective chapters. Chapters I is meant to provide a high-level overview
of the problems worked on and our solutions and do not contain the same level of
detail as Chapters II, III, and IV. The results of Chapter II have appeared in Dallal
and Lafortune (2014). Earlier versions of the results presented in Chapters III and
IV have appeared in Dallal et al. (2013a) (in the case of perfect measurement) and
Dallal et al. (2013b) (in the case of imperfect measurement).
3
1.1 Discrete Event Systems Preliminaries
This section describes those concepts in discrete events systems (DESs) which are
necessary to understand the work in chapters II, III, and IV. It should not be seen as
an overview or an introduction to the field. Only matter that is relevant to the two
problems that make up this work will be presented here. The emphasis will be on
logical automata as a DES modelling formalism, the problem of diagnosability, and
the problem of control. See chapters 1-3 of Cassandras and Lafortune (2008) for a
reference of the following material.
Informally, a DES is an event-driven, discrete space, system in which changes in
state occur upon the occurrence of an event. Among the modelling formalisms for
DESs are automata and Petri nets. This work uses only logical automata, which
are sufficient when event occurrences are not synchronized to a clock (as in timed
automata), do not have preconditions (sometimes called guards, as in hybrid systems)
and do not follow any probabilistic structure (as in stochastic systems). Following is
a formal definition of deterministic logical automata.
Definition I.1 (Deterministic Logical Automata). A deterministic logical automaton
G is a tuple G = (X,E, f, x0, Xm), where X is the set of discrete states, E is the set
of events, f : X × E → X is a partial transition function, x0 is the initial state of
the system, and Xm is a set of marked states. For any x ∈ X and e ∈ E, f(x, e)
signifies that the system moves to state f(x, e) when event e occurs in state x. The
set of marked states Xm generally represent the set of states where some operation
of interest has completed. This set is sometimes omitted from the definition of an
automaton if it is not required.
Henceforth, we will refer to deterministic logical automata only as automata.
Given a set of events E (also called an alphabet), a string s is a sequence of zero
or more events. The string of length zero is called the empty string, and is denoted
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by ε. Given two strings s and t (either of which could be empty), the notation
st or s.t denotes their concatenation. In this case, s is a prefix of st, and t is a
suffix of st. A language L is a set of strings defined over an alphabet E. The (·)∗
operation, called the Kleene-closure is defined by L∗ := {{ε} ∪ L ∪ LL ∪ . . .}, where
LL = {uv : u, v ∈ L}. Thus, the set E∗ contains all strings consisting of members
of the alphabet E. For any L ⊆ E∗, the set L, called the prefix-closure, contains the
set of all prefixes of all strings in L and is defined by L := {s ∈ E∗ : st ∈ L}. Since t
could be the empty string in the previous definition, it follows that L ⊆ L. If L = L,
we call L prefix-closed.
The transition function f of an automaton can be extended to strings (rather
than only events) by defining f(x, ε) := x and f(x, se) := f(f(x, s), e), for any string
s ∈ E∗. This allows us to define the language and marked language of an automaton
G as:
L(G) := {s ∈ E∗ : f(x0, s) is defined} (language of G)
Lm(G) := {s ∈ L(G) : f(x0, s) ∈ Xm} (marked language of G)
From the above definitions, it follows that L(G) = L(G) and that Lm(G) ⊆ L(G).
An automaton is blocking if Lm(G) ⊂ L(G). Informally, this means there exist
strings in G that cannot be extended to form a marked string in G. Mathematically,
∃s ∈ L(G) : (@t ∈ E∗) s.t. st ∈ Lm(G). conversely, an automaton is non-blocking if
Lm(G) = L(G).
The remainder of this section will deal with problems in DES related to either
partial observability (i.e., in the presence of events whose occurrence is not observ-
able), or partial controllability (i.e., in the presence of events whose occurrence is not
controllable).
Given some set of events E, there may be some events in E that cannot be
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observed. In this case, the set E is partitioned as E = Eo ∪ Euo, Eo ∩ Euo = ∅,
where Eo is the set of events that are observable and Euo is the set of events that
are unobservable. In this case, the occurrence of some string s ∈ L(G) will result
in the observance of the string P (s), called the projection of s, where the function
P : E∗ → E∗o is defined by:
P (ε) := ε
P (e) :=
 e if e ∈ Eoε if e /∈ Eo
P (se) := P (s)P (e)
Intuitively, the projection P acts as a filter, leaving only those events that are in
Eo. We can also define the inverse projection P
−1 : E∗o → 2E∗ by P−1(t) = {s ∈ E∗ :
P (s) = t}.
Given some automaton G = (X,E, f, x0) (i.e., without a set of marked states
defined), and a partition of E into E = Eo ∪ Euo, Eo ∩ Euo = ∅, we may wish
to determine when some significant event ef ∈ Euo has occurred. This is called
the diagnosability problem, or the fault diagnosability problem (if ef represents the
occurrence of a faulty or abnormal event). Let Lf be defined as the set of strings in
the language of G in which the event ef has occurred. That is, Lf := {s ∈ L(G) : s =
s1efs2} . Given some observed string t ∈ E∗o , we can determine that ef has occurred if
P−1(t)∩L(G) ⊆ Lf and we can determine that ef has not occurred if P−1(t)∩Lf =
∅. If neither condition is satisfied, then we cannot make any determination. The
standard diagnosability problem requires only that we “eventually” be able to make
the determination.
Definition I.2 (Diagnosability). Given automaton G = (X,E, f, x0) with observable
event set Eo ⊆ E, the unobservable event ef ∈ Euo = E \ Eo is not diagnosable with
6
respect to L(G) if it is possible to find strings sY , sN ∈ L(G) satisfying the following
three conditions:
1. sY contains ef and sN does not
2. sY is of arbitrarily long length after ef
3. P (sY ) = P (sN).
Given automaton G = (X,E, f, x0), the problem of finding a minimal set Eo ⊆ E
of observable events such that unobservable event ef is diagnosable with respect
to L(G) is called the static sensor selection problem for diagnosability. The first
problem that this thesis will address is the dynamic sensor selection problem for K-
diagnosability (the meanings of dynamic and K-diagnosability will be explained in
Sec. 1.2.1).
Next, we describe the supervisory control problem in DES. Once again, we begin
with an automaton G = (X,E, f, x0, Xm) and a partition on the set of events E =
Ec ∪ Euc with Ec ∩ Euc = ∅. This time, however, Ec and Euc represent controlled
and uncontrolled events. A controlled event can be disabled to prevent undesired
behavior; an uncontrolled event can never be disabled. A supervisor in DES is a
function S : L(G) → 2E which chooses which events to enable (i.e., allow to occur)
after each string in L(G). The supervisor only chooses which events can occur, not
which event will occur. We call S/G the automaton G under the control of S. The
language generated by S/G is denoted by L(S/G) and defined as follows:
1. ε ∈ L(S/G)
2. [(s ∈ L(S/G)) and (sσ ∈ L(G)) and σ ∈ S(s)]⇔ [sσ ∈ L(S/G)]
The language marked by S/G is defined by Lm(S/G) = L(S/G) ∩ Lm(G). The
supervisory control problem in DES consists of finding a supervisor S such that
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L(S/G) ⊆ La ⊆ L(G) and/or Lm(S/G) ⊆ Lam ⊆ Lm(G), where La and/or Lam is
called the specification of the system. In the case of La, it represents the system’s
legal behavior in the sense that S must disable any string outside of La. Lam may
similarly be interpreted as the legal marked behavior. Next, we define what it means
for a language to be controllable.
Definition I.3 (Controllability). Given a prefix closed language M = M over event
set E and a subset of uncontrollable events Euc ⊆ E, language K is called controllable
with respect to M and Euc if:
KEuc ∩M ⊆ K.
In words, the above definition means that if some string s ∈ K (s is legal) can be
extended by uncontrollable event e ∈ Euc (e cannot be disabled), and string se ∈ M
(se is possible), then we should also have se ∈ K (se is legal). If we take M = L(G)
and K = La then we obtain that La is controllable with respect to L(G) and Euc if
the extension of any string s ∈ La by an uncontrollable event e ∈ Euc that is also
feasible (se ∈ L(G)) results in a string that is also in La (se ∈ La). The controllability
property is used in the following theorem.
Theorem I.4 (Controllability Theorem). Given automaton G = (X,E, f, x0, Xm),
uncontrollable event set Euc ⊆ E, and specification K ⊆ L(G), there exists a super-
visor S such that L(S/G) = K if and only if K satisfies the controllability condition.
If the controllability condition is not satisfied, then we instead seek a supervisor
S that achieves as much of K as possible without allowing any strings outside of
K. Specifically, we seek to find a language Kcon ⊆ K satisfying the following two
properties:
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1. KconEuc ∩ L(G) ⊆ Kcon (i.e., Kcon is controllable).
2. Given any K ′con ⊆ K satisfying K ′conEuc ∩ L(G) ⊆ K ′con, we have the inclusion
Kcon ⊇ K ′con.
In words, we would like to find a sublanguage of K that is controllable and supre-
mal, in the sense that it contains all other controllable sublanguages of K. Since set
inclusion does not induce a total order over sublanguages of K, it is not obvious that
a solution will always exist. It can be shown, however, that a solution to the problem
does indeed always exist. The key to proving this is showing that controllability is
preserved under union. This solution is called the supremal controllable sublanguage
of K with respect to uncontrollable event set Euc and language L(G) and is denoted by
K↑C . This language appears in the solution to the basic supervisory control problem
(BSCP), presented below:
Problem I.5 (BSCP: Basic Supervisory Control Problem). Given automaton G =
(X,E, f, x0, Xm), uncontrollable event set Euc ⊆ E, and specification La = La ⊆
L(G), find a supervisor S such that:
1. L(S/G) ⊆ La
2. Given any other supervisor S ′ satisfying L(S ′/G) ⊆ La, we have the inclusion
L(S/G) ⊇ L(S ′/G).
Condition 2 above is often referred to as maximal permissiveness. The solution to
problem BSCP is to choose S such that L(S/G) = L↑Ca .
If we would like the supervisor S to be non-blocking (i.e., L(S/G) = Lm(S/G)),
then we must use the following theorem instead.
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Theorem I.6 (Non-Blocking Controllability Theorem). Given automaton G = (X,E, f, x0, Xm),
uncontrollable event set Euc ⊆ E, and specification K ⊆ L(G), there exists a non-
blocking supervisor S such that Lm(S/G) = K and L(S/G) = K if and only if K
satisfies the two conditions:
1. Controllability: KEuc ∩ L(G) ⊆ K
2. Lm(G)-closure: K = K ∩ Lm(G).
Suppose that there exists some automaton H such that Lm(H) = K and L(H) =
K. If we interpret K as the legal specification and K as the legal marked specification,
then the Lm(G)-closure condition can be seen as one of consistency. It means that
any string s in both K (legal specification) and L(G) (feasible behavior) should either
be marked in both L(H) and L(G) or not marked in either.
As before, if we are given a non-controllable legal marked specification Lam ⊆
Lm(G) then we can instead try to find a maximally permissive non-blocking supervi-
sor:
Problem I.7 (BSCP-NB: Basic Supervisory Control Problem - Nonblocking Case).
Given automaton G = (X,E, f, x0, Xm), uncontrollable event set Euc ⊆ E, and
Lm(G)-closed specification Lam ⊆ Lm(G), find a non-blocking supervisor S such
that:
1. Lm(S/G) ⊆ Lam
2. Given any other non-blocking supervisor S ′ satisfying Lm(S ′/G) ⊆ Lam, we
have the inclusion Lm(S/G) ⊇ Lm(S ′/G).
The solution to problem BSCP-NB is to choose S such that L(S/G) = L↑Cam and
Lm(S/G) = L↑Cam.
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1.2 Problem Descriptions
This section describes the two problems under consideration in this thesis. Section
1.2.1 describes the dynamic diagnosability problem in discrete event systems and Sec.
1.2.2 describes the vehicular control problem. Section 1.2.3 briefly outlines similarities
and differences between the two problems.
1.2.1 Dynamic Diagnosability
Recall the definition of diagnosability from Def. I.2. As stated in section 1.1,
the static sensor selection problem in this context consists of finding a minimal set
of sensors Eo ⊆ E such that some fault event ef ∈ E is diagnosable in the language
of some automaton G. This problem can be extended to the dynamic case in which
sensors may be activated and deactivated after each observation by the system. In this
work, we are concerned with characterizing the entire set of solutions to the problem.
Informally, a control decision at any time consists of a set of sensors to monitor. Once
a control decision is made, the system enters a waiting state, “waking up” from this
state upon the occurrence of an event that it has chosen to monitor, referred to as
an observation. A new control decision may be made at this point, after which the
system enters a waiting state again, and so on. If we denote the sequence of control
decisions by C0, C1, . . . and the sequence of observations by e0, e1, . . . then, placing
these in chronological order, we obtain an alternating sequence C0, e0, C1, e1, . . .. A
sequence of this form with n control decisions and n observations is called a history,
or run of length n. In the most general sense, a dynamic controller is a function
C : R→ 2E, where R is the set of runs, E is the set of events, and C(ρ) = γ signifies
that the controller chooses to monitor (i.e., activates sensors for) the set of events
γ ⊆ E after run ρ ∈ R. A controller is called safe if it maintains the K-diagnosability
property throughout system operation. Informally, this means the controller must
diagnose the occurrence of any fault within K + 1 events after a fault. A formal
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definition is given below, after defining the controller induced projection.
For a static set of observable events, the string that is observed upon the occur-
rence of execution s is the projection P (s). In the dynamic sensor activation problem,
the set of observable events changes through the system’s execution in a way that
depends on controller C. Therefore, we use the notation PC(s) rather than P (s) to
denote the observed string, in order to emphasize the dependence on the controller
C. Given some string of events s and controller C, we can iterate through the events
of s until we find an event e0 ∈ C0 = C(ε), where ε denotes the empty history. The
event e0 will be the first event observed in the string s. The next set of events to
monitor will be C1 = C((C0, e0)). We can then continue to iterate through the events
of s (from where we left off), until we find event e1 ∈ C1, and so on. See Def. II.3 for
a formal definition of the controller induced projection PC(·). The K-diagnosability
property is formally defined below. Also see Fig. 1.1 for an example.
Definition I.8 (Dynamic K-Diagnosability). Given automaton G = (X,E, f, x0)
and controller C : R→ 2E which chooses which events to monitor after each possible
run ρ = (C0, e0, . . . , Cn−1, en−1), the unobservable event ef ∈ E is not diagnosable
with respect to L(G) if it is possible to find strings sY , sN ∈ L(G) satisfying the
following three conditions:
1. sY contains ef and sN does not
2. sY is of length at least K + 1 after ef
3. PC(sY ) = PC(sN)
For a fixed automaton G = (X,E, f, x0) and fault event ef ∈ E, controller C
is called safe if it satisfies the K-diagnosability property through any execution of
the system (i.e., if there do not exist sN and sY satisfying the three conditions of
Def. I.8 for controller C). Individual control decisions are called safe if they allow
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(a) A 1-Diagnosable System (b) A 2-Diagnosable System
Figure 1.1: In the above examples, f is a fault event and all other events are ob-
servable. Left: A system that is 1-Diagnosable. Right: A system that
2-Diagnosable but not 1-Diagnosable.
for the K-diagnosability property to be maintained through some future sequence of
(run-dependent) control decisions.
This work has three goals:
1. To characterize the set of all safe controllers in some finite-sized structure
2. To efficiently compute the set of safe control decisions after any given run
3. To minimize the size of the structure in the first goal and the running times of
algorithms for computing safe controllers and safe control decisions.
1.2.2 Vehicle Control
The vehicle control problem consists of finding controllers to safely coordinate a
number vehicles across an intersection. Vehicles drive on multiple roads, all leading to
a central intersection. We assume that vehicles maintain a strictly positive velocity at
all times. Given a set of vehicles N = {1, . . . , n} and a set of roads R = {1, . . . ,m},
vehicle i ∈ N enters the intersection on road ri,1 and exits the intersection on road
ri,2. For any road r ∈ R, the portion of the road that is inside the intersection has
size αr. If we denote vehicle i’s position by xi then vehicle i enters the intersection on
road ri,1 when xi = −αri,1 , switches instantaneously from road ri,1 to road ri,2 when
xi = 0, and exits the intersection when xi = αri,2 . See Fig. 3.2 for a depiction of the
vehicle control problem. The safety criteria are defined as follows:
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1. Vehicles on the same road must maintain a minimal distance of at least γ at all
times.
2. Vehicles on different roads cannot simultaneously be in the intersection.
Note that the first safety criterion implies that passing of one vehicle by another
on the road is not allowed. The set of all vehicle positions that do not satisfy both
safety criteria is called the bad set, denoted by B.
If we take x ∈ X to be the vector of vehicle positions and v to be the applied
control, then the dynamics of the system are given by the first order model x˙ = v+d,
where d is a disturbance with known bounds representing unmodelled dynamics. That
is, d ∈ D = [dmin, dmax]n at all times. It is assumed that the set V is discretized by
some parameter µ ∈ R+. That is, each v ∈ V is a vector whose components are each
members of some finite set {µa, µ(a+ 1), . . . µb}, for some a, b ∈ N.
Additionally, we assume that a subset of the vehicles are uncontrolled. Their
available control actions are the same as for the other vehicles, but their behaviour is
inherently uncontrollable. We do not make any assumptions on the behaviour of these
vehicles. As such, it is not even possible to affect their behaviour indirectly through
those vehicles that are controllable. Thus, collisions involving two uncontrolled vehi-
cles do not count as a failure of the controller to enforce safety. In chapter III, we
assume that vehicle positions are measured perfectly. In chapter IV, we assume that
vehicle positions are measured with a maximal error of emax ∈ R+.
As in the dynamic diagnosability problem, we seek the set of all solutions rather
than one particular solution. Thus, we wish to obtain a supervisor σ : X → 2Vc
(σ : 2X → 2Vc in the case of imperfect measurement) which determines a set of
velocities the controlled vehicles are allowed to take rather than which precise velocity
they will take. The supervisor σ should satisfy three conditions:
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1. Safety: If the controlled vehicles choose control actions allowed by σ at each
state x, the system avoids the bad set, no matter what happens with the un-
controlled vehicles or the disturbance
2. Non-blockingness: If σ(x(0)) is non-empty, then the vehicles must eventually
cross the intersection, never reaching any state x where σ(x) = ∅
3. Maximal Permissiveness: The supervisor allows any action that can not even-
tually cause a violation of safety or non-blockingness.
Ideally, we would be able to solve the problem as defined. In practice, the domain
over which the supervisor is defined is the continuous set X, which is uncountably
infinite. Thus, instead of trying to find a maximally permissive solution over an un-
countably infinite domain, we reduce the domain by a suitable discretization in space
and time, to obtain a DES. This means restricting the space of possible supervisors
σ. Since the maximally permissive criterion for σ is defined relative to the domain of
possible supervisors, restricting the space of possible supervisors to some set Σ will
mean that the obtained solution σ will not be maximally permissive in the original,
continuous-time, continuous space domain.
This work has three goals:
1. To construct a suitable DES abstraction of the original system
2. To translate solution requirements and specifications from the continuous level
to the DES level, solve at the DES level, and translate back
3. To characterize the class of supervisors over which the obtained supervisor is
maximally permissive.
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1.2.3 Problem Comparison
Both of the problems worked on in this thesis are discrete event system control
problems: the dynamic diagnosability problem is formulated in discrete event systems
terminology whereas the vehicle control problem is solved by discretization in space
and time, resulting in a discrete event system abstraction (see Sec. 1.4.2). The two
problems are also similar in the sense that a maximally permissive solution is sought
to both. In the vehicle control problem, a maximally permissive solution is sought
so as to restrict the behavior of the vehicles as little as possible. In the dynamic
diagnosability problem, a maximally permissive solution can be used as a first step
to obtaining an optimal solution (according to some cost criterion) or simply a min-
imal solution in the sense of set inclusion (i.e., a Pareto optimal solution). Finally,
both problems can be formulated as supervisory control problems in discrete event
systems. In the dynamic diagnosability problem, the maximally permissive solution
(the most permissive observer) can be obtained as the automaton that marks the
supremal controllable sublanguage of the total observer (a structure that contains all
possible controllers, including those which are not safe) with respect to a particular
specification. In practice, however, the problem will be solved through a different
method that allows for faster computation. In the vehicle control problem, formula-
tion as a supervisory control problem is the chosen solution method (see Sec. 1.4.2).
Much of the work there focuses on translating safety requirements to the discrete
event level, on obtaining efficient algorithms for computing the supremal controllable
sublanguage, and on defining the class of supervisors in which the obtained supervisor
is maximally permissive.
16
1.3 Related Literature
1.3.1 Dynamic Diagnosability
The original definition of diagnosability is from Sampath et al. (1995). Related
literature in the context of static sensor selection problems in discrete event sys-
tems include e.g., Haji-Valizadeh and Loparo (1996), Jiang et al. (2003) and Yoo
and Lafortune (2002). The sensor selection problem is of particularly great impor-
tance in wireless sensor networks due to energy limitations. For a survey of work in
this domain, see Rowaihy et al. (2007). See Zaytoon and Sayed Mouchaweh (2012)
for a survey of works that consider the problem of dynamic sensor selection under
some diagnosability constraint in discrete event systems. It was shown in Yoo and
Lafortune (2002) that finding a minimal observable event set such that the diagnos-
ability property holds is an NP-complete problem. The same was shown for the DES
properties of normality and observability, properties relevant to supervisory control
of DESs. This work is most similar to that of Thorsley and Teneketzis (2007) and
Cassez and Tripakis (2008), both of which have considered the problem of dynamic
diagnosability.
In Thorsley and Teneketzis (2007), the optimal dynamic diagnosability problem
is considered for each of: acyclic timed automata, acyclic untimed automata, and
general untimed automata. In each case, the goal is to find an optimal controller ac-
cording to a cost function on sensor activations. Both the logical and stochastic cases
are considered. A solution is obtained by first defining an appropriate information
state and then using dynamic programming to obtain an optimal solution.
In Cassez et al. (2007a), the solution concept of most permissive observer (MPO)
is introduced, which the authors use as a basis for optimization according to a non-
discounted numerical cost criterion in Cassez et al. (2007b); Cassez and Tripakis
(2008). Instead of an information state based approach, the authors use results from
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game theory (particularly safety games) and games on graphs. The same approach
is also applied to the problem of opacity in Cassez et al. (2009).
Another paper that considers the dynamic diagnosability problem is Wang et al.
(2010). That paper first defines feasible and implementable controllers over language
based partitions and then proceeds to define a paricular class of language based
partitions called window partitions. The paper provides an algorithm for obtaining
minimal solutions to both the centralized and distributed dynamic diagnosability
problems, where minimality is defined over the space of feasible and implementable
controllers for a particular window partition. Better solutions can be obtained by
taking finer partitions, at the cost of additional computation time.
We also mention Wang et al. (2009), which defines the state disambiguation prob-
lem and the extended specification, both used in this work. They provide an algorithm
for solving the minimal sensor activation problem on-line. Other than diagnosability,
it has also been shown that the property of observability can be mapped to state
disambiguation in Wang et al. (2007). Earlier versions of the results presented in
Chapter II appear in Dallal and Lafortune (2010, 2011a,b).
1.3.2 Vehicle Control
Three common approaches to the problem of vehicle control include: the com-
putation of maximally controlled invariant sets; mapping the problem to that of
scheduling; and abstraction/symbolic models. Among approaches falling in the first
category include, e.g., (Hafner and Del Vecchio, 2011; Verma and Del Vecchio, 2011).
By explicitly computing the capture set, or set of states from which it is not possible
to guarantee avoidance of the unsafe states, these approaches naturally satisfy safety,
non-deadlockingness and maximal permissiveness, and can deal with sources of un-
controllability and also with measurement uncertainty. However, such approaches
typically make assumptions such as convexity or order preserving dynamics, without
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which they do not scale well to systems with multiple dimensions. See also (Tomlin
et al., 2003) for an example involving a flight management system. Scheduling ap-
proaches work by allocating time intervals during which the vehicles can be inside
the intersection.
The scheduling problem is generally NP-hard but takes polynomial time in the
special case where all jobs require the same processing time. Reducing the vehicle
control problem to the polynomial-time scheduling case amounts to either an as-
sumption of certain symmetries in the vehicle control problem set-up, or a problem
relaxation where such symmetries are not satisfied. Approaches in this category in-
clude (Colombo and Del Vecchio, 2012), its extension to the case of dynamics with
disturbances, (Bruni et al., 2013), and its extension to the case of uncontrolled vehi-
cles, Ahn et al. (2014). To our knowledge, these methods have not been extended to
the case of measurement uncertainty. Furthermore, the assumption of mutual exclu-
siveness of the intersection’s use is restrictive, as it precludes vehicles on common or
non-intersecting trajectories (e.g., in the case of right turns) from utilizing the inter-
section simultaneously. Another approach is to pre-compute fail-safe maneuvers as in
(Kowshik et al., 2011), or evasion plans as in (Au et al., 2012). These last approaches
deal with some types of environmental uncertainty, but do not guarantee maximal
permissiveness.
Finally, abstraction based methods work by mapping the continuous system model
and specifications to a finite model and solving for a supervisor on the finite model,
in such a way that the obtained supervisor can be used on the original (continuous)
system, while preserving safety and non-deadlocking properties. Work in this domain
includes (Alur et al., 2000; Daws and Tripakis , 1998) in the context of verification /
model checking, as well as (Colombo and Del Vecchio, 2011a,b; Colombo and Girard ,
2013), which makes use of differential flatness of dynamical systems to construct ab-
stractions with provable errors bounds. Our work is most closely related to that of
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(Girard et al., 2010; Pola and Tabuada, 2009; Zamani et al., 2012; Camara et al.,
2011), which construct symbolic models that satisfy simulation or alternating simu-
lation relations with the original system. In particular, this work also makes use of
alternating simulation relations, and variations thereof.
Besides the language based specifications of supervisory control theory, system
specifications can also be formulated using temporal logics such as Linear Tempo-
ral Logic (LTL). Linear temporal logic is a language for specifying system behavior
which consists of boolean logic and a few “temporal” operators such as Next, Always,
Eventually, and Until. LTL can be used to specify allowable sequences of states in
a compact way. This approach is used in Belta et al. (2007), where the authors use
a discretization based on triangularization for the problem of robot control. In Alur
et al. (2000), the authors characterize classes of hybrid systems in which it is possible
to obtain finite discrete abstractions for the purpose of deciding formulas expressed in
LTL or Computational Tree Logic (CTL) (a temporal specification language similar
to LTL). A particular class of LTL formulas called General Reactivity (GR(1)) for-
mulas are defined in Piterman et al. (2006). These formulas place constraints on the
initial values, transitions, and goals of the system and the environment. The authors
pose the question: do the constraints on the environment imply the specifications on
the system. If so, they show that the complexity of translating the formula to an
automaton is polynomial in the size of the formula (as oppose to doubly exponential
in the general case).
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1.4 Solution Methodology & Contributions
1.4.1 Dynamic Diagnosability
Figure 1.2: A summary of the approach to the construction of the MPO. The K-
Diagnosability problem is mapped to the state disambiguation problem,
for which the extended specification is computed. An appropriate infor-
mation state is defined and the TO, containing all admissible controllers,
is constructed over the space of information states. By proving a mono-
tonicity property over the extended specification, we are able to reduce
the information state. Finally, the MPO is constructed over the space of
reduced information states, obtained as a sub-automaton of the TO, and
using the extended specification to determine the safety of control actions
and reduced information states.
Our solution methodology for the dynamic diagnosability problem is depicted in
Fig. 1.2. We begin by providing a more formal behavioral definition of the MPO, the
structure which encapsulates the set of all safe controllers. Specifically, we define the
MPO as a deterministic bipartite automaton defined over two types of states, called
Y and Z states. The MPO has transitions from Y to Z states, labelled with sensor
activation decisions in Γ = {γ ∈ 2E : Eo ⊆ γ ⊆ Eo∪Es}, and transitions from Z to Y
states, labelled with events (corresponding to observations). Now remark that a run
can be considered a string in the set (ΓE)∗. The MPO therefore maps each run to at
most one Y state. Let this mapping be denoted by the partial function ∆ : R → Y .
We say that the MPO allows controller C if, for every run ρ ∈ R such that ∆(ρ) is
defined, there is a transition from ∆(ρ) in the MPO with label C(ρ). The MPO is
characterized by the property that a controller must be safe if and only if it is allowed
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by the MPO.
With the above behavioral definition of the MPO, the remainder of the work
therefore consists of precisely defining what the set of Y and Z states is, what the
safe control actions are from any given Y state, and how to efficiently construct the
MPO. To this end, we begin by defining an appropriate notion of information state
for this problem, and let the set of such states be denoted by I. Specifically, these
information states satisfy two critical properties:
• The information state is uniquely determined by the sequence of control actions
and observations (i.e., the run).
• The set of safe control actions after any given run is uniquely determined by
the reached information state.
With these properties, we can then let Y = I, and Z = I × Γ, where Γ is the
set of feasible control actions. The reason for the definition of Z as I × Γ is that
transitions from Z states to Y states in the MPO correspond to event observations,
and the set of possible event observations is a subset of the monitored events. Thus,
any Z state must “remember” the previous control action in order to determine the
outgoing transitions from this Z state.
We proceed to define the TO, which has the same transition structure as the MPO,
but which allows all controllers, not merely the safe ones. It follows that the MPO
will be a sub-automaton of the TO. In practice, there may be information states that
cannot be produced by any run, and hence only a subset of the set of Y and Z states
will actually be reachable in the TO. Furthermore, some runs may occur only under
unsafe controllers, and hence the set of Y and Z states present in the MPO will be
smaller still. The next step, therefore, is to determine which Y and Z states (among
those in the TO) will in fact be present in the MPO. We call these remaining Y and
Z states safe.
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To determine this set of safe Y and Z states, we begin by mapping the K-
diagnosability problem to that of state disambiguation. Informally, given automaton
Gsd = (Xsd,Σ, f sd, xsd0 ) and subset of monitorable events Σ0 ⊆ Σ, the dynamic state
disambiguation problem consists of finding a dynamic controller (which also chooses
sets of events to monitor) such that it is always possible to differentiate between
pairs of states in a given specification Tspec ⊆ Xsd × Xsd. That is, the controller
ensures that the system’s information state never contains both states of some pair
(x1, x2) ∈ Tspec. We show that the K-diagnosability problem is equivalent to an ap-
propriately defined state disambiguation problem. This in turn allows us to make
use of the extended specification of the state disambiguation problem. In words, the
extended specification T espec contains all state pairs that must not be confused be-
cause such confusion would make it impossible to ensure that the system does not
confuse a pair of states in the specification Tspec, not even by turning on all available
sensors from that point onwards. We then prove that a Y or Z state is safe if and
only if satisfies the extended specification, a condition which can be verified in time
quadratic in the size of G. Using this quadratic time test, we can then construct the
MPO through a depth-first search over the states of the TO, leaving only the safe Y
and Z states in the final MPO.
Finally, we prove a monotonicity property on the extended specification that, as
a corollary, allows us to reduce the set I of information states to a smaller set of
reduced information states, without losing any information necessary for diagnosis.
Thus, the MPO can be constructed over the smaller space of reduced information
states, yielding a lower space complexity.
Our contributions are as follows. By defining the information state as we have, we
reduce the space complexity of the MPO from O(2|X|
2·K·2|E|) in Cassez and Tripakis
(2008) to O(2|X|·(K+2)2|E|). Furthermore, the monotonicity property on the extended
specification and the resulting reduction of the information state reduces this com-
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plexity to O(2|X|(K+2)|X|2|E|), yielding a complexity that is polynomial in K, rather
than exponential in K. Finally, the use of the extended specification allows for an
efficient quadratic time test for determining the safety of a control decision from any
given information state. This potentially allows for a minimal solution to be com-
puted on-line, simply by taking a minimal control decision from each information
state (all such controllers will be minimal but not all minimal controllers will have
this form).
1.4.2 Vehicle Control
Figure 1.3: A depiction of the solution method in the case of perfect measurement.
The continuous system is discretized in time and space and a DES abstrac-
tion G is defined over the discrete state space. The problem specifications
are translated to a sub-automaton H, and a supervisor for the abstracted
system is obtained by solving problem BSCP-NB. Finally, the continu-
ous domain supervisor σ is obtained from the supervisor S of the DES
domain.
Our solution methodology for the vehicle control problem in the case of perfect
measurement is depicted in Fig. 1.3. The first step consists of translating the system
model (dynamics) and specifications (safety and non-deadlockingness) to the DES
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domain. This is achieved by discretizing the continuous time system in space and
time, a technique called abstraction. We begin by discretizing the system in time
with parameter τ , so that vehicles choose control actions at times 0, τ, 2τ, . . . and
hold those control decisions for time τ . This yields the discrete time system:
xk+1 = xk + uk + δk (1.1)
with xk = x(kτ), uk = v(kτ)τ , and δk =
∫ (k+1)τ
kτ
d(t)dt. Calling U = V τ and ∆ = Dτ ,
we have that u ∈ U and δ ∈ ∆. Recall that a certain subset of the vehicles is
uncontrolled. To represent this, we write u = (uc, uuc), for any u ∈ U , where uc
is the control action of the controlled vehicles and uuc is the control action of the
uncontrolled vehicles. We also write U = Uc × Uuc, and similarly, V = Vc × Vuc.
Next, we discretize the system in space with a parameter of τµ, yielding a lattice
of states Q˜ with spacing τµ. Each continuous state x ∈ X is therefore mapped to a
discrete state q ∈ Q˜ through the function ` : X → Q˜. Fig. 1.4 depicts the real time
system operation.
As the next step, we define a DES abstraction G = (Q,E, ψ, q0, Qm) over the set
of discrete state Q˜ to capture the dynamics of the discrete time system of Eq. (1.1).
The events of G are Uc (for the actions of the controlled vehicles), Uuc (for the actions
of the uncontrolled vehicles), and W (which is a discretization of the set D and
represents the “actions” of the disturbance). The set of controllable events is Uc and
the set of uncontrollable events is Uuc ∪W . Each of these event classes forms one
of three “layers” of the transition function ψ, so that L(G) ⊆ (UcUucW )∗ (n.b.: this
requires the addition of two layers of “intermediate states”, QI1 and QI2). See Fig. 3.3
for a depiction of the transition function ψ. The transition function ψ satisfies the
property that, for any q ∈ Q˜, uc ∈ Uc, and q′ ∈ Q˜, there exist uuc ∈ Uuc and w ∈ W
such that q′ = ψ(q, ucuucw) if and only if there exist x ∈ X, δ ∈ ∆, and x′ ∈ X such
that q = `(x), q′ = `(x′), and x′ = x+u+δ, where u = (uc, uuc). Finally, Qm = {qm},
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Figure 1.4: A depiction of the real time system operation of the vehicle control system.
The state x(t) is sampled at times 0, τ, 2τ, . . ., yielding x(kτ). This sample
is then discretized through the function `(·) to a lattice point in the set
Q˜. The discrete state `(x(kτ)) is sent to the supervisor, which allows
a subset of the available control actions. One of these control actions is
chosen by the vehicles, and held for the following interval of length τ (i.e.,
a zero-order hold). Finally, the chosen control action vc, in addition to the
actions of the uncontrolled vehicles vuc and the effect of the disturbance
d determine the system trajectory.
where `(x) = qm for any x ∈ X where all the vehicles have crossed the intersection.
This completes the translation of the system model from the continuous domain
to the DES domain. The next step is to translate safety and non-deadlocking speci-
fications to the DES domain as well. To translate the safety requirement, we define
a transition from q to q′ = ψ(q, ucuucw) in G as safe if all trajectories of the continu-
ous time and space system corresponding to this discrete transition do not cross the
bad set. The translation of the non-deadlocking specification is achieved through the
DES marking: the set of marked states Qm = {qm} corresponds to the continuous
states where all the vehicles have crossed the intersection. Requiring that the DES
system be able to reach the state qm therefore implies that the vehicles will cross
the intersection in the original, continuous, domain system. We therefore define a
second automaton H, which is the sub-automaton of G containing only safe tran-
sitions. Solving problem BSCP-NB with marked legal language Lam = Lm(H), G,
and uncontrollable event set Euc = Uuc ∪W therefore yields a maximally permissive
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safe and non-deadlocking supervisor S for the DES domain problem. The continuous
domain supervisor σ is obtained from S through σ(x(kτ)) = S(`(x(kτ))), for k ∈ N,
and control actions are held for the following interval of length τ .
It remains to show that the supervisor σ will be safe, non-deadlocking, and maxi-
mally permissive. To this end, we define two types of relations between systems and
their abstractions: the state reduction and the exact state reduction. We show that,
when an abstraction is a state reduction of some initial system and the safety and
non-deadlocking specifications of the initial system are translated to the abstract do-
main as induced specifications, then the supervisor for the initial system obtained by
following the procedure of Fig. 1.3 will be safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally per-
missive among the class of memoryless supervisors, given the spatial discretization.
Furthermore, when the abstraction is an exact state reduction of the initial system,
the resulting supervisor for the initial system will be safe, non-deadlocking, and max-
imally permissive among the class of all controllers (given the spatial discretization),
not merely memoryless ones.
Finally, we show that the abstraction G is indeed a state reduction of the continu-
ous domain vehicle control system, and that the specifications given by sub-automaton
H are in fact the induced safety and non-deadlocking specifications. Thus, we can in-
voke the preceding theorem to show that the obtained continuous domain supervisor
σ is indeed safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally permissive. Furthermore, we also
show that, when the bounds dmin and dmax on the disturbance are integer multiples
of µ (recall that µ is the discretization parameter for the velocities V ), then G is an
exact state reduction of the continuous domain vehicle control system.
We now turn attention to the case of imperfect measurement. Our solution
methodology for this case is depicted in Fig. 1.5. The idea is very similar to that
of the case of perfect measurement, except that, in this case, we construct a DES
automaton that is an abstraction of the prediction-correction estimator of the con-
27
Figure 1.5: The solution method. Given the time discretized system of Eq. (1.1) with
the space discretization given by `(·), constituting system Sb, we can
construct DES G that is a state reduction of this system. Given system
Sb with measurement uncertainty given by L(·), constituting partially ob-
served system S ′b, we can construct DES G
′ that models the measurement
uncertainty of L(·) by partitioning the set of measurements X into equiv-
alence classes Λ. Given the estimator Sb of partially observed system S
′
b,
we can construct DES G that is a state estimate reduction of Sb. Fur-
thermore, when emax = kµτ/2 for some k ∈ N, G can be obtained as the
observer of G′. A DES supervisor S is then computed by solving problem
BSCP-NB, from which a continuous domain supervisor σ is obtained.
tinuous system. In this setting, the actions of the uncontrolled vehicles and of the
disturbance are not directly observed. Instead, we obtain information about them
through measurements χ, taken at times 0, τ, 2τ, . . .. Given some maximum measure-
ment error emax, we define the function L : X → 2X by:
L(χ) = [χ− 1emax, χ+ 1emax], (1.2)
where 1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn and, for any a, b ∈ Rn, [a, b] := {x ∈ Rn : ai ≤ xi ≤ bi, i =
1, . . . , n} denotes a box. Thus, for any measurement χ ∈ X, L(χ) consists of the
set of states that are consistent with measurement χ. Recall that Vuc is the set of
actions of the uncontrolled vehicles (i.e., velocities), and ∆ = Dτ is the set of possible
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disturbances for the discrete time system of Eq. (1.1). With L defined as above, we
can define a prediction-correction estimator as the two functions Ip : 2X × Vc → 2X
and Ic : 2X ×X → 2X (n.b.: X is both the set of possible vehicle positions and the
set of possible measurements), given by:
Ip(I, vc) =
⋃
x∈I
⋃
vuc∈Vuc
⋃
δ∈∆
(x+ vτ + δ) (1.3)
Ic(I, χ) = I ∩ L(χ), (1.4)
where v = (vc, vuc). Thus, if I ⊆ X is the current best estimate of the system state at
some time t and control action vc ∈ Vc is taken then Ip(I, vc) predicts the set of states
that the system could be in at time t+ τ . Similarly, if I is the current estimate of the
system’s state and measurement χ is obtained then the corrected estimate is given by
Ic(I, χ). The prediction-correction estimator given by Eqs. (1.3) and (1.4) define a
new transition system defined over state estimates. Specifically, the partial transition
function of this system is some subset of 2X × Vc × 2X , with transition (I, vc, I ′)
present in this system if there exists some χ ∈ X such that I ′ = Ic(Ip(I, vc), χ). Let
this transition system defined over state estimates be denoted by Sb. The next step
is to construct a suitable DES abstraction of Sb.
For the vehicle control problem under consideration, this is achieved by modifying
the DES abstraction G that was constructed in the case of perfect information and
then taking the observer of the modified abstraction. The DES abstraction G is
modified by partitioning the set of measurements X into a set of equivalence classes,
given the discretization function `(·). Mathematically, χ1 ≡o χ2 ⇔ `(L(χ1)) =
`(L(χ2)). Thus, two measurements are grouped in the same equivalence class if the
set of discrete states consistent with both measurements are the same. Next, we let
[χ] denote the equivalence class of measurement χ ∈ X and Λ be the set of such
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equivalence classes. The set Λ is then used as a set of discrete measurement events
for the modified abstraction G′. The set of events Λ is taken to be the first layer of
the four layer transition function ψ′ of G′, so that L(G′) ⊆ (ΛUcUucW )∗. The state
of G′ reached after any string in the set (UcUucWΛ)∗ is some element of Q˜′, which is
a copy of the set of discrete states Q˜. For any λ ∈ Λ, q ∈ Q˜, and q′ ∈ Q˜′ that is the
copy of q, we have that:
ψ′(q′, λ) :=
 q, if (∃χ ∈ X : [χ] = λ)[L(χ) ∩ `
−1(q) 6= ∅]
undefined, else
(1.5)
In words, there is a transition from the copy of q to q itself upon measurement event
λ if and only if there exists some (continuous) measurement χ whose equivalence
class is λ and some continuous state x mapping to discrete state q such that x is
consistent with χ. Intuitively, the measurement event λ can not occur when in state
q if the above condition does not hold. If the condition does hold, then the act
of measuring does not change the system’s physical state, so there is a transition
between q′ and q. Because the measurement events Λ are observed but cannot be
chosen by the system, we take these events to be observable but uncontrollable. On
the other hand, the events of uncontrolled vehicles Uuc and of the disturbance W are
not directly observed by the system, and as such are taken to be unobservable (as
well as uncontrollable). The set of control events Uc are taken to be both controllable
and observable. This is summarized in Fig. 1.6.
Finally, let G = Obs(G′), the observer of DES G′. This observer is a new automa-
ton whose states are state estimates of G′, obtained by performing a determinization
with respect to the unobservable events. Its event set is only the observable events,
namely the (controllable) events Uc and the (uncontrollable) events Λ. It can be
shown that G is effectively a prediction-correction estimator. As in the perfectly
measured case, we proceed to translate safety and non-deadlocking requirements to
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Figure 1.6: A depiction of the process by which the modified DES abstraction G′
is constructed from DES G. The set of continuous measurements X is
partitioned into a set of equivalence classes with respect to the function
`(L(·)), yielding the set of equivalence classes Λ representing measurement
events. The events of Uc are classified as controllable and observable, the
events of Uuc and W are classified as uncontrollable and unobservable,
and the events of Λ are classified as uncontrollable but observable. With
four classes of events, the language of G′ becomes L(G′) ⊆ (ΛUcUucW )∗.
the DES domain, given by a sublanguage of L(G), following which we solve prob-
lem BSCP-NB and translate the obtained supervisor S from the DES domain to the
continuous domain, yielding supervisor σ.
As before, it remains to prove that σ satisfies the safety and non-deadlocking spec-
ifications of the continuous time system, and to characterize the class of supervisors
over which σ is maximally permissive. To this end, we define the analogous versions of
the state reduction and the exact state reduction, but for the case of imperfect mea-
surement: the state estimate reduction and the exact state estimate reduction. The
analogous theorems show that, when some abstraction is a state estimate reduction of
a prediction-correction estimator, and the safety and non-deadlocking specifications
of the initial system are translated to the abstract domain as induced specifications,
then the supervisor for the initial system obtained by following the procedure of
Fig. 1.5 will be safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally permissive among the class
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of memoryless supervisors, given the spatial discretization. Furthermore, when the
abstraction is an exact state estimate reduction of the initial system, the resulting
supervisor for the initial system will be safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally permis-
sive among the class of all controllers (given the spatial discretization), not merely
memoryless ones.
Finally, we show that, when the maximal measurement error emax is an integer
multiple of µτ/2, then the observer G will indeed be a state estimate reduction of
the prediction-correction estimator Sb. Furthermore, if bounds on the disturbance
dmin and dmax are also multiples of µτ (i.e., for the same condition under which the
abstraction G of the perfectly measured case is an exact state reduction), then G will
be an exact state estimate reduction of the prediction-correction estimator Sb. On
the other hand, if emax is not an integer multiple of µτ/2, then the above procedure
does not yield a state estimate reduction. In such a case, it is still possible to obtain
an abstraction that is a state estimate reduction, but only by directly constructing
an abstraction of the prediction-correction estimator.
Our contributions are as follows. We showed how to construct DES abstractions
for systems with environmental uncertainty by discretizing the state space, using un-
controllable events to model sources of environmental uncertainty and, in the case of
imperfect measurement, using observable but uncontrollable events to model measure-
ment uncertainty. We also showed how to translate safety and marking specifications
defined over a continuous state space to the DES domain, yielding a language based
specification. Finally, we defined new relations between systems and their DES ab-
stractions, allowing for supervisors to be computed using a “abstract-solve-translate”
method and characterizing the class of supervisors over which the result will be max-
imally permissive.
32
CHAPTER II
Dynamic Diagnosability
2.1 Abstract
We consider the problem of dynamic sensor activation for fault diagnosis of dis-
crete event systems modeled by finite state automata under the constraint that any
fault must be diagnosed within no more than K + 1 events after its occurrence, a
property called K-diagnosability. We begin by defining an appropriate notion of
information state for the problem and defining dynamic versions of the projection
operator and information state evolution. We continue by showing that the problem
can be reduced to that of state disambiguation. Then we define the most permissive
observer (MPO) structure that contains all the solutions to the problem, and we prove
results showing that maintaining the K-diagnosability property is equivalent to satis-
fying the extended specification of the state disambiguation problem. We then prove
a monotonicity property of the extended specification, and show that this allows us
to reduce our information state, which in turn allows us to significantly reduce the
complexity of our solution. Putting all of our results together, we obtain a MPO
with a size complexity of O(2|X|(K + 2)|X|2|E|), compared with O(2|X|
2·K·2|E|) for the
previous approach, where X and E are respectively the sets of states and events of
the automaton to diagnose. Finally, we provide an algorithm for constructing the
most permissive observer and demonstrate its scalability through simulation.
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2.2 Introduction
The problem under consideration in this work is that of dynamic fault diagnosis
for discrete event systems modelled by finite state automata. We assume that there
are sensors capable of detecting event occurrences for a subset of the events of the
automaton model of the system. Among those events that are monitorable, it is
further assumed that there is a subset whose sensors are costly to operate. This
may be because of limited availability of energy or bandwidth, out of a desire to
minimize communication for security reasons, or for any other reason. We use the
sensor outputs and system model to diagnose past fault occurrence. In this work,
we consider the K-diagnosability property, which stipulates that the occurrence of a
fault must be determined with certainty within no more than K + 1 events after its
occurrence. It is assumed that we do not have sensors capable of detecting these fault
events directly. Thus, the structure of the problem presents a trade-off: if sensors
are turned on too infrequently, we may fail to diagnose the fault in time; if sensors
are turned on too frequently, fault diagnosis will be needlessly costly. The problem is
dynamic because we assume that sensors can be turned on or off at different points in
the system’s execution. A controller in this problem is (in the most general sense) a
function mapping histories of past sensor activations (i.e., the control decisions) and
observed events to a set of sensor activations.
Related literature in the context of static sensor selection problems in discrete
event systems include e.g., Haji-Valizadeh and Loparo (1996), Jiang et al. (2003)
and Yoo and Lafortune (2002). The sensor selection problem is of particularly great
importance in wireless sensor networks due to energy limitations. For a survey of
work in this domain, see Rowaihy et al. (2007). See Zaytoon and Sayed Mouchaweh
(2012) for a survey of works that consider the problem of dynamic sensor selection
under some diagnosability constraint in discrete event systems. In particular, we
describe Thorsley and Teneketzis (2007); Cassez and Tripakis (2008); Wang et al.
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(2010) here. In Thorsley and Teneketzis (2007), the emphasis is on finding a sin-
gle dynamic controller that solves the diagnosability problem optimally according to
a discounted numerical cost criterion. The authors use an information state based
approach in combination with dynamic programming. In Cassez et al. (2007a), the
solution concept of most permissive observer (MPO) is introduced, which the authors
use as a basis for optimization according to a non-discounted numerical cost crite-
rion in Cassez et al. (2007b); Cassez and Tripakis (2008). Instead of an information
state based approach, the authors use results from game theory (particularly saftey
games) and games on graphs. The same approach is also applied to the problem of
opacity in Cassez et al. (2009). Finally, Wang et al. (2010) considers the decentral-
ized version of the dynamic diagnosis problem. The authors use a “window-based
partition” approach to obtain polynomial time algorithms for computing solutions in
the centralized and decentralized cases.
In this work, we provide a new information state based characterization of the
MPO structure originally defined in Cassez et al. (2007a), an approach similar to
that used in Thorsley and Teneketzis (2007). We prove that our information state is
sufficient to fully determine the set of all control decisions (i.e., sensor activations) that
maintain the K-diagnosability property. Our goals in providing a new information
state based characterization of the MPO are three-fold: (i) to obtain a more readily
interpretable solution; (ii) to better study informational properties of the MPO; and
(iii) to have a method that could more easily be adapted to other dynamic optimiza-
tion problems in discrete event systems. We show that the fault diagnosis problem
under consideration can be reduced to a state disambiguation problem, which we use
to prove a number of monotonicity properties about the MPO. Notably, we show
that satisfying the K-diagnosability property is equivalent to satisfying the extended
specification of a state disambiguation problem. Finally, we prove a monotonicity
property of the extended specification, and show how this allows us to reduce our
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information state, without losing any “useful” information for the purpose of diag-
nosis. Putting these results together, we present an algorithm for constructing the
MPO. The MPO can then be used as the basis for solving an optimal dynamic sensor
activation problem, as is done in Cassez and Tripakis (2008); Cassez et al. (2007b)
or Thorsley and Teneketzis (2007).
The MPO constructed in this work improves upon that of Cassez and Tripakis
(2008) in four ways. First, by using a single automaton to track both faulty and non
faulty executions rather than the product of two automata, we obtain a space com-
plexity for our MPO that is exponential in |X|, rather than exponential in |X|2, where
X is the state space of the automaton to diagnose. Second, by defining an information
state at the outset and then introducing control decisions on these information states,
we avoid performing a determinization after introducing control decisions. This al-
lows us to obtain a space complexity for our MPO that is exponential in |E|, rather
than doubly exponential in |E|, where E is the set of events of the automaton to di-
agnose. Third, by mapping the problem to that of state disambiguation and making
use of the extended specification, we allow for an on-line construction of a minimal
solution when |E| is small. Finally, by proving a monotonicity property on the ex-
tended specification, we reduce the number of distinct information states, resulting
in an MPO that has polynomial size in K, rather than exponential in K. The final
size complexity of our MPO is O(2|X|(K + 2)|X|2|E|), compared with O(2|X|
2·K·2|E|)
in Cassez and Tripakis (2008). Preliminary versions of some of the results in this
work have appeared in Dallal and Lafortune (2010), Dallal and Lafortune (2011a),
and Dallal and Lafortune (2011b).
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In Sect. 2.3, we formally
define the problem we wish to solve. In Sect. 2.4, we provide definitions related
to our notion of information state and define the total observer, which contains all
admissible controllers. In Sect. 2.5, we present the state disambiguation problem,
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show how the K-diagnosability problem can be mapped to it, and use this mapping to
construct the most permissive observer by pruning the total observer. In Sect. 2.6, we
define the extended specification and prove that K-diagnosability is maintained if and
only if the extended specification is satisfied. In Sect. 2.7, we prove the monotonicity
property on the extended specification that allows us to reduce our information state.
In Sect. 2.8, we present an algorithm for constructing the MPO, give its running
time, and provide experimental results demonstrating the scalability of the algorithm
in practice. Finally, we conclude in Sect. 2.9. Appendix 1 contains algorithms
and their running times for computing the extended specification and the reduced
unobservable reach, which are used in the construction of the MPO. Appendix 2
contains the proofs of some results.
2.3 Problem Formulation
We begin by defining the dynamic diagnosability problem more precisely. Assume
that the system to be diagnosed is modeled by a deterministic finite state automaton.
We use the standard deterministic model that has been adopted in the literature on
supervisory control Ramadge and Wonham (1989) and diagnosis Sampath et al. (1995)
in discrete event systems. Specifically, let G = (X,E, f, x0), where X is the set of
states, E is the set of events, f : X ×E → X is a partial transition function, and x0
is the initial state. Let E∗ denote the set of all finite length strings of events in E.
The transition function f is extended from the domain X ×E to X ×E∗ recursively:
f(x, es) := f(f(x, e), s) for all s ∈ E∗. We denote by L(G, x) the set of all strings
s ∈ E∗ that can occur through f when starting from x. For brevity, we denote by
L(G) := L(G, x0) the language of the system and we define f(s) := f(x0, s) for all
s ∈ E∗. The set of events E is partitioned into four mutually exclusive categories:
E = Eo ∪ Es ∪ Euo ∪ Ef , where Eo is the set of freely monitorable events (events for
which we have zero cost sensors), Es is the set of costly monitorable events (events
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for which we have costly sensors), Euo is the set of non-faulty unobservable events
(non-faulty events for which we do not have sensors), and Ef = {ef} contains the
fault event whose occurrence we would like to diagnose. The generalization of the
results to the case of multiple fault events and / or types is straightforward.
Our goal is to dynamically diagnose the occurrence of the fault event ef within
no more than K + 1 events after the occurrence of the fault. Note that this is K + 1
events of any kind, whether we can observe the events or not. This is referred to as
the K-diagnosability property. A controller for this problem is a function that chooses
a set of events to monitor. This set of events remains fixed until an observation is
made, at which point a new set of events to monitor can be chosen (i.e., a new control
decision). This naturally produces an alternating sequence of control decisions and
event observations, which we call a run (Def. II.1); these runs constitute the domain
for controllers (Def. II.2). With these definitions, we can define a function mapping
executions to observations (Def. II.3) and hence formally define the K-diagnosability
property (Def. II.4). We end this section by defining the problem we wish to solve
(Prob. II.5).
Definition II.1 (Run). A run ρ of length n is defined as a sequence C0, e0, . . . , Cn−1, en−1
of control decisions or sensor activations (the Ci’s, which are subsets of events to
monitor) and observed events (the ei’s). Since the events are observed, they must
be among the monitored events. That is, ei ∈ Ci, for all i = 0, . . . , n − 1. On the
other hand, the strict alternation of control decisions and observed events reflects the
assumption that control decisions are only changed upon the observance of an event.
Denote by Rn the set of runs of length n and by R =
⋃∞
n=0Rn the set of all runs.
Finally, let ρ(k) = C0, e0, . . . , Ck−1, ek−1 denote the subsequence of ρ of length k.
Definition II.2 (Admissible Controller). Let Γ = {γ ∈ 2E : Eo ⊆ γ ⊆ Eo ∪ Es} be
defined as the set of admissible control decisions (i.e., Γ is the set of control decisions
that monitor all events in Eo and no events in Euo or Ef ). Then a controller is defined
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as any function C : R→ Γ from runs to admissible control decisions.
For a fixed set of monitored events, it is a trivial task to define the projection of
a string. When the set of monitored events changes dynamically along the string’s
execution, in a way that depends on the particular controller C, it is necessary to
define a controller induced projection.
Definition II.3 (Controller Induced Projection). Given a controller C, we define
PC(ρ, s) as the string t that is observed when string s occurs after run ρ (the projection
t does not include the observed events of ρ). This can be computed as follows:
PC(ρ, ε) := ε
PC(ρ, e) :=
 e if e ∈ C(ρ)ε if e /∈ C(ρ)
PC(ρ, es) :=
 e.[PC(ρ.C(ρ).e, s)] if e ∈ C(ρ)PC(ρ, s) if e /∈ C(ρ)
(2.1)
For the last case, the first argument of PC must be updated with the new run. If
the event e is not observed then the run does not change. If e is observed, then
we produce the new run by concatenating the last control decision and the observed
event to ρ. For brevity, we define PC(s) := PC(ρ0, s), where ρ0 is the empty run (i.e.,
the unique element of R0).
We also define the (static) natural projection P : E∗ → (Eo∪Es)∗ in the usual way.
Equivalently, we can write P (s) = PCall(s), with Call defined by Call(ρ) = Eo ∪ Es,
for all ρ ∈ R. That is, Call is the controller that always monitors all available sensors
and P (s) is the projection induced by this controller. We can now formally define
the K-Diagnosability property.
Definition II.4 (K-Diagnosability). We recall the standard definition of diagnosabil-
ity from Sampath et al. (1995). Adapted for a fixed K and the context of a dynamic
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observer, we say that a system G is K-diagnosable given controller C if there do not
exist a pair of strings sY , sN ∈ L(G) such that the following three conditions are
satisfied:
1. sY has an occurrence of the fault event ef and sN does not.
2. sY has at least K + 1 events after the fault event ef .
3. PC(sY ) = PC(sN), that is, the observed string of events is identical given the
controller.
We also say that a system G is K-diagnosable if there exists a controller C such that
G is K-diagnosable given controller C. We call such a controller safe.
We now formally define the problem we wish to solve. The following problem def-
inition is an adaptation of the behavioural definition of the most permissive observer
found in Cassez and Tripakis (2008).
Problem II.5 (Behavioral Definition of the Most Permissive Observer). We would
like to find a deterministic bipartite automaton MPO = (Y ∪Z,Γ∪E, hY Z ∪hZY , y0)
satisfying the following properties:
1. Control decisions are made from Y states: hY Z ⊆ Y × Γ× Z.
2. Observations are made from Z states: hZY ⊆ Z×E×Y and, for any z ∈ Z and
e ∈ E, hZY (z, e) is defined if and only if there exists some y ∈ Y and γ ∈ Γ such
that hY Z(y, γ) = z and e ∈ γ. This means that, if z ∈ Z was reached through
monitoring decision γ from a previous Y state, then there exists an outgoing
transition from z with label e for each e ∈ γ.
With MPO’s transition function defined in this way, we can map any run ρ ∈ R to at
most one Y state (the converse need not hold). Let the partial function ∆ : R → Y
represent this mapping and define ∆(ρ0) = y0, where ρ0 is the empty run. We say
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that controller C is allowed by MPO if, for all ρ ∈ R such that ∆(ρ) is defined,
we have that hY Z(∆(ρ), C(ρ)) is defined. Notice from property 2) that, if ∆(ρ) is
defined and hY Z(∆(ρ), γ) is also defined, then ∆(ρ.γ.e) will be defined for all e ∈ γ,
and will satisfy ∆(ρ.γ.e) = hZY (hY Z(∆(ρ), γ), e). From this observation and the fact
that ∆(ρ0) is defined, it follows by induction that any controller C allowed by MPO
will never produce a run ρ such that ∆(ρ) is undefined. The last property of MPO
is therefore as follows:
3. MPO contains exactly the safe controllers: C is allowed by MPO ⇔ C is
safe.
Such a structure clearly exists. In the worst case, we use a distinct Y state for
every possible run in R (in which case ∆ will be invertible) and define a transition for
hY Z(y, γ) if and only if there exists some safe controller C such that C(∆
−1(y)) = γ.
Defining MPO in this way will result in an infinite structure, however. A procedure
for obtaining a finite MPO is given in Cassez and Tripakis (2008) and thus the goal
of this work is to make use of structural properties of the problem to find a more
compact structure that still satisfies all of these properties.
2.4 Towards an Information State
Finding a compact structure for the solution to Problem II.5 requires us to reduce
the infinite domain of runs to some finite domain. Hence, the first step is to define
an appropriate information state that summarizes the information of the run. We
begin by defining the augmented state, augmented transition function, and augmented
automaton. Note that the augmented state used here was previously defined in Cassez
and Tripakis (2008). This work differs in that we do not synchronize these states with
those of a copy of the plant with fault events removed. As a consequence, we obtain a
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size and time complexity for constructing the MPO that is exponential in |X| rather
than exponential in |X|2.
Define the augmented state as a pair (x, n) ∈ X × {−1, 0, 1, . . .}, where, n repre-
sents a “count” of the number of events (of all kinds) that have occurred since a first
fault event occurred, or −1 if no fault event has occurred. The set of such states is
denoted by X+ = X × {−1, 0, 1, . . .}. The initial augmented state is x+0 = (x0,−1).
For any augmented state x+ ∈ X+, we let the state and count components be denoted
by S(x+) and N(x+), respectively, so that x+ = (S(x+), N(x+)). We extend this no-
tation to sets by defining S(U) =
⋃
u∈U S(u), for any U ⊆ X+. Next, we define the
augmented transition function g : X+×E → X+ on augmented states that is induced
by the automaton G = (X,E, f, x0) and the partition of event set E. Formally, for
any u = (xu, nu) and event e, we have:
• Case 1: If nu = −1 and e 6= ef then g(u, e) = (f(xu, e),−1).
• Case 2: If nu = −1 and e = ef then g(u, e) = (f(xu, e), 0).
• Case 3: If nu ≥ 0 then g(u, e) = (f(xu, e), nu + 1).
For any U ⊆ X+, let g(U, e) = ⋃u∈U g(u, e). This definition is extended to strings
(rather than merely events) in the usual way. Also, define g(s) = g(x+0 , s) for brevity.
Finally, we define the augmented automaton as the automaton G+ = (X+, E, g, x+0 )
defined over augmented states that is induced from the original automaton G. Note
that, since there is no bound on the count component of augmented states, G+ might
not be finite in size. (In Sect. IV, we will use a trimmed version of G+ that avoids this
problem). Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show an automaton and its corresponding augmented
automaton.
Definition II.6 (Information State). An information state (IS) is a subset S ⊆ X+
of augmented states. We denote by I = 2X
+
the set of information states.
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Figure 2.1: A finite state automaton with fault event f .
Figure 2.2: The augmented automaton for the automaton of Fig. 2.1
Definition II.7 (Information State Based Controller). An information state based
controller (or IS-controller) is a function C : I → 2E that satisfies the two conditions
of an admissible controller (i.e., C(i) ⊇ Eo and C(i)∩(Euo∪Ef ) = ∅ for all i ∈ I).
Henceforth, controllers will be assumed to be information state based unless stated
otherwise.
With the information state defined, the next step is to construct a structure that
encapsulates all admissible controllers (safe or not), which we call the total observer.
This structure will serve as the basis from which we construct the most permissive
observer, which will contain only the safe controllers. Constructing an observer for
an automaton and a fixed set of unobservable events is a relatively simple task. To
construct the observer when the set of observable events is a dynamic control decision,
we must explicitly model the effect of the controller on the evolution of the information
state.
Definition II.8 (Total Observer). The total observer (TO) is defined as the bipartite
automaton TO = (Y ∪Z,Γ∪E, hY Z∪hZY , y0). Here, Y is the set of information states
(i.e., Y = I) and Z is the set of information states augmented with control decisions
(i.e., Z = I × Γ). We use the notation I(z) and C(z) to denote z’s information state
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and control decision components, respectively, so that z = (I(z), C(z)). The function
hY Z defines transitions from Y states to Z states, which occur when a control decision
is taken, and the function hZY defines transitions from Z states to Y states, which
occur when a monitored event occurs (i.e., an observation). Thus, the alternation
between control decisions and event observations (i.e, the run) also results in an
alternation between Y and Z states. The initial state of TO is the Y state y0 = {x+0 },
the initial information state. The transition functions hY Z and hZY are defined below.
First, z = hY Z(y, γ) defined by the unobservable reach operation:
I(z) = UR(y, γ) (2.2)
=
 v ∈ X
+ : (∃u ∈ y)(∃t ∈ (E \ γ)∗)
s.t. v = g(u, t)
 (2.3)
=
⋃
u∈y
⋃
t∈(E\γ)∗
g(u, t) (2.4)
C(z) = γ (2.5)
In words, this means that I(z) is the set of augmented states reachable from some
augmented state of the preceding Y state through some string of unmonitored events.
Next, y = hZY (z, e) for observation e ∈ C(z) is given by:
y = {v ∈ X+ : (∃u ∈ I(z)) s.t. v = g(u, e)} (2.6)
=
⋃
u∈I(z)
g(u, e) (2.7)
In words, this means that y is the set of augmented states reachable through the
single event e from some augmented state in the information state component of the
preceding Z state.
Because the total observer contains all admissible control decisions after each run
and all possible event observances after each control decision, it contains every run
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and, also, every admissible controller.
Definition II.9 (Y and Z State Controller Induced Information State Evolution).
Given a controller C, we define ISYC (y, s) to be the Y state that results from the
occurrence of string s, when starting in Y state y. This can be computed as follows:
ISYC (y, ε) := y
ISYC (y, e) :=
 hZY (hY Z(y, C(y)), e) if e ∈ C(y)y if e /∈ C(y)
ISYC (y, es) := IS
Y
C (IS
Y
C (y, e), s)
(2.8)
For brevity, we define ISYC (s) := IS
Y
C (y0, s). Also define IS
Z
C (z, s) analogously, with
ISZC (s) := IS
Z
C (z0, s) as before, where z0 = hY Z(y0, C(y0)) (which is well defined for
a fixed controller).
Definition II.10 (IS-Controller Induced Projection). We redefine the controller in-
duced projection PC(ρ, s) of Def. II.3 to PC(z, s) for IS-controllers:
PC(z, ε) := ε
PC(z, e) :=
 e if e ∈ C(z)ε if e /∈ C(z)
PC(z, es) :=
 e.[PC(z
′, s)] if e ∈ C(z)
PC(z, s) if e /∈ C(z)
where z′ = hY Z(y′, C(y′)) and y′ = hZY (z, e)
(2.9)
We define PC(s) := PC(z0, s) for brevity, as before.
Lemma II.11 (Relation between projection and information state). For any string
s and controller C, I(ISZC (s)) = {v ∈ X+ : ∃s′ s.t. PC(s) = PC(s′) ∧ v = g(s′)}.
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix 2. This lemma shows that the
information state reached by controller C upon the occurrence of string s is the set
45
of augmented states reached through strings that cannot be distinguished from s by
C.
2.5 The State Disambiguation Problem and the Most Per-
missive Observer
In this section, we show how to obtain the most permissive observer (MPO), the
structure containing all safe controllers, from the total observer. We begin by briefly
describing the state disambiguation problem and showing that the K diagnosability
property can be formulated as a state disambiguation problem. This allows us to
prove that the information state as defined is sufficient to uniquely determine the set
of safe control decisions after any given run. We then proceed to define safety of Y
and Z states and, finally, we define the MPO.
Definition II.12 (State Disambiguation Problem). The state disambiguation prob-
lem is defined as a triple 〈Gsd,Σo, Tspec〉, where Gsd = (Xsd,Σ, f sd, xsd0 ) is an automa-
ton, Σo ⊆ Σ is a set of monitorable events, and Tspec ⊆ Xsd × Xsd is a set of pairs
that must not be confused. The state disambiguation problem consists of finding a
controller C for Gsd, which chooses sensors to activate, such that the state of Gsd is
never confused between any pair of states in the specification Tspec. The controller C
is again defined as a function C : R→ 2Σo from runs to control decisions, as in Sect.
2.3. Using the notation defined in Sect. 2.3 of this work, we can define the problem
formally as that of finding a controller C such that:
s1, s2 ∈ L(Gsd) : PC(s1) = PC(s2)
⇒ (f sd(s1), f sd(s2)) /∈ Tspec .
(2.10)
To formulate the K-diagnosability problem as a state disambiguation problem,
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we specify each of Gsd, Σo, and Tspec:
• Gsd = G+K which is the augmented automaton G+, but restricted to augmented
states having counts no greater than K + 1.
• Σo = Eo∪Es is the set of monitorable events (we assume that C is an admissible
controller).
• Finally, we define Tspec as:
Tspec = {(u, v) ∈ X+ ×X+ : N(u) = −1 ∧N(v) = K + 1} . (2.11)
Comparing Defs. II.4 and II.12, we see that this state disambiguation problem can be
satisfied if and only if there do not exist two strings s1 and s2 with PC(s1) = PC(s2),
N(g(s1)) = −1, and N(g(s2)) = K + 1. Recall that N(g(s)) is equal to −1 if there
is no fault in s, and the number of events since a fault event otherwise. If we take s1
and s2 in this problem to correspond to sN and sY of Def. II.4, we see that the two
problems are identical, except for the fact that, in the definition of K-diagnosability
sY must have at least K + 1 events after a fault, whereas in Tspec the string s2 has
exactly K + 1 events after a fault. To see that this makes no difference, suppose
that there exist two strings sN and sY that violate K-diagnosability and that sY has
r > K + 1 events after a fault. Then we may simply truncate sY to obtain an s
′
Y
with exactly K + 1 events after a fault. If this shortens the projection PC(sY ), we
can truncate sN as well to obtain an s
′
N such that PC(s
′
Y ) = PC(s
′
N).
Definition II.13 (K-diagnosable binary function for information states). An in-
formation state i ∈ I violates K-diagnosability if there exist two augmented states
x+1 , x
+
2 ∈ i where x+1 = (x1,−1) and x+2 = (x2, n) for some n > K. In light of the def-
inition of Tspec, we define the K-diagnosability binary function for information states
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DI : I → {0, 1} as:
DI(i) =
 0, ∃u, v,∈ I : (u, v) ∈ Tspec1, else (2.12)
In words, DI(i) = 1 if and only if i does not violate the K-diagnosability property.
Theorem II.14 (Formulation of the K-diagnosability property through the infor-
mation state). Controller C is safe if and only if DI(I(z)) = 1, for all reachable Z
states. Mathematically:
∃s ∈ L(G) : z = ISZC (s) ∧ ∃u, v ∈ I(z)
s.t. N(u) = −1 and N(v) = K + 1
⇔ ∃sY , sN ∈ L(G) : PC(sY ) = PC(sN),
N(g(sN)) = −1 and N(g(sY )) = K + 1.
Proof. (⇐) Since unobserved events cannot change the information state, we have
that ISZC (s) = IS
Z
C (PC(s)). Thus, PC(sY ) = PC(sN) implies IS
Z
C (sY ) = IS
Z
C (sN) = z.
By definition, g(s) ∈ I(ISZC (s)), for all s. Thus, g(sN) ∈ I(ISZC (sN)) = z and
g(sY ) ∈ I(ISZC (sY )) = z as well. We may therefore take s = sY , u = g(sN), and
v = g(sY ).
(⇒) Recall from Lem. II.11 that I(ISZC (s)) = {v ∈ X+ : ∃s′ s.t. PC(s) = PC(s′)∧v =
g(s′)}. Then u, v ∈ I(z) implies that there exists s1, s2 such that PC(s1) = PC(s2) =
PC(s), u = g(s1), and v = g(s2). We simply take sN = s1 and sY = s2.
The above theorem has two consequences. First, because the safety of a controller
is dependent on the Z information states that are reached and because the possible
next Z states are determined by the current information state and control decision, it
follows that there is no loss of generality by using IS-controllers instead of run-based
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controllers. That is, any safe controller must make control decisions allowed by the
MPO (although a run-based safe controller may make a different control decision
from the same information state). The second consequence is that we have a test for
determining whether or not a particular controller is safe, in terms of the Z states
that are reachable. Specifically, they must all satisfy DI(I(z)) = 1. Mathematically,
we can write that controller C is safe if DI(I(IS
Z
C (s))) = 1, for all s ∈ L(G). A
minor additional consequence is that we can consider only Z states. This could have
been guessed from the definition of the Z state as the unobservable reach of the
preceding Y state, from which it follows that, for any y and any C(y), y ⊆ I(z) for
z = hY Z(y, C(y)).
The purpose of defining the MPO is to capture all controllers that satisfy the
K-diagnosability property. In light of the preceding theorem and the fact that we
can deterministically compute future Z states from the current Y or Z state and the
sequence of future control decisions and observed events, we see that we can speak not
only of safe controllers but also of safe information states. Specifically, we say that Y
State y is safe if it currently satisfies the K diagnosability property and there exists
some controller that maintains the K-diagnosability property for all future executions
of the system. This is formalized in the following definition:
Definition II.15 (K-diagnosibility binary functions for Y and Z states). Since we
can choose control decisions but not event occurrences, we define twoK-diagnosability
binary functions, DY : Y → {0, 1} and DZ : Z → {0, 1} (similar to DI , but for Y
and Z states) as follows:
DY (y) =

1
if DI(y) = 1
and ∃γ ∈ Γ : DZ(hY Z(y, γ)) = 1
0 else
(2.13)
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DZ(z) =

1
if DI(I(z)) = 1
and DY (hZY (z, e)) = 1 ∀e ∈ C(Z)
0 else
(2.14)
From these definitions, we can say that G is K-diagnosable if and only if DI(y0) =
1, and ∃C(y0) : DI(hY Z(y0, C(y0))) = 1, and ∃C(y0)∀e0 ∈ C(y0) : DI(hZY (hY Z(y0, C(y0)), e0)) =
1, and so forth. Put in terms of the information state evolution, we can equivalently
say that G is K-diagnosable if and only if ∃C such that ∀s ∈ L(G), DI(ISYC (s)) = 1
and DI(I(IS
Z
C (s))) = 1 (in practice, the second condition is sufficient). Thus the
alternation of existential and universal quantifiers in Def. II.15 implicitly captures
the idea that there must exist some controller such that K-diagnosability holds for
all possible strings of events. This is the same conclusion that is reached from Thm.
II.14. Note that the above definitions are akin to the controllable predecessor of game
theory, with the information states such that DI(·) = 1 playing the role of the base
set of winning states, as is done in Cassez and Tripakis (2008). We can now use the
above definition to define the safety of a control decision.
Definition II.16 (Safe Control Decision). Control decision γ is safe from Y state y
if and only if DZ(hY Z(y, γ)) = 1, since we know that there exists a future sequence
of safe control decisions in this case.
The above definition has the consequence that after any run ρ resulting in Y state
y, the set of safe control decisions is uniquely determined by the information state y.
Thus, there is no loss of generality in using information state based controllers.
Definition II.17 (Fault diagnosis binary function). Define the fault diagnosis binary
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function DF : Y → {0, 1} as follows:
DF (y) =
 1 if N(u) 6= −1, ∀u ∈ y0 else (2.15)
In words, this means that DF (y) = 1 if and only if all possible executions s ∈ L(G)
resulting in information state y had a fault occurrence. A Y state y satisfyingDF (y) =
1 is called diagnosed.
Definition II.18 (Structural Definition of the Most Permissive Observer). The most
permissive observer is defined as the trim of the total observer when removing Y
states such that DY (·) = 0 and Z states such that DZ(·) = 0. The trim operation
removes these states and all transitions involving them, as well as any states and
transitions that become unreachable from the initial state. To make this automaton
finite, we also replace any Y state such that DF (y) = 1 by a “fault detected” state
F , and make this state terminal in the sense that there are no transitions out of it
(i.e., we make no further control decisions from F ).
Theorem II.19 (Correctness of the MPO). If K <∞, then a controller C is safe if
and only if it only makes control decisions allowed by the MPO.
Proof. The contrapositive of the “only if” part of this assertion follows immediately
from Thm. II.14. To see the “if” part of the assertion, consider any string sY ∈
(E \Ef )∗EfEK+1. Since new control decisions are made only upon event observances,
at most K+1 control decisions will be made after the occurence of a fault event before
reaching a Z information state containing an augmented state with a count of K+ 1.
If all the control decisions are safe, then this information state cannot also contain
an augmented state with a count of -1, and hence the fault will be diagnosed. Thus,
if K is finite, a controller which makes only safe control decisions must reach the
fault diagnosed state within K + 1 events of a fault event occurring. From Lem.
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II.11, it follows that there does not exist any sN ∈ (E \ Ef )∗ ∩ L(G) such that
PC(sN) = PC(sY ), which proves that controller C is safe.
Thus, the MPO as defined does indeed solve Problem II.5 when K is finite. This
result was also proven in Cassez and Tripakis (2008) for their construction of the
MPO. If K is infinite, then infinite sequences of control decisions without a definitive
diagnosis after a fault event are possible. See Thorsley and Teneketzis (2007) for an
example of this. An example of the MPO is useful at this point.
Example II.20 (A simple example). Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the total and most
permissive observer for the automaton of Fig. 2.1. Note that the TO shown does
not have any transitions out of Y and Z states such that DI(·) = 0 for all finite K
and shows only states reachable from y0. We have also not shown any transitions
out of diagnosed Y states or from Z states for events that would lead to an empty
information state (e.g., there is no b transition out of Z state z3). Finally, we omit (in
both the TO and MPO) any further control decisions from any Y state from which it
is clear that no fault has occurred in the past and none can occur in the future (such
as y1).
If we take any K ≥ 2, then the removal of all Y and Z states such that DI(·) = 0
results in the removal of all states of the TO marked with a “X”, which leaves state
y2 of the TO with no safe control decisions. If we take K = 1, then DI(y2) = 0 as
well. In either case, y2 is removed, leading to the removal of z2. Intuitively, it is
initially necessary to choose to monitor event b for otherwise it will not be possible to
differentiate between the string fbatn and the string a, which means K-diagnosability
is violated for any K. Thus, it is indeed possible for a Y or Z state to satisfy DI(·) = 1
but still not be safe. It can be verified that DY (·) = 1 for all remaining Y states and
that DZ(·) = 1 for all remaining Z states. To verify that this is intuitively correct,
consider what happens after choosing to initially monitor only b and then observing
event b. At this point, it is now necessary to monitor event a, for otherwise it will not
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Figure 2.3: The total observer for the automaton of Fig. 2.1, with events classified
as follows: Eo = ∅, Es = {a, b}, Euo = {t}, and Ef = {f}.
Figure 2.4: The MPO for the automaton of Fig. 2.1, for any K ≥ 1. We used
the convention of Cassez and Tripakis (2008) by marking Y states with
squares and Z states with circles.
be possible to differentiate between the string ab and the string fbatn, which again
violates K-diagnosability for any K. Notice that we can achieve 0-diagnosability by
choosing to monitor {a, b} initially, and only 1-diagnosability if we choose to monitor
only {b}.
With the structure of the MPO defined, it remains to describe an efficient method
of constructing it. One possibility is to use the method described in Cassez and
Tripakis (2008), in which the most permissive observer is obtained as the solution of
a two player safety game where player 1 must prevent the system from reaching the
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unsafe set of states. The same method can be applied here, where the analogous
set of “unsafe states” to be avoided consists of those Y and Z states such that
DI(·) = 0. However, we will not use this method as a means of computing the
most permissive observer in this work. We will instead use the extended specification
of state disambiguation problems, which will be described in the next section.
2.6 The Extended Specification and Properties of the MPO
In this section, we present the extended specification and explain how it allows
for a simple test to determine the safety of the Y and Z states of the MPO.
Definition II.21 (Extended Specification). We repeat the definition of the extended
specification found in Wang et al. (2009):
T espec =
 (u, v) ∈ X
+ ×X+ : ∃s1, s2 s.t. P (s1) = P (s2)
and (g(u, s1), g(v, s2)) ∈ Tspec
 (2.16)
In words, the extended specification is defined as the set of all augmented state pairs
that must not be confused because even if all the sensors in Eo ∪ Es are turned on
for the rest of time, there still exists some sequence of events such that some pair in
Tspec will be confused.
Definition II.22 (Extended specification binary function for information states). In
light of the definition of T espec, we define the extended specification binary function
for information states DeI : I → {0, 1} as follows:
DeI(i) =
 0, ∃u, v,∈ I : (u, v) ∈ T
e
spec
1, else
(2.17)
In words, DeI(i) = 1 if and only if i does not violate the extended specification.
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The following theorems show how the extended specification is useful.
Lemma II.23 (Equality of projection when everything is observed is equivalent to
equality of projection under all controllers). For any two strings s1, s2 ∈ E∗ and
starting Z state z, P (s1) = P (s2)⇔ ∀C,PC(z, s1) = PC(z, s2).
Proof. (⇐) Clearly, if PC(z, s1) = P (z, s2) ∀C, then it is true for the particular con-
troller Call defined by Call(y) = Eo ∪ Es, ∀y ∈ I. But this is exactly the same as
taking the natural projection P .
(⇒) Certainly, events that can never be observed make no difference in the pro-
jection that is computed by some controller C. Thus, we may write PC(z, s1) =
PC(z, P (s1)) and PC(z, s2) = PC(z, P (s2)), from which it follows that P (s1) =
P (s2)⇒ ∀C,PC(z, s1) = PC(z, s2).
Theorem II.24 (Safety is equivalent to satisfying the extended specification for Z
states). For any Z state z, we have DZ(z) = D
e
I(I(z)). That is, a Z state is safe if
and only if it satisfies the extended specification.
Proof. Define L(G,S(I(z))) := ⋃x∈S(I(z)) L(G, x), the set of strings that can occur
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after reaching Z state z. Then:
DZ(z) = 0
⇔ ∀C, ∃s ∈ L(G,S(I(z))) :
DI(I(IS
Z
C (z, s))) = 0
Thm. II.14
⇔
∀C, ∃s ∈ L(G,S(I(z))),
∃v1, v2 ∈ I(ISZC (z, s)) :
(v1, v2) ∈ Tspec
Def. II.13
⇔
∀C, ∃s1, s2 ∈ L(G,S(I(z))),
∃u1, u2 ∈ I(z) :
PC(z, s1) = PC(z, s2),
and (g(u1, s1), g(u2, s2)) ∈ Tspec
⇔
∃s1, s2 ∈ L(G,S(I(z))),
∃u1, u2 ∈ I(z) : P (s1) = P (s2)
and (g(u1, s1), g(u2, s2)) ∈ Tspec
Lemma II.23
⇔ ∃u1, u2 ∈ I(z) : (u1, u2) ∈ T espec Def. II.21
⇔ DeI(I(z)) = 0 Def. II.22
The fourth equivalence follows in the forward direction by taking the particular con-
troller Call. In the backward direction, we have a statement of the form ∃(·) :
P (s1) = P (s2) . . . and invoke Lemma II.23 to obtain a statement of the form ∃(·),∀C :
PC(z, s1) = PC(z, s2) . . ., which implies the previous statement of the form ∀C, ∃(·) :
PC(z, s1) = PC(z, s2) . . ., since ∃∀(·) is stronger than ∀∃(·).
Note that Thm. II.24 immediately implies that the safety of a Z state is solely
dependent on its information state component, and not on its associated control
decision.
A few corollaries follow from this result.
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Corollary II.25 (Monotonicity Properties).
(i) If Z state z1 is safe then so is any Z state z2 satisfying I(z2) ⊆ I(z1).
(ii) Any control decision γ that is safe in Y state y1 is also safe in Y state y2 ⊆ y1.
(iii) If control decision γ1 is safe in Y state y, then so is any control decision γ2 ⊇ γ1.
Proof.
(i) Immediate from Thm. II.24 and Def. II.22, since I(z2) ⊆ I(z1) ⇒ DeI(I(z2)) ≥
DeI(I(z1)).
(ii) Immediate from part (i), since y2 ⊆ y1 implies I(hY Z(y2, γ)) ⊆ I(hY Z(y1, γ)).
(iii) Immediate from part (i), since γ2 ⊇ γ1 implies I(hY Z(y, γ2)) ⊆ I(hY Z(y, γ1)).
Theorem II.26 (Safety is equivalent to satisfying the extended specification for Y
states). For any Y state y, we have DY (y) = D
e
I(y). That is, a Y state is safe if and
only if it satisfies the extended specification.
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Proof.
DY (y) = 0
⇔ DI(y) = 0
or ∀γ : DZ(hY Z(y, γ)) = 0
Def. II.15
⇔ DI(y) = 0
or DZ(hY Z(y, Eo ∪ Es)) = 0
Cor. II.25 (iii)
⇔ DI(y) = 0
or DeI(I(hY Z(y, Eo ∪ Es))) = 0
Thm. II.24
⇔
DI(y) = 0
or ∃v1, v2 ∈ I(hY Z(y, Eo ∪ Es)) :
(v1, v2) ∈ T espec
Def. II.21
⇔
DI(y) = 0
or ∃u1, u2 ∈ y,
∃s1, s2 ∈ (Euo ∪ Ef )∗ :
(g(u1, s1), g(u2, s2)) ∈ T espec
⇔ DI(y) = 0
or ∃u1, u2 ∈ y : (u1, u2) ∈ T espec
Def. II.21
⇔ DeI(y) = 0 Def. II.22
The fifth equivalence follows from the definition of hY Z as the unobservable reach.
Theorems II.24 and II.26 have important implications. By making use of the ex-
tended specification, we can determine the safety of any control decision γ ∈ Γ, from
any Y state y by checking if the resulting Z state satisfies the extended specifica-
tion. That is, γ is a safe control decision from y if and only if DeI(I(hY Z(y, C(y))) =
DeI(UR(y, C(y))) = 1. This can be done in O(K|X||E|+K|X|2) time, since comput-
ing the unobservable reach can be done through a O(K|X||E|) time depth-first search
over G+K and evaluating D
e
I(·) can be done in O(K|X|2) time. Thus, we can determine
safe control decisions from any Y state y without constructing any part of the TO
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beyond the immediate successors of y. This implies that the MPO can be constructed
with a search algorithm that need only visit safe states of the TO (i.e., those that will
remain in the MPO) and their immediate successors. This results in savings in both
running time and memory and would not be the case if we were to use the algorithm
presented in Cassez and Tripakis (2008). Another important consequence of the use
of the extended specification is that, if |Es| is small, we can compute an “on the fly”
minimal solution (i.e., a safe controller C such that there does not exist any other
safe controller C ′ 6= C such that C ′(y) ⊆ C(y) for all y ∈ Y satisfying DY (y) = 1).
Clearly, any controller that makes minimal safe control decisions at each Y state is a
minimal controller (the converse is not true). Thus, it suffices to find a minimal safe
control decision at each Y state to construct a minimal controller on the fly, and this
requires time exponential in Es, but only quadratic in |X|, at each new Y state.
Example II.27 (A simple example revisited). To illustrate the use of the extended
specification, let us now revisit Ex. II.20. From the definition of Tspec, we know
that ((1,−1), (2, K + 1)) ∈ Tspec. The two strings s1 = a and s2 = atK−1 satisfy
P (s1) = P (s2), g((0,−1), s1) = (1,−1), and g((4, 1), s2) = (2, K + 1). Thus, we
have ((0,−1), (4, 1)) ∈ T espec, for any finite K > 0. If K = 0, then ((0,−1), (4, 1)) ∈
Tspec ⊆ T espec. Thus, for any finite K, ((0,−1), (4, 1)) ∈ T espec, from which it follows
that state z2 of Fig. 2.4 does not satisfy the extended specification and will not be in
the MPO. The use of the extended specification therefore allows us to construct the
MPO without exploring y2 and its four successors.
2.7 Reducing the Information State
In this section, we prove new results using a monotonicity property on the ex-
tended specification. Specifically, we use this to show that we can “reduce” our
information state. That is, we will show that, as currently defined, our information
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state carries more information than what is strictly necessary for the problem of K-
diagnosability. In order to simplify notation in what follows, we write that v′ >+ v
for augmented states v and v′ if S(v′) = S(v) and N(v′) > N(v). Let <+, ≥+, and
≤+ be similarly defined for augmented states.
Theorem II.28 (Monotonicity Property for the Extended Specification). Suppose
that (u, v) ∈ T espec. Then, for any v′ >+ v, we also have (u, v′) ∈ T espec.
Proof. Suppose that (u, v) ∈ T espec. Then:
∃s1, s2 : P (s1) = P (s2), (g(u, s1), g(v, s2)) ∈ Tspec .
We know that N(g(u, s1)) = −1 and N(g(v, s2)) = K + 1. Clearly, v′ >+ v ⇒
g(v′, s2) >+ g(v, s2). Truncate s2 to obtain s′2 such that N(g(v
′, s2)) = K + 1.
Similarly, truncate s1 to obtain s
′
1 such that P (s
′
1) = P (s
′
2). Then s
′
1 and s
′
2 satisfy
the three conditions that P (s′1) = P (s
′
2), N(g(u, s
′
1)) = −1, and N(g(v′, s′2)) = K+1,
which implies that (u, v′) ∈ T espec.
The above theorem allows us to reduce the extended specification to a |X|×|X| ta-
ble filled with elements from {−1, 0, . . . , K+1}, where an entry of n at location (x1, x2)
signifies that ((x1,−1), (x2, n)) ∈ T espec and that, for all n′ < n, ((x1,−1), (x2, n′)) /∈
T espec. We will see with the next definition and theorems that this has even more
significant consequences.
Definition II.29 (Information State Reducing Function). Define R : I → I by:
R(i) = {u ∈ i : [N(u) = −1] ∨ [@u′ ∈ i s.t. u′ >+ u]} . (2.18)
Also define the notation m(i) = {u ∈ i : N(u) = −1} and M(i) = {u ∈ i :
@u′ ∈ i s.t. u′ >+ u}, so that R(i) = m(i) ∪ M(i). Define R : Z → Z by
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R(z) = (R(I(z)), C(z)). Finally, define reduced versions of hY Z , UR, hZY :
hRY Z(y, C(y)) = R(hY Z(y, C(y))) (2.19)
RUR(y, C(y)) = R(UR(y, C(y))) (2.20)
hRZY (z, e) = R(hZY (z, e)) (2.21)
In words, R(·) reduces an information state by keeping only those augmented
states within it that have a count of -1 and, for each state in X, keeping only the
augmented state with that state component that has the highest count. As the
following corollary will show, this information is sufficient to determine the safety of
a Y or Z state.
Corollary II.30 (Reduced information state carries all necessary information in
determining safety). For any information state i ∈ I, DeI(i) = Dei (R(i)).
Proof. Obviously, R(i) ⊆ i, so that DeI(R(i)) ≥ DeI(i), ∀i ∈ I. Now suppose to the
contrary that for some i ∈ I, DeI(i) 6= Dei (R(i)). Then it must be that Dei (R(i)) = 1
and DeI(i) = 0. Thus, ∃u, v ∈ i : (u, v) ∈ T espec. Since N(u) = −1, we know that
u ∈ R(i) as well. Then it must be that v /∈ R(i). Hence N(v) 6= −1 and, since
v ∈ i but v /∈ R(i), there exists some v′ ∈ R(i) such that v′ >+ v. But by Thm.
II.28 and (u, v) ∈ T espec, we know that (u, v′) ∈ T espec, so that Dei (R(i)) = 0 also, a
contradiction.
This proves that R(·) conserves all the necessary information for determining the
safety of a Y or Z state. However, it is still possible that this “filtering out” of
information in the present could change safety properties of Y or Z states in the
future (i.e., those Y and Z states that are reachable further in the execution of the
system). The following two theorems preclude this possibility.
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Theorem II.31 (There is no loss in applying hRZY to a reduced Z state). For any Z
state z and event e ∈ C(z), hRZY (z, e) = hRZY (R(z), e).
Proof. We seek to prove thatm(hZY (z, e)) = m(hZY (R(z), e))) and thatM(hZY (z, e)) =
M(hZY (R(z), e))). From the definition of hZY , {v ∈ hZY (z, e)} =
⋃
u∈I(z) g(u, e).
Since e /∈ Ef ,
m(hZY (z, e)) =
⋃
u∈m(I(z)) g(u, e)
=
⋃
u∈m(I(R(z))) g(u, e) = m(hZY (R(z), e)).
Next, we claim that, for any i1, i2 ∈ I:
M(i1) ⊆ i2 ∧M(i2) ⊆ i1 ⇒M(i1) = M(i2) (2.22)
To see this, consider any v ∈ M(i1) ⊆ i2 and suppose that v /∈ M(i2). Then there
exists some v′ ∈M(i2) such that v′ >+ v. But M(i2) ⊆ i1, so this would imply v′ ∈ i1,
contradicting v ∈ M(i1). Thus, M(i1) ⊆ M(i2). We can prove M(i2) ⊆ M(i1) by a
symmetrical argument. Next, we claim that:
M(i1) = M(i2),
where i1 =
⋃
u∈I(z) g(u, e) and i2 =
⋃
u∈M(I(z)) g(u, e)
(2.23)
From the definition of M , it follows that M(i2) ⊆ i2 ⊆ i1. By Eq. (2.22), it therefore
suffices to prove that M(i1) ⊆ i2. Consider any v ∈ M(i1) and let u ∈ I(z) be such
that g(u, e) = v. Suppose that u /∈ M(I(z)). Then there exists some u′ ∈ I(z) such
that u′ >+ u. This in turn implies that g(u′, e) >+ g(u, e) = v, which contradicts
v ∈M(i1). It follows that u ∈M(I(z)) and hence that v = g(u, e) ∈ i2, which proves
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that M(i1) ⊆ i2. Finally, we obtain:
M(hZY (z, e))
= M
(⋃
u∈I(z) g(u, e)
)
Def. of hZY
= M
(⋃
u∈M(I(z)) g(u, e)
)
Eq. (2.23)
= M
(⋃
u∈M(I(R(z))) g(u, e)
)
Def. of M(·)
= M
(⋃
u∈I(R(z)) g(u, e)
)
Eq. (2.23)
= M(hZY (R(z), e) Def. of hZY
which completes the proof.
Theorem II.32 (There is no loss in applying hRY Z to a reduced Y state). For any Y
state y and control decision C(y), hRY Z(y, C(y)) = h
R
Y Z(R(y), C(y)).
Proof. Similar to the previous proof, except that we consider unobservable strings of
events rather than single events.
By induction, Thms. II.31 and II.32 along with Cor. II.30 show that we do
not lose any information relevant to determining safety of Y or Z states by working
solely with reduced information states. Significantly, this substantially reduces the
number of “distinct” information states. Without this reduction, the number of
information states that may be present in the MPO is 2(K+2)|X|, since there are
|{−1, 0, 1, . . . , K}| = K + 2 values for the count component of each augmented state
in the information state. For reduced information states ri, we must indicate, for
each x ∈ X, whether or not (x,−1) ∈ ri and what the maximal value of n is such
that (x, n) ∈ ri. If we use −1 to denote both the case where this maximal value is
−1 and the case when x /∈ S(ri) (where we determine which case it is by checking if
(x,−1) ∈ ri), then we obtain only 2|X| · (K+2)|X| distinct reduced information states
that may be present in the MPO. This reduces the space complexity of the MPO from
exponential in K to polynomial in K.
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Following is a second MPO example that demonstrates the usefulness of the re-
duced information state.
Example II.33 (MPO with and without reduced information state).
Figure 2.5: A finite state automaton. Events are classified as follows: Eo = ∅, Es =
{a, b}, Euo = {t}, and Ef = {f}.
Figure 2.6: The MPO corresponding to the automaton of Fig. 2.5, with K = 2, not
using reduced information states.
Consider the automaton of Fig. 2.5. The entire extended specification has |X|2 =
81 “critical values”, the minimum value of n such that ((x1,−1), (x2, n)) ∈ T espec,
for each x1, x2 ∈ X. Of these, only four actually restrict behavior: ((0,−1), (6, 0)),
((3,−1), (6, 2)), ((2,−1), (7, 0)), and ((8,−1), (8, 0)). These values can be determined
by inspection for this example, by computing longest strings with the same projection
for each pair (see Appendix 1 for details on this method for computing T espec). For
((0,−1), (6, 0)), take s1 = ba and s2 = bat∞. For ((3,−1), (6, 2)), take s1 = b and
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Figure 2.7: The MPO corresponding to the automaton of Fig. 2.5, with K = 2, using
reduced information states.
s2 = b. For ((2,−1), (7, 0)), take s1 = a and s2 = at∞. Finally, for ((8,−1), (8, 0)),
take s1 = ε and s2 = t
∞. The remaining critical values are either irrelevant because
the corresponding pair of states does not occur, or are relevant but do not require any
more events to be monitored. The MPOs without and with reduced information states
are shown in figures 2.6 and 2.7, respectively. If we choose not to monitor event a
initially, the unobservable reach will include both augmented states (0,−1) and (6, 1),
which causes a lack of K-diagnosability since ((0,−1), (6, n)) ∈ T espec for any n ≥ 0.
From Y states y1, y2, and y4, we must monitor event a since the unobservable reach
from any of these Y states would otherwise include both augmented states (3,−1)
and (6, 2), and ((3,−1), (6, n)) ∈ T espec for any n ≥ 2. From Y states y2, y3, and y4,
we must monitor event b since the unobservable reach from any of these Y states
would otherwise include both augmented states (2,−1) and one of (7, 2) or (7, 3),
and ((2,−1), (7, n)) ∈ T espec for any n ≥ 0. Finally, it is also necessary to monitor
event a from Y state y5, since the unobservable reach would otherwise include both
augmented states (8,−1) and (8, 3), and ((8,−1), (8, n)) ∈ T espec for any n ≥ 0. As
in the MPO of Ex. II.20, we omitted the portion of the MPO after which we can
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determine that no fault has occurred in the past and none can occur in the future.
We can confirm the validity of this MPO by observing that the faulty and non-
faulty languages are f(ε + b)abat∗ and (ε + b)aabt∗, respectively, whereas the faulty
and non-faulty languages of Ex. II.20 are fbat∗ and abt∗, respectively. Thus, once we
have observed a first occurrence of event a, the structure of the MPO from that point
on should be similar to the structure of the MPO in Ex. II.20. Indeed, upon observing
event a we find ourselves in one of Y states y2, y3, or y4. If we have potentially reached
an augmented state with a count of 2 (i.e., in y2 or y4), then the MPO from these
states onwards has the same structure as the MPO of Ex. II.20, but with K = 0. If,
on the other hand, at most one event has occurred after a fault (i.e., in y3), then the
MPO from this state onwards has the same structure as the MPO of Ex. II.20 (i.e.,
with K = 1).
Notice that MPO states y2 and y4 have the same reduced versions (namely (2,−1), (6, 2))
and the same structure from that point on. On the other hand, MPO state y3 is also
very similar to y2 and y4, but has a different reduced version (namely (2,−1), (6, 1))
and therefore a different structure from that point on.
2.8 Constructing the MPO
In this section, we provide an algorithm for constructing the MPO and determine
its running time. The algorithm assumes that T espec has already been computed.
An algorithm for computing T espec and its running time are given in Appendix 1.
The algorithm also makes use of a specialized algorithm for computing the reduced
unobservable reach, which has a better running time than simply computing the
unobservable reach and reducing the resulting information state. This algorithm and
its running time are also given in Appendix 1.
The basic outline of an implemented algorithm for constructing the MPO is shown
in Algorithm 1. The algorithm is based on a depth-first search (DFS). The parameter
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G represents the finite-state automaton, the parameter y is a Y state, the param-
eter Tespec is the extended specification, the parameter Γ is the set of admissible
control decisions, and the parameter MPO represents the MPO automaton, with
MPO.Y Z being its set of states and MPO.h being its transition function. Before
calling MakeMPO, it is necessary to check if G is diagnosable. If so, then the initial
call will be MakeMPO(G, y0, Tespec, Γ, MPO), with MPO.Y Z initialized to {y0}
and MPO.h initialized to the empty set.
Algorithm 1 searches through the space of Y states and, for each encountered
Y state y, checks if DF (y) = 1 (lines 2-4) and finds the safe control decisions (line
7). For each safe control decision, a transition is added from y to the next z state
(line 11). If a control decision leads to a Z state z that is already in the MPO, the
algorithm moves on to another control decision (lines 12-14). If z is not already in
the MPO, it is added to the MPO (line 15), and the algorithm enters the inner for
loop. The inner for loop considers each possible observation e ∈ γ which could occur
from z and computes the next Y state y′. If y′ is an empty information state (which
occurs if e cannot be the next observation from z), the algorithm moves on to another
event e ∈ γ (lines 18-20). Otherwise, a transition is added from z to y′ (line 21). If
y′ is non-empty and not already in the MPO, it is added to the MPO (line 23), and
the algorithm recurses on y′ (line 24). Since there is a finite number of augmented
states with count at most K + 1, there is a finite number of information states that
will be traversed and the algorithm must eventually terminate.
Theorem II.34 (Correctness of MakeMPO). Algorithm 1 correctly constructs the
MPO.
Proof. Def. II.18 defines the MPO as the accessible part of the TO after removing
the Y states such that DY (·) = 0 and the Z states such that DZ(·) = 0. It follows
that the MPO can be correctly constructed by a DFS over the TO which visits all
the remaining accessible Y and Z states. By Thm II.24, DZ(z) = D
e
I(I(z)). By Def.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for constructing the MPO
1: procedure MakeMPO(G, y, Tespec, Γ, MPO)
2: if DF(y) = true then . Fault can be diagnosed
3: return
4: end if
5: for all γ ∈ Γ do . Try all admissible control decisions
6: ur ← GetRUR(y, γ) . Get reduced unobservable reach for next z state
7: if DeI(ur, Tespec) = false then . γ is not safe from y
8: continue . Try the next admissible control decision
9: end if
10: z ← (ur, γ)
11: MPO.h←MPO.h ∪ {(y, γ, z)} . z = h(y, γ)
12: if z ∈MPO.Y Z then . z is already in MPO.Y Z
13: continue . Try the next admissible control decision
14: end if
15: MPO.Y Z ←MPO.Y Z ∪ {z} . Add z to MPO.Y Z
16: for all e ∈ γ do . Try all events
17: y′ ← Next(ur, e) . Get next reduced y state
18: if y′ = ∅ then . y′ is empty
19: continue . Try the next event
20: end if
21: MPO.h←MPO.h ∪ {(z, e, y′)} . y′ = h(z, e)
22: if y′ /∈MPO.Y Z then . y′ is not already in MPO.Y Z
23: MPO.Y Z ←MPO.Y Z ∪ {y′} . Add y′ to MPO.Y Z
24: MakeMPO(G, y′, T espec, sl, E,MPO)
25: end if
26: end for
27: end for
28: end procedure
II.15, DZ(z) = 1 implies DY (y) = 1, for all successor y states. Thus it suffices for
the DFS to visit all encountered Y and Z states other than the Z states such that
DeI(I(z)) = 0, which is precisely what Algorithm 1 does.
Proposition II.35 (Running time of MakeMPO). The running time of Algorithm 1
is in O([(2(K + 2))|X|][2|Es|][|X||E|+ |X|2]).
Proof. There are (2(K+2))|X| reduced information states. For each information state
encountered, a maximum of 2|Es| control decisions are considered. For each control
decision, we find the next Z state z, check if it satisfies the extended specification, and
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for each e ∈ C(z), find the next Y state. Finding z consists of computing the reduced
unobservable reach and can be done in O(|X||E|) time (see Appendix 1). Checking
if it satisfies the extended specification can be done in time O(|X|2). Finally, there
are at most |Eo ∪ Es| successors to z, and each takes O(|X|) time to compute since
there are at most 2|X| augmented states in reduced information state I(z), and we
must consider the occurrence of event e from each of these to compute hZY (z, e). The
total running time is therefore O([(2(K + 2))|X|][2|Es|][|X||E|+ |X|2 + |Eo ∪Es||X|]).
But |Eo ∪ Es| ≤ |E|, so this reduces to O([(2(K + 2))|X|][2|Es|][|X||E|+ |X|2]).
2.8.1 Experimental Results
We have implemented Algorithm 1 in C++ and run the program on randomly
generated automata in order to demonstrate the scalability of the algorithm. We also
created a program to generate random automata in accordance with the following
specifications, in terms of input parameters n, ny, nm, nn, py, pm, pn, and pf :
• The generated automaton will have |X| = n states, |Eo| = ny events that are
always observed, |Es| = nm events that may or may not be observed, |Euo| = nn
non-faulty unobservable events, and |Ef | = 1 fault event ef .
• The generated automaton will be accessible and will have no fault event self-
loops.
• From any x ∈ X, the probability that f(x, e) is defined is given by py if e ∈ Eo,
pm if e ∈ Es, pn if e ∈ Euo, and pf if e = ef . These probabilities are independent
between one state and another, given the accessibility constraint.
We used the parameters ny = 0, nm = 4, nn = 1, py = 0, pm = 0.35, pn = 0.05,
and pf = 0.05. These parameters were chosen by trial and error. We found that
low probabilities tended to result in automata that were trivial or almost trivial (in
some cases, it was safe to choose to monitor no events from the initial state). When
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the probabilities were too high, the generated automata were undiagnosable. As the
purpose of these results is to demonstrate the scalability of the algorithm, we do not
present data with different parameters.
Table 2.1 shows MPO sizes and running times (rounded to the nearest second)
for two versions of the program, one that makes use of the reduced information state
and associated faster algorithms (e.g., for computed the reduced unobservable reach
and for verifying if the extended specification is satisfied) and one that does not. We
ran ten simulations each with n = 75 states and n = 100 states, respectively. We
used K = 4 for the 75 state simulations and K = 5 for the 100 state simulations.
One of the randomly generated automata with n = 75 states and two with n = 100
states were not K-diagnosable. The results of Table 2.1 show that the use of the
reduced information state has little effect on the size of the resulting MPO, but that
the algorithms for working with the reduced information state reduce running time by
a factor of 3 or 4. We conjecture that the lack of structure of the randomly generated
automata accounts for the small effect on MPO size of the reduced information state.
The results of Table 2.1 also show that large MPOs can be generated in a small
amount of time, which demonstrates that the algorithm of Sec. 2.8 is scalable in
practice. All simulations were run on a 6GB Dell XPS 12 Laptop with a 1.6GHz intel
core i7 processor (no parallelization was used in the simulations).
n RIS?
MPO States/Time (s)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
75
no
84325 N/A 86114 54502 54832 40404 29493 146108 169635 30819
3 N/A 4 2 3 1 1 18 11 1
yes
84258 N/A 86114 54502 54829 40325 29493 146003 169635 30674
1 N/A 1 1 1 1 1 4 5 0
100
no
N/A 586886 871242 204583 149817 N/A 259381 199464 170652 2016398
N/A 109 98 18 9 N/A 17 15 13 395
yes
N/A 579455 871225 204458 149759 N/A 259380 199460 170618 2016395
N/A 21 27 6 4 N/A 6 5 4 91
Table 2.1: Simulation results showing running times and MPO sizes with and without
using the reduced information states, for randomly generated automata
with 75 and 100 states.
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2.9 Conclusion
This work considered the problem of dynamic fault diagnosis under the constraint
of maintaining K-diagnosability. We established results about a structure called the
MPO that contains all the solutions of the problem, developed from our notion of the
information state. We next proved that the problem of finding safe controllers can
be mapped to the state disambiguation problem, and showed an equivalence between
safety and satisfying the extended specification. We proceeded to prove a monotonic-
ity result on the extended specification that allowed us to reduce our information state
and the size of our MPO. Putting all of our results together, we obtained a MPO
with a size complexity of O(2|X|(K + 2)|X|2|E|), compared with O(2|X|
2·K·2|E|) for the
previous approach of Cassez and Tripakis (2008). Finally, we presented an algorithm
for computing the MPO, and demonstrated through simulations that the algorithm
is scalable in practice. In future work, we will concentrate on finding a single optimal
controller (according to some numerical cost criterion), using the MPO as a basis.
We will also work on extending the results of this work to the problem of dynamic
co-diagnosability.
Appendix 1: Computing the Extended Specification and the
Reduced Unobservable Reach
Computing the Extended Specification
In this section, we show that computing the extended specification is equivalent
to finding maximal weight paths on a particular graph. This idea was presented
in Cassez and Tripakis (2008), in which the authors reduced the problem of finding
the minimal K for which K-diagnosability can be achieved for a given automaton (i.e.,
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the minimal detection delay). Computing the extended specification is a similar, but
more general problem. In fact, in the notation to follow, the problem of computing
this minimal K is equivalent to determining the single value mF (x0, x0). The method
used here is very similar to that presented in Yoo and Garcia (2008) in that both
approaches make use of strongly connected components to find minimal / maximal
weight paths. The algorithm presented here differs from that of Yoo and Garcia
(2008) in two ways: (i) we compute the extended specification rather than merely
the minimal detection delay; and (ii) we use a customized algorithm for the problem
of event-diagnosability whereas Yoo and Garcia (2008) considers the more general
problem of language-diagnosability. Our algorithm therefore achieves a complexity of
O(|X|2|E|), compared to O(|X|3|E|) as would be obtained by applying the method of
Yoo and Garcia (2008). There are also similarities to the construction of the verifier
Yoo and Lafortune (2002).
In what follows, let L = L(G) be the language of the automaton G = (X,E, f, x0)
and let LNF = L ∩ (E \ Ef )∗, the language of G but excluding strings with fault
occurrences. Also, for any state x ∈ X, let L/x denote the language L(G, x) =
L((X,E, f, x)). That is, L/x denotes the language that is possible given the automa-
ton G when starting in state x. Define LNF/x analogously. Finally, for any string s
and fault event ef , let s/ef denote the part of s beginning at the first occurence of
event ef in s, or ε if ef does not occur in s. As before, we assume that there is only
a single fault event, so that Ef = {ef}.
In Sect. 2.6, we proved that safety is equivalent to satisfying the extended specifi-
cation. By Thm. II.28, it suffices to find (for each (x1, x2) ∈ X2) the minimum count
n such that ((x1,−1), (x2, n)) ∈ T espec to compute the extended specification. But by
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Def. II.21, this is equivalent to finding:
min

n ∈ {−1, 0, 1, . . .} : ∃s1 ∈ L/x1, s2 ∈ L/x2
s.t. P (s1) = P (s2), N(g((x1,−1), s1)) = −1,
and N(g((x2, n), s2)) = K + 1
 (2.24)
Instead of computing this minimum, we compute the following two maxima:
m(x1, x2) = max
s1∈LNF /x1,s2∈L/x2
s.t. P (s1)=P (s2)
|s2| (2.25)
mF (x1, x2) = max
s1∈LNF /x1,s2∈L/x2
s.t. P (s1)=P (s2)
|s2/ef | (2.26)
Theorem II.36.
min
 n ∈ {−1, 0, 1, . . .} :((x1,−1), (x2, n)) ∈ T espec

=

−1 if m
F (x1, x2)
≥ K + 2
max{0, K + 1−m(x1, x2)} else
(2.27)
Proof. Suppose that mF (x1, x2) = c. Then there exists s1 ∈ LNF/x1 and s2 ∈
L/x2 such that P (s1) = P (s2) and |s2/ef | = c. Since s1 ∈ LNF/x1, it follows that
N(g((x1,−1), s1)) = −1. Also, since |s2/ef | is the number of events in s2 starting
at the first occurrence of ef , it follows that N(g((x2,−1), s2)) = c − 1. Thus, the
minimum in equation (2.24) is n = −1 if c − 1 ≥ K + 1. Now suppose instead
that mF (x1, x2) < K + 2 and that m(x1, x2) = c. Then there exists s1 ∈ LNF/x1
and s2 ∈ L/x2 such that P (s1) = P (s2) and |s2| = c. As before, this implies that
N(g((x1,−1), s1)) = −1. It also implies that N(g((x2, n), s2)) = c + n if n ≥ 0 and
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hence N(g((x2, n), s2)) ≥ K + 1 if n ≥ 0 and n ≥ K + 1−m(x1, x2).
An advantage to using this method for computing the extended specification is
that the values in equations (2.25) and (2.26) are not dependent on the particular
value of K. This means that we do not need to recompute the extended specifica-
tion for different values of K. The procedure for computing the values of m(·, ·) and
mF (·, ·) is described below. The two sets of values are computed by finding maximal
weight (not necessarily simple) paths in a graph. The graph will be described below
but it is effectively the complete (in the sense that we do not trim the non-accessible
parts) one-sided verifier of G. The intuition for the procedure is that it generates all
pairs of strings that have the same projection (with the first string being non-faulty),
from each pair of states of the automaton G, and assigns a value to such a pair of
strings equal to the length of the second string (in the case of the m(·, ·) values), or
equal to the number of events starting from the first fault occurrence of the second
string (in the case of the mF (·, ·) values).
Step 1:
Create the graph Ges = (Ves, Aes), where Ves = X × {N} ×X × {N, Y }, and Aes ⊆
Ves × Ves is the set of (directed) edges between them, with labels in the set E × E.
Here, N and Y are fault labels, where N represents no fault (i.e., a count of -1) and Y
represents the occurence of a fault at some point in the past (i.e., any count not equal
to -1). We use FL = {N, Y } to denote the set of fault labels. Define the function
FLes : Ves → FL to be the fault label associated with the second state of a vertex.
That is:
FLes(v) =
 N, if v ∈ X × {N} ×X × {N}Y, if v ∈ X × {N} ×X × {Y } (2.28)
Also, let ELes : Aes → E ×E be the function that assigns labels to edges. The set of
edges Aes is defined by three cases:
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• Observed Events : For any vertex v1 = (x1, N, x2, f l) and any event e ∈ Eo∪Es,
if f(x1, e) and f(x2, e) are both defined, then there exists an edge (v1, v2) ∈ Aes
with label (e, e), where v2 = (f(x1, e), N, f(x2, e), f l).
• Unobservable Events : For any vertex v1 = (x1, N, x2, f l) and any event e ∈ Euo,
if f(x1, e) is defined, then there exists an edge (v1, v2) ∈ Aes with label (e, ε),
where v2 = (f(x1, e), N, x2, f l). Similarly, if f(x2, e) is defined, then there exists
an edge (v1, v2) ∈ Aes with label (ε, e), where v2 = (x1, N, f(x2, e), f l).
• Faulty Events : For any vertex v1 = (x1, N, x2, f l), if f(x2, ef ) is defined, then
there exists an edge (v1, v2) ∈ Aes with label (ε, ef ), where v2 = (x1, N, f(x2, ef ), Y ).
Remark that, for any edge (v1, v2) ∈ Aes, its corresponding label (e1, e2) will satisfy
P (e1) = P (e2) in any of the above three cases. Next, we assign weights to each edge
of Ges through the function Wes : Aes → {0, 1} as follows. For any a = (v1, v2) ∈ Aes
with label EL(a) = (e1, e2),
Wes(a) =

1,
if [FLes(v1) = N and e2 = ef ]
or [FLes(v1) = Y and e2 6= ε]
0, else
(2.29)
Thus Wes(a) = 1 precisely when it corresponds to an event occurrence that would
increment the count on the x2 state in the augmented automaton. For any (x1, x2) ∈
X2, the value of m(x1, x2) is equal to the maximal weight of a path starting at
(x1, N, x2, Y ). Similarly, the value of m
F (x1, x2) is equal to the maximal weight of a
path starting at (x1, N, x2, N). Let the weight of the maximal weight path starting
from v ∈ Ves be denoted by des(v).
Step 2:
Create the component graph GSCCes = (V
SCC
es , A
SCC
es ) of Ges, which is the graph over
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strongly connected components (SCCs) of Ges. If we denote by SCC(v) the SCC con-
taining vertex v, we can write V SCCes = {SCC(v) : v ∈ V ees} and ASCCes = {(S1, S2) ∈
V SCCes × V SCCes : S1 6= S2 ∧ ∃v1 ∈ S1, v2 ∈ S2 s.t. (v1, v2) ∈ Aes}. Also, assign weights
to each edge of GSCCes through the function W
SCC
es : A
SCC
es → {0, 1} as follows. For
any a = (S1, S2) ∈ ASCCes ,
W SCCes (a) = max
v1∈S1,v2∈S2:(v1,v2)∈Aes
Wes((v1, v2)) . (2.30)
Since all edge weights of Ges are non-negative, the maximal path weights starting
from any two vertices in the same strongly connected components must be equal.
That is, SCC(v1) = SCC(v2) ⇒ des(v1) = des(v2). This is clearly true if all edges
in a SCC have weight zero. If there is a non-zero edge, it can be traversed infinitely
often on a maximal weight path starting from any vertex in the SCC, in which case
the maximal path weights will be infinite for any vertex in the SCC. Thus, we can
define dSCCes (S) for any S ∈ V SCCes and give it the value of des(v) for any v ∈ S.
Step 3:
To compute the maximal weight paths, we consider the following three cases:
• For any S ∈ V SCCes such that there exist two vertices v1, v2 ∈ S and an edge
a = (v1, v2) with weight 1, assign d
SCC
es (S) =∞, since this edge can be traversed
an infinite number of times in the maximal weight path starting from any v ∈ S.
• For any S1 ∈ V SCCes that has a path to some S2 ∈ V SCCes in GSCCes with
dSCCes (S2) = ∞, assign dSCCes (S1) = ∞, since there exists a path from any
v1 ∈ S1 to any v2 ∈ S2 in this case (and hence the weight of the maximal weight
path from any such v1 is at least as great as that of the maximal weight path
from any such v2).
• For the remainder of the vertices of GSCCes , we can do a topological sort, assign
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dSCCes (S) = 0, for any S ∈ V SCCes that is a sink of GSCCes (i.e., with no outgo-
ing edges), and work backwards from these to compute the remaining values
of dSCCes (S). Considering the vertices in this order ensures that we find the
longest path from any vertex before moving on to any of its predecessors in the
topological sort.
Proposition II.37 (Running Time of Extended Specification Computation). The
running time of the procedure described in this section is O(|X|2|E|) if G is deter-
ministic.
Proof. The graph created in step 1 has |Ves| = 2|X|2 vertices. For a deterministic
automaton, there is at most one transition defined for a given initial state and event.
Thus, for each of the 2|X|2 vertices of Ges, there is at most one outgoing edge for
each event e ∈ Eo ∪ Es (labeled (e, e)), at most two outgoing edges for each event
e ∈ Euo (labeled either (e, ε) or (ε, e)), and at most one outgoing edge for each event
e ∈ Ef (labeled (ε, e)). Hence, the graph created in step 1 has |Aes| ≤ [2|X|2][2|E|] =
4|X|2|E| edges. Creating the component graph in step 2 can be done in time O(|Ves|+
|Aes|) (see e.g., Cormen et al. (2009)). Furthermore, |V SCCes | ≤ |Ves| = 2|X|2 and
|ASCCes | ≤ |V SCCes | − 1 < 2|X|2. Computing W SCCes and performing the first part of
step 3 can be done together in time O(|Aes|), by considering each edge (v1, v2) ∈ Aes
such that Wes(v1, v2) = 1. If SCC(v1) = SCC(v2) = S, then we set d
SCC
es (S) = ∞.
If SCC(v1) 6= SCC(v2), then we set W SCCes (SCC(v1), SCC(v2)) = 1. The second
part of step 3 can be done through a single depth-first search on GSCCes , and hence
takes O(|X|2) time. For the last part of step 3, finding a topological sort can be
done at the same time as computing the component graph. The remainder of the
algorithm takes linear time in the size of GSCCes by considering this graph’s vertices in
topologically sorted order, starting from sink nodes. Thus, the total running time is
in O(|X|2|E|).
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Computing the Reduced Unobservable Reach
In this section, we show how to efficiently compute the reduced unobservable reach
(i.e., how to compute rur = RUR(y, γ)). The naive method of computing the un-
observable reach and reducing the resulting information state has a running time of
O(K|X||E|) + O(|X|), which is worse than the O(|X||E|) running time of the algo-
rithm presented below. The procedure for this computation bears some similarity
to the one used to compute the extended specification in that we also make use of
strongly connected components and the topological sort. In what follows, we assume
that the computation of the unobservable reach is a step in determining whether or
not a particular control decision is safe, so that we stop immediately if we find an
augmented state with a count of more than K + 1 in the unobservable reach.
Step 1: Graph construction
Create the graph Gγ = (X,Aγ), where Aγ ⊆ X × X is the set of (directed) edges.
Let Aγ = A
F
γ ∪ ANFγ , where these are defined by:
AFγ = {(x1, x2) ∈ X2 : ∃e ∈ Ef s.t. f(x1, e) = x2}
ANFγ =
 (x1, x2) ∈ X
2 : ∃e ∈ E \ (γ ∪ Ef )
s.t. f(x1, e) = x2

Thus, the set of edges Aγ corresponds simply to all unobservable transitions of the
automaton G, given the set of monitored events γ, and are split into AFγ (for fault
transitions) and ANFγ (for non-faulty transitions). Note that some (x1, x2) may be in
both sets.
Step 2: Finding the -1 count augmented states
Initialize rur ← y. For all u ∈ y such that N(u) = −1, determine all x ∈ X such
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that there exists a path from S(u) to x in Gγ, considering only edges in A
NF
γ , and set
rur ← rur ∪ {(x,−1)}. This can be done through a single depth-first search on the
graph Gγ and gives the set of all v ∈ RUR(y, γ) such that N(v) = −1.
Step 3: Finding the 0 count augmented states
For each u ∈ rur such that N(u) = −1 and for each x ∈ X such that (S(u), x) ∈ AFγ ,
set rur ← rur ∪ {(x, 0)}, unless there exists some v ∈ rur such that v >+ (x, 0).
Step 4: Finding the maximal count augmented states
Create the component graph GSCCγ = (V
SCC
γ , A
SCC
γ ) of Gγ defined over strongly
connected components. For each x ∈ X, let SCCγ(x) denote the SCC that contains
x. We first check if there are any augmented states that can be reached with arbitrarily
large count. This will occur if there exists some x ∈ X such that (x, n) ∈ rur for
some n ≥ 0 and a path from SCCγ(x) to some SCC S ∈ V SCCγ with |S| > 1. In this
case, we stop here and determine that γ was not a safe control decision. If we do
not halt at this point, then we know that all non-singleton SCCs are unreachable by
any x ∈ X such that (x, n) ∈ rur for some n ≥ 0. It follows that any non-singleton
SCCs in GSCCγ will not have any effect on the maximal counts. Therefore, we remove
all these states from GSCCγ , obtaining a subgraph G
′
γ of Gγ. Finally, we compute
the maximal counts by considering the vertices in topologically sorted order, starting
from source nodes. This guarantees that we will find all paths to a vertex x (and
hence the maximal value of n such that (x, n) ∈ RUR(y, γ)) before moving on to any
of its successors.
Proposition II.38 (Running Time of Reduced Unobservable Reach Computation).
The running time of the procedure described in this section is O(|X||E|) if G is de-
terministic.
Proof. The graph created in step 1 has |X| vertices and at most |E\γ| ≤ |E| outgoing
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edges per vertex and can therefore be constructed in time O(|X||E|). The depth-
first search in step 2 takes linear time in the size of the graph Gγ. Step 3 requires
considering all fault transitions in the automaton. Since G is deterministic, and there
is only one fault event, there are at most |X| such transitions and hence this step
is done in O(|X|) time. In step 4, computing the component graph can be done in
linear time in the size of the graph Gγ (see e.g., Cormen et al. (2009)). We can then
find all the SCCs of GSCCγ that are not singletons and mark them in time O(|X|).
Checking if there exists a path to one of these non-singleton SCCs from some x ∈ X
such that (x, n) ∈ rur for some n ≥ 0 can be done with a single depth-first search
on GSCCγ , which takes linear time. Removing the non-singleton SCCs from G
SCC
γ and
topologically sorting the remaining graph also takes linear time in the size of GSCCγ .
Finally, computing the maximal counts by considering the vertices in topologically
sorted order takes linear time in the size of G′γ. Since all of the operations are
linear time and no graph has size larger than O(|X||E|), the overall running time is
O(|X||E|).
Appendix 2: Proofs not contained in main body
Proof of Lemma II.11:
Proof. The proof is established by induction on the length of PC(s). Let |PC(s)| = n.
Furthermore, for any string t, let t[k] denote the kth event in t, and let t(k) denote
the substring t[1] · · · t[k], with t(0) = ε. As further shorthand, let sk = PC(s)(k) for
k = 0, . . . , n and ek = PC(s)[k + 1] for k = 0, . . . , n− 1, so that s0 = ε, s1 = e0, etc...
Define y0 as usual. For k = 0, . . . , n, let zk = hY Z(yk, C(yk)) and for k = 0, . . . , n− 1,
define yk+1 = hZY (zk, ek). Finally, for k = 0, . . . , n, define Ck by Ck = C(yk). First,
notice that since unobserved events do not change the information state, we have
ISZC (sk) = zk and, in particular, z = IS
Z
C (s) = IS
Z
C (PC(s)) = IS
Z
C (sn) = zn. The
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inductive hypothesis is:
I(zk) = {v ∈ X+ : ∃s′k s.t. PC(s′k) = sk ∧ v = g(s′k)}, (2.31)
where we have dropped the PC(·) around sk since sk is already a projection. For the
base case z0, we have that:
I(z0) = UR(y0, C0)
=
 v ∈ X
+ : (∃u ∈ y0)(∃t ∈ (E \ C0)∗)
s.t. v = g(u, t)

= {v ∈ X+ : ∃t ∈ (E \ C0)∗ s.t. v = g(x+0 , t)}
= {v ∈ X+ : ∃t s.t. PC(t) = ε = s0 ∧ v ∈ g(t)}
Thus the base case is established, by taking s′0 = t. Now suppose that the inductive
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hypothesis is true at k. Then:
yk+1 = hZY (zk, ek)
= {v ∈ X+ : ∃u ∈ I(zk) s.t. v = g(u, ek)}
=
v ∈ X+ : ∃s
′
k s.t. PC(s
′
k) = sk
and v = g(s′kek)

I(zk+1) = UR(yk+1, Ck+1)
=
v ∈ X+ : (∃u ∈ yk+1)(∃t ∈ (E \ Ck+1)
∗)
s.t. v = g(u, t)

=
v ∈ X
+ :
(∃s′k)(∃t ∈ (E \ Ck+1)∗)
s.t. PC(s
′
k) = sk
v = g(s′kekt)

=
v ∈ X+ : ∃s
′
k+1 s.t. PC(s
′
k+1) = sk+1
and v = g(s′k+1)
 ,
where the last equality follows by taking s′k+1 = s
′
kekt and noting that, since s
′
k can
be any string satisfying PC(s
′
k) = sk and t can be any string satisfying t ∈ (E \Ck+1)∗
(which is equal to the set {t : PC(zk, t) = ε}), the concatenation s′k+1 = s′kekt can be
any string satisfying PC(s
′
k+1) = skek = sk+1. Thus the induction step is proven and
the lemma follows from this.
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CHAPTER III
Vehicle Control : The case of perfect measurement
3.1 Abstract
We consider the problem of controlling a set of vehicles at an intersection, in the
presence of uncontrolled vehicles and a bounded disturbance. We begin by discretiz-
ing the system in space and time to construct a suitable discrete event system (DES)
abstraction, and formally define the problem to be solved as that of constructing a su-
pervisor over the discrete state space that is safe (i.e., collision-free), non-deadlocking
(i.e., the vehicles all cross the intersection eventually), and maximally permissive with
respect to the chosen discretization. We show how to model the uncontrolled vehi-
cles and the disturbance through uncontrollable events of the DES abstraction. We
define two types of relations between systems and their abstraction: state reduction
and exact state reduction. We prove that, when the abstraction is a state reduction
of a continuous system, then we can obtain a safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally
permissive memoryless supervisor. This is obtained by translating safety and non-
deadlocking specifications to the abstract domain, synthesizing the supervisor in this
domain, and finally translating the supervisor back to the concrete domain. We show
that, when the abstraction is an exact state reduction, the resulting supervisor will be
maximally permissive among the class of all supervisors, not merely memoryless ones.
Finally, we provide a customized algorithm and demonstrate its scalability through
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simulation.
3.2 Introduction
We consider the problem of controlling a set of n vehicles in the vicinity of an
intersection. We assume that vehicles move along a set of m intersecting two-way
roads, m ≤ n, and that the path that each vehicle will follow is known a priori (for
example, by means of reading the turn signal of the vehicle), and we want to supervise
the vehicles’ behaviour to avoid a side impact of any two vehicles on intersecting paths,
and a rear-end collision of any two vehicles on a common or on merging paths. See
Fig. 3.1 for an example.
Figure 3.1: An example of the vehicle control problem.
We assume that a certain subset of the vehicles are uncontrolled, and that there
is a disturbance on the vehicle dynamics with a known bound. The problem to be
solved consists of designing a supervisor that restricts the actions of the controlled
vehicles such that the system is safe (i.e., collision-free), non-deadlocking (i.e., the
vehicles must eventually cross the intersection), and maximally permissive.
Three common approaches to this problem include: the computation of maximally
controlled invariant sets; mapping the problem to that of scheduling; and abstrac-
tion/symbolic models. Among approaches falling in the first category, we mention,
e.g., (Hafner and Del Vecchio, 2011; Verma and Del Vecchio, 2011; Hafner et al.,
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2013). By explicitly computing the capture set, or set of states from which it is not
possible to guarantee avoidance of the unsafe states, these approaches naturally satisfy
safety, non-deadlockingness and maximal permissiveness, and can deal with sources of
uncontrollability and also with measurement uncertainty. However, such approaches
typically require conditions on the geometry of the unsafe set and on the structure
of the dynamics, or else scale poorly to systems with more than a few dimensions.
See also (Tomlin et al., 2003) for an example involving a flight management system.
Scheduling approaches work by allocating time intervals during which the vehicles
can be inside the intersection. The scheduling problem is generally NP-hard but
takes polynomial time in the special case where all jobs require the same processing
time. Reducing the vehicle control problem to the polynomial-time scheduling case
amounts to either an assumption of certain symmetries in the vehicle control problem
set-up, or a problem relaxation where such symmetries are not satisfied. Approaches
in this category include (Colombo and Del Vecchio, 2012), its extension to the case
of dynamics with disturbances, (Bruni et al., 2013), and its extension to the case
of uncontrolled vehicles Ahn et al. (2014). Because of the assumption of mutual ex-
clusiveness of the use of the intersection, these approaches do not deal with vehicles
on non-intersecting paths (in which case multiple vehicles could simultaneously be
in the intersection). Another approach is to pre-compute fail-safe maneuvers as in
(Kowshik et al., 2011), or evasion plans as in (Au et al., 2012). These last approaches
deal with some types of environmental uncertainty, but do not guarantee maximal
permissiveness.
Our approach falls in the category of abstraction/symbolic models. Abstraction
based methods work by mapping the continuous system model and specifications
to a finite model and solving for a supervisor on the finite model, in such a way
that the obtained supervisor can be used on the original (continuous) system, while
preserving safety and non-deadlocking properties. Work in this domain includes (Alur
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et al., 2000; Daws and Tripakis , 1998) in the context of verification / model checking,
as well as (Colombo and Del Vecchio, 2011a,b; Colombo and Girard , 2013), which
make use of differential flatness of dynamical systems to construct abstractions with
provable errors bounds. Our work is most closely related to that of (Girard et al., 2010;
Pola and Tabuada, 2009; Zamani et al., 2012; Camara et al., 2011), which construct
symbolic models that satisfy simulation or alternating simulation relations with the
original system. In particular, this work also makes use of alternating simulation
relations, and variations thereof.
In this problem, the number of vehicles will typically be at least five (we provide
simulation results for six vehicles) and the bad set has a non-convex shape, which
makes exact computation of the capture set intractable. On the other hand, the
scheduling methods of (Colombo and Del Vecchio, 2012), (Bruni et al., 2013), and
(Ahn et al., 2014) do not explicitly pre-compute sets of states from which there exist
solutions to the corresponding scheduling problems, but instead perform verification
on-line. Because the exact verification problem is NP-hard, only the polynomial-
time problem relaxations are feasible in practice. While also suffering from prob-
lems related to state space explosion, abstraction based methods nevertheless offer
more scalability than capture set computation and more flexibility than reductions
to scheduling problems.
We proceed to solve the problem by discretizing the system in space and time, thus
obtaining a finite solution space. Using this discretization as a basis, we construct a
discrete-event system (DES) abstraction and model the two sources of uncontrollabil-
ity (the uncontrolled vehicles and the disturbance) through uncontrollable events. By
translating the safety and non-deadlocking specifications from the continuous to the
discrete-event domain, we formulate the problem to be solved in the context of super-
visory control theory of DES (see (Ramadge and Wonham, 1987), (Wonham, 2013),
(Cassandras and Lafortune, 2008)). Specifically, we obtain a maximally permissive
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safe and non-deadlocking supervisor for the DES by solving the Basic Supervisor
Control Problem in the Non-Blocking case (BSCP-NB). The resulting supervisor is
then translated back to the original (continuous) problem domain, preserving safety,
non-deadlockingness, and maximal permissiveness with respect to the discretization.
To prove that safety and non-deadlockingness are preserved when translating the
obtained supervisor from the abstract back to the continuous problem domain and
to characterize the sense in which the resulting solution is maximally permissive, we
define two types of relations between systems and their abstractions: the state reduc-
tion and the exact state reduction. We prove that, when the abstraction is a state
reduction of the original system, the obtained supervisor for the continuous domain
problem will be safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally permissive among the class of
memoryless supervisors. When the abstraction is an exact state reduction of the orig-
inal system, the obtained supervisor will be maximally permissive among the class
of all supervisors, not merely memoryless ones. In the context of the vehicles control
problem, we show that our DES abstraction is a state reduction of the continuous
system model. Additionally, we show that, if the bounds on the disturbance are an
integral multiple of one of the discretization parameters, then our DES abstraction
becomes an exact state reduction of the continuous system model.
Finally, we present a customized algorithm to construct the supervisor for the
vehicle control problem. By making use of the problem’s structure, we are able
to obtain an algorithm that is faster than the standard DES supervisory control
algorithms. We show through simulation that the algorithm is scalable in practice,
with running times of under one minute for systems with hundreds of millions of
accessible transitions in the DES abstraction.
Our contributions are as follows. First, the translation of the system model and
specifications to the domain of DES allows us to leverage methods from supervisory
control theory, methods which are well-suited to finding maximally permissive su-
87
pervisors in the presence of uncontrolled elements of the environment. Second, the
notions of state reduction and exact state reduction are general notions that conserve
maximal permissiveness, rather than merely safety and non-deadlockness, when going
from an abstraction back to the original system. Finally, the customized algorithm
presented in this work makes use of system properties that could also generalize to
other problems of interest. Preliminary versions of some of the results presented here
have appeared in (Dallal et al., 2013a), (Dallal et al., 2013b).
The organization of this work is as follows. In Sec. 3.3, we present the system
model, its time/space discretization, and the problem to be solved. In Sec. 3.4,
we describe the set of collision points to be avoided. In Sec. 3.5, we define the
DES abstraction of the system defined in Sec. 3.3. In Sec. 3.6, we present the state
reduction, exact state reduction, and associated theorems. In Sec. 3.7, we provide an
overview of supervisory control theory, prove that the abstraction defined in Sec. 3.5 is
a state reduction of the system defined in Sec. 3.3, and additionally prove under what
conditions the abstraction is an exact state reduction. In Sec. 3.8, we present our
customized algorithm for solving the vehicle control problem. In Sec. 3.9, we present
simulation results for an implementation of our algorithm. Finally, we conclude in
Sec. 3.10. We also include derivations of the equations used in our algorithms, which
are contained in the appendix.
3.3 Model and Problem Definition
Consider a set of n vehicles N = {1, . . . , n} modeled as kinematic entities (inte-
grators) and described by
x˙ = v + d (3.1)
where x ∈ X ⊂ Rn is the state, v ∈ V ⊂ Rn is the control input, and d ∈ D ⊂ Rn
is a disturbance input representing unmodeled dynamics (for instance, the dynamic
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response of the vehicle to the engine torque). Assume that X is compact (i.e., the
vehicles are controlled in some neighbourhood of the intersection) and that D =
[dmin, dmax]
n, with dmin ≤ 0 ≤ dmax. We take the set V to be the (discrete) set of
vectors with elements in the finite set {aµ, (a+1)µ, . . . , bµ}, with a, b ∈ N and µ ∈ R+.
The values aµ and bµ are denoted by vmin and vmax, respectively. To allow for the
possibility that a subset of the vehicles cannot be controlled, let v be partitioned into
two subvectors, vc ∈ Vc for the controlled vehicles, and vuc ∈ Vuc for the uncontrolled
vehicles, so that v = (vc, vuc) and V = Vc×Vuc. Assume also that vmin +dmin ≥ µ, so
that µ constitutes a lower bound on the velocity of the vehicles. Finally, assume that
the input v is kept constant over time intervals [kτ, (k + 1)τ ], k ∈ N and discretize
the above system in time with step τ , obtaining
xk+1 = xk + uk + δk (3.2)
with xk = x(kτ), uk = v(kτ)τ , δk =
∫ (k+1)τ
kτ
d(t)dt. Calling U = V τ and ∆ = Dτ ,
we have that u ∈ U and δ ∈ ∆. In the remainder of this work, we will also use the
notation δmin := dminτ and δmax = dmaxτ . As with the set V , we use the notation
u = (uc, uuc) to denote the controls of the controlled and uncontrolled vehicles and
write U = Uc × Uuc. Next, we discretize the system in space by defining a set of
discrete states Q˜ and a mapping ` : X → Q˜ from continuous to discrete states as
follows:
`i(xi) :=

cτµ, for c ∈ Z s.t.
cτµ− τµ/2 < xi ≤ cτµ+ τµ/2,
if xi ≤ αk
qi,m, if xi > αk
(3.3)
where k is the index of the road on which vehicle i exits the intersection (i.e., after
any turn) and αk marks the end of the intersection on road k (the shape of the
intersection will be described in more detail in Sec. 3.4). Note that, if the vehicles are
to be controlled beyond the end of the intersection, then a value greater than αk could
89
be used in Eq. (3.3). This could potentially result in more than one marked state
in the definition of G (see Sec. 3.5) and would not invalidate any results presented
in this work. Define `(x) as the vector (`1(x1), . . . , `n(xn)) and define the notation
`−1(q) = {x ∈ X : `(x) = q}. In words, the space X is covered by a regular lattice
with spacing τµ. Vehicles before the end of the intersection are mapped to a point of
this lattice whereas vehicles after the end of the intersection are mapped to “special”
states qi,m. The state qm = (q1,m, . . . , qn,m) is the (unique) discrete state where all
vehicles have crossed the intersection. Assume that, for all q ∈ Q˜, there exists some
x ∈ X such that `(x) = q. Finally, assume that there is some set B of bad states
(representing collision points) and that we would like to define a supervisor so that
x(t) /∈ B ∀ t ≥ 0. We will describe the bad set in the following section. Specifically,
we wish to solve the following problem:
Problem III.1. Let X/` denote the quotient set of X with respect to the equivalence
relation E ⊆ X × X defined by (x1, x2) ∈ E ⇔ `(x1) = `(x2). Given Q˜, define a
supervisor σ : X/` → 2Vc that assigns to each x(kτ) ∈ X a set of inputs vc ∈ Vc
allowed for the interval [kτ, (k + 1)τ ] and constant over this time interval, with the
following properties:
• if vc(t) ∈ σ(x(bt/τcτ)) for t ∈ [kτ, (k + 1)τ ], then x(t) /∈ B in the same time
interval (safety)
• if σ(x(kτ)) 6= ∅, vc(t) ∈ σ(x(bt/τcτ)) for t ∈ [kτ, (k+ 1)τ ], and `(x((k+ 1)τ)) 6=
qm, then σ(x((k + 1)τ)) 6= ∅ (non-deadlockingness)
• if σ˜ 6= σ and σ˜ satisfies the two properties above, then σ˜(x(kτ)) ⊆ σ(x(kτ)) for
all k ≥ 0 (maximal permissiveness).
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3.4 Bad Set Description
Let the set of roads in this system be denoted by R = {1, . . . ,m}. Associated
to each vehicle i is a pair of roads (ri,1, ri,2), indicating that the vehicle starts on
road ri,1 and turns onto road ri,2 at the intersection. Each road r in this system is
parametrized by the length αr of the road that is inside the intersection. We assume
that vehicles instantaneously switch from one road to another (i.e., when turning)
at point 0. Thus, vehicle i is on road ri,1 when xi < 0, inside the intersection when
xi ∈ [−αri,1 , αri,2 ], and on road ri,2 when xi > 0. We define any two pairs of roads
(ri,1, ri,2) and (rj,1, rj,2) as conflicting pictorially as follows.
Figure 3.2: An example scenario involving three vehicles on five roads. Blue lines are
drawn for each vehicle indicating starting road and ending road.
Let each road r ∈ R be represented by two points (one for each direction of traffic),
arranged as a regular polygon with m sides. Figure 3.2 shows an example with five
roads. Now suppose that vehicles travel on the right side of the road and represent a
pair of roads (r1, r2) by a line segment from the right point of road r1 (when looking
toward the center of the intersection) to the right point of road r2 (when looking away
from the center of the intersection). We say that the two pairs of roads (ri,1, ri,2) and
(rj,1, rj,2) are conflicting if their respective line segments intersect. We identify two
types of constraints, depending on whether the intersection point is an endpoint of
the line segments (case 1) or not (case 2). The former case (case 1) will occur if two
vehicles are travelling on the same road and in the same direction, either before or
after reaching the origin. Figure 3.2 contains two examples of this: there are two
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vehicles entering the intersection on road 3, and there are two vehicles exiting the
intersection on road 1. In this case, we place the safety constraint that they must
maintain a distance of at least γ, as long as both vehicles are on this road. Thus,
if ri,1 = rj,1, then the forbidden set of points is given by |xi − xj| < γ, xi, xj ≤ 0.
Similarly, if ri,2 = rj,2, then the forbidden set of points is given by |xi − xj| < γ,
xi, xj ≥ 0. The latter case (case 2) will occur when there is a danger of a crash at the
intersection between vehicles while turning. Figure 3.2 shows an example of this in
which one vehicle turns from road 3 to road 5 and another turns from road 4 to road
1. In this case, we place the safety constraint that they must not simultaneously be
in the intersection. Thus, the forbidden set of points is given by −αri,1 < xi < αri,2
and −αrj,1 < xj < αrj,2 . If the line segments for two vehicles do not intersect, then
no constraints are placed on the joint position of the two vehicles (ex: two vehicles
on different roads turning onto the roads to their immediate rights). We call the set
of all forbidden points the bad set, and denote it by B. Note that we do not include
collision points involving two uncontrolled vehicles in the bad set, since these cannot
be prevented through any control action.
3.5 Discrete Abstraction
In this section, we define a discrete event system (DES) and proceed to construct
a DES G that models the behavior of the continuous time system, using the lattice
Q˜ as the set of discrete states.
Definition III.2 (Discrete Event System). A (deterministic) discrete event system
is tuple G = (X,E, ψ, x0, Xm) where X is a set of states, E is a set of events,
ψ : X × E → X is a partial transition function, x0 ∈ X is the initial state, and
Xm ⊆ X is a set of marked states representing the completion of some behavior of
interest.
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To construct a DES abstraction of the continuous-time system, we use a three-
layered transition function ψ. The first layer consists of events in the set Uc, for the
actions of the controlled vehicles. The second layer consists of events in the set Uuc,
for the actions of the uncontrolled vehicles. It remains to model the disturbance d.
We achieve this by discretizing the set ∆ to obtain a set of “discretized disturbances”
W . Specifically, let
W = {kτµ : k ∈ Z ∧ bδmin/(τµ)c ≤ k ≤ dδmax/(τµ)e}n. (3.4)
This set W makes up the third layer of G’s transition structure. For any q ∈ Q˜,
uc ∈ Uc, uuc ∈ Uuc, and w ∈ W , we define
ψ(q, ucuucw) := q + u+ w, (3.5)
where u = (uc, uuc). In Sec. 3.7, we will show that ψ(q, ucuucw) = q
′ if and only
if there exist x ∈ X, δ ∈ ∆, and x′ ∈ X such that x′ = x + u + δ, q = `(x),
and q′ = `(x′) (see Prop. III.20). To define the discrete system state in between
the occurrence of events in Uc and Uuc and in between the occurrence of events in
Uuc and W (all of which occur simultaneously in the continuous-time system), we
introduce two sets of “intermediate” states QI1 and QI2 (disjoint from each other and
from Q˜ and with no physical meaning), and three intermediate transition functions:
ψ1 : Q˜ × Uc → QI1, ψ2 : QI1 × Uuc → QI2, and ψ3 : QI2 × W → Q˜, defined
only by ψ(q, uc, uuc, w) = ψ3(ψ2(ψ1(q, uc), uuc), w). See Fig. 3.3 for a depiction of the
transition function ψ. We take the set of marked states to be the set Qm = {qm}.
Finally, we define a set Q0 of possible initial states, which we model by introducing
a dummy initial state q0 and having transitions from q0 to each state q ∈ Q0 with
event label eq. We denote this set of events by EQ := {eq : q ∈ Q0} and define
ψ(q0, eq) := q. The final DES is defined as:
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G := (Q,EQ ∪ Uc ∪ Uuc ∪W,ψ, q0, Qm) (3.6)
where Q = {q0} ∪ Q˜ ∪ QI1 ∪ QI2. The sets of events Uc is taken to be controllable,
whereas the sets of events Uuc and W are taken to be uncontrollable. Note that, in
the context of supervisory control problems of DES, a supervisor is obtained which
does not choose a particular event from any given state, but rather chooses which
events to enable (allow) and which ones to disable (prevent). An uncontrollable event
is an event that cannot be disabled.
Figure 3.3: The transition function ψ.
Remark III.3. Although the initial state can not be chosen by the system, we take
the set of events EQ to also be controllable. In Sec. 3.7, we will use G as the basis for
a supervisory control problem. If EQ were defined as uncontrollable, we would obtain
an empty solution to the supervisory control problem whenever there was any initial
state from which there was no solution, even if there existed solutions from some of
them. By defining the set EQ as controllable, the computed supervisor will contain
a transition from q0 to q for every q ∈ Q0 from which there exists a solution to the
supervisory control problem. We will revisit this issue in Sec. 3.8.
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3.6 State Reductions and Supervisory Control
In this section, we define two types of relations between systems: state reductions
and exact state reductions, and prove theorems relating safety, non-deadlockness, and
maximal permissiveness of supervisors for systems related through state reductions
and exact state reductions. The state reduction and exact state reduction relations are
based on the notions of alternating similarity relations, as defined in Tabuada (2009).
The theorems proven in this section will be used later in this work to establish the
correctness of our solution to Prob. III.1. We begin with some preliminary definitions.
3.6.1 Preliminaries
Definition III.4 (System). A system S is defined as a tuple S = (X,U,→, Y,H),
where X is the set of states, U is a set of control inputs,→⊆ X×U×X is a transition
relation, Y is an output set, and H : X → Y is the output function.
For a system S = (X,U,→, Y,H), we will use the notation Postu(x) := {x′ ∈ X :
(x, u, x′) ∈→} and U(x) := {u ∈ U : Postu(x) 6= ∅}. In the remainder of this work,
it will be assumed that all systems satisfy the property H(x1) = H(x2) ⇒ U(x1) =
U(x2), for all x1, x2 ∈ X. In words, this means that any two states with the same
observation should not be distinguishable by their available set of inputs.
Definition III.5 (Run). A run ρ of length n for a system S = (X,U,→, Y,H) is a se-
quence of past states and inputs (x0, u0, . . . , xn−1, un−1, xn), such that ui ∈ U(xi) and
xi+1 ∈ Postui(xi) for i = 0, . . . , n−1. The set of runs of length n is denoted by Rn(S)
and the set of runs is R(S) =
⋃∞
i=0 Rn(S). Given run ρ = (x
0, u0, . . . , xn−1, un−1, xn),
we define the notation tgt(θ) := xn and ρ(k) := (x0, u0, . . . , xk−1, uk−1, xk), called a
prefix of ρ.
Definition III.6 (History). A history θ of length n for a system S = (X,U,→, Y,H)
is a sequence of past outputs and inputs (y0, u0, . . . , yn−1, un−1, yn), such that there
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exists a run ρ = (x0, u0, . . . , xn−1, un−1, xn) ∈ Rn(S) that is consistent with θ, in
the sense that yi = H(xi) for i = 0, . . . , n. The set of histories of length n is
denoted by Θn(S) and the set of histories is Θ(S) =
⋃∞
i=0 Θn. We will also write
θ(ρ) to mean the unique history produced by a run ρ ∈ R. Given history θ =
(y0, u0, . . . , yn−1, un−1, yn), we define the notation θ(k) := (y0, u0, . . . , yk−1, uk−1, yk)
and tgt(θ) := yn, as was the case with runs.
Definition III.7 (Supervisor). A supervisor σ for a system S = (X,U,→, Y,H) is a
function σ : Θ→ 2U which chooses which control inputs to enable/disable after each
history. A supervisor is called memoryless if it is of the form σ : Y → 2U . A run
ρ = (x0, u0, . . . , xn−1, un−1, xn) ∈ Rn(S) is allowed by supervisor σ if ui ∈ σ(θ(ρ(i))),
for i = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Definition III.8 (Specification). A safety specification for a system S = (X,U,→
, Y,H) is a subset Safe ⊆→ of transitions that we would like the system S to be
restricted to. A marking specification for S is a set Xm ⊆ X of “special” or marked
states. We say that S is deadlocking if there exists a run ρ such that U(tgt(ρ)) = ∅
and tgt(ρ) /∈ Xm.
In discrete event systems, marked states are used to denote states where some
operation of interest has completed.
3.6.2 The State Reduction
Definition III.9 (State Reduction). Given two systems Sa and Sb with Ya = Yb = Y ,
we say that Sa is a state reduction of Sb with state relation R ⊆ Xa×Xb and output
dependent control relation C : Y → 2Ua×Ub (hereafter referred to only as control
relation) if:
1. R−1 = {(xb, xa) ⊆ Xb ×Xa : (xa, xb) ∈ R} is a function.
2. For every y ∈ Y , the relation C(y) ⊆ Ua × Ub is a bijection relation.
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3. Ha(xa) = Hb(xb) if and only if (xa, xb) ∈ R.
4. ∀(xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a, ∃(xb, ub, x′b) ∈→b such that (xa, xb) ∈ R, (ua, ub) ∈ C(Ha(xa)),
and (x′a, x
′
b) ∈ R.
5. ∀(xb, ub, x′b) ∈→b, ∃(xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a such that (xa, xb) ∈ R, (ua, ub) ∈ C(Hb(xb)),
and (x′a, x
′
b) ∈ R.
Remark III.10. The state reduction was first defined in (Dallal et al., 2013b), where
we used slightly different conditions. In this work, we have changed notation for the
control relation C to resolve ambiguity. Furthermore, condition 5) was previously
stated as: ∀(xa, xb) ∈ R, (ua, ub) ∈ C and x′b ∈ Postub(xb), ∃x′a ∈ Postua(xa) such
that (x′a, x
′
b) ∈ R. The two conditions can be shown to be equivalent under conditions
1) and 2).
In words, condition 1) signifies that every xb ∈ Xb is in relation with exactly
one xa ∈ Xa, condition 5) signifies that, for every (xb, ub, x′b) ∈→b, there exists
(xa, ua, x
′
a) ∈→a which models (xb, ub, x′b) ∈→b, and condition 4) signifies that every
transition in →a models some transition in →b. Significantly, conditions 4) and 5)
can be achieved by construction for any system Sb, and relations R and C satisfying
conditions 1), 2), and 3). Furthermore, the system Sa is uniquely defined by Sb, R,
and C.
Definition III.11 (Induced Specification). Given system Sb with state reduction Sa,
along with safety and marking specifications Safeb ⊆→b and Xm,b ⊆ Xb on system
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Sb, define the induced specification on Sa as follows:
(xa, ua, x
′
a) ∈ Safea ⊆→a
⇔
 (xb, ub, x
′
b) ∈→b s.t. (xa, xb) ∈ R
∧(ua, ub) ∈ C(Ha(xa)) ∧ (x′a, x′b) ∈ R
 ⊆ Safeb (3.7)
Xa ∈ Xm,a ⊆ Xa ⇔ {xb ∈ Xb s.t. (xa, xb) ∈ R} ⊆ Xm,b (3.8)
In the remainder of this work we will often refer to the computation of a maximally
permissive, safe, and non-blocking supervisor of a system. We will leave the discussion
of its computation and of the translation between DES in the form of Def. III.2 and
systems in the form of Def. III.4 to the next section.
The usefulness of Def. III.9 is illustrated in the following theorem:
Theorem III.12. Suppose that system Sa is a state reduction of system Sb with
state relation R and control relation C and that we are given safety and marking
specifications Safeb ⊆→b and Xm,b ⊆ Xb for system Sb. Let Safea and Xm,a be
the corresponding induced specifications for system Sa and suppose that we have a
maximally permissive, safe, and non-deadlocking supervisor σa : Y → 2Ua, where Y
is the (common) output space. Define the supervisor σb : Y → 2Ub by ub ∈ σb(y)
iff ∃ua ∈ σa(y) such that (ua, ub) ∈ C(y). Then σb is safe, non-deadlocking, and
maximally permissive among supervisors of the form σb : Y → 2Ub.
Proof. We proceed in three claims. The first two claims show that the supervisor σb
will be safe and non-deadlocking. To prove maximal permissiveness, we first define
a function σb→a which maps supervisors for Sb to supervisors for Sa such that σa =
σb→a(σb), for σa and σb as defined in the theorem statement. The last claim shows
that, for any σ′b that is safe an non-deadlocking for Sb, σ
′
a = σb→a(σ
′
b) will be safe
and non-deadlocking for Sa. Maximal permissiveness then follows by a monotonicity
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property on σb→a.
Claim 1: (xa, xb) ∈ R∧(σa(Ha(xa)) 6= ∅∨xa ∈ Xm,a)⇒ (σb(Hb(xb)) 6= ∅∨xb ∈ Xm,b).
By definition of Xm,a, xa ∈ Xm,a ⇔ xb ∈ Xm,b, for all xb : (xa, xb) ∈ R, so that
(xa, xb) ∈ R ∧ xa ∈ Xm,a ⇒ xb ∈ Xm,b. By definition of σb, ub ∈ σb(y) iff ∃ua ∈ σa(y)
such that (ua, ub) ∈ C(y). But (xa, xb) ∈ R ⇒ Ha(xa) = Hb(xb), so that (xa, xb) ∈
R ∧ σa(Ha(xa)) 6= ∅ ⇒ σb(Hb(xb)) 6= ∅.
By assumption, Hb(xb,1) = Hb(xb,2)⇒ Ub(xb,1) = Ub(xb,2), from which it follows that,
if σb(Hb(xb)) 6= ∅, then xb is not deadlocked under σb.
Claim 2: ∀xb ∈ Xb, ub ∈ σb(Hb(xb)) ⇒ ∀x′b ∈ Postub(xb), (xb, ub, x′b) ∈ Safeb ∧
[σb(Hb(x
′
b)) 6= ∅ ∨ x′b ∈ Xm,b].
Consider any xb ∈ Xb and any ub ∈ σb(Hb(xb)). By property (1) of Def. III.9, R−1 is
a function. Therefore let xa be the unique member of Xa such that (xa, xb) ∈ R. By
property (3) of Def. III.9, Ha(xa) = Hb(xb) = y for some y ∈ Y . By property (2) of
Def. III.9, C(y) is a bijection. Therefore let ua be the unique member of Ua such that
(ua, ub) ∈ C(y). From the definition of σb, it follows that ua ∈ σa(Ha(xa)). Thus,
∀x′a ∈ Postua(xa), (xa, ua, x′a) ∈ Safea∧ [σa(Ha(x′a)) 6= ∅∨x′a ∈ Xm,a]. From the way
that Safea was defined, this implies that (xb, ub, x
′
b) ∈ Safeb, for all x′b ∈ Postub(xb)
such that (x′a, x
′
b) ∈ R and x′a ∈ Postua(xa). But property (5) of Def. III.9 states
that ∀x′b ∈ Postub(xb), ∃x′a ∈ Postua(xa) satisfying (x′a, x′b) ∈ R. From this and the
previous statement, it follows that (xb, ub, x
′
b) ∈ Safeb, for all x′b ∈ Postub(xb). It
similarly follows from property (5) of Def. III.9 along with Claim 1 that σb(Hb(x
′
b)) 6=
∅ ∨ x′b ∈ Xm,b, for all x′b ∈ Postub(xb).
Thus σb is safe and non-deadlocking. Given any supervisor σ
′
b : Y → 2Ub , let σ′a :
Y → 2Ua be defined by ua ∈ σ′a(y) iff ∃ub ∈ σ′b(y) such that (ua, ub) ∈ C(y) and let
the function σb→a be the mapping which takes a supervisor σ′b for system b to the
supervisor σ′a for system a in this way.
Claim 3: If σ′b is safe and non-deadlocking then so is σ
′
a = σb→a(σ
′
b).
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Suppose that σ′b is safe and non-deadlocking and take σ
′
a = σb→a(σ
′
b). Consider
any xa ∈ Xa, any ua ∈ σ′a(Ha(xa)), and any x′a ∈ Postua(xa). By property (4) of
Def. III.9, there exists (xb,1, ub, x
′
b,1) ∈→b such that (xa, xb,1) ∈ R, (ua, ub) ∈ C, and
(x′a, x
′
b,1) ∈ R. From the definition of σb→a(σ′b), it must be that ub ∈ σ′b(Hb(xb,1)). By
property (3) of Def. III.9, any xb,2 such that (xa, xb,2) ∈ R must satisfy Hb(xb,1) =
Ha = Hb(xb,2). It follows that ub ∈ σ′b(Hb(xb)), for any xb ∈ Xb such that (xa, xb) ∈ R.
Since σ′b is safe and non-deadlocking, it follows that, for all (xb, ub, x
′
b) ∈→b such that
(xa, xb) ∈ R, we have that (xb, ub, x′b) ∈ Safeb ∧ [σ′b(Hb(x′b)) 6= ∅ ∨ x′b ∈ Xm,b]. It
follows from the definition of Safea that (xa, ua, x
′
a) ∈ Safea and from the definitions
of σb→a(σ′b) and Xm,a that σ
′
a(Ha(x
′
a)) 6= ∅ ∨ x′a ∈ Xm,a. Since x′a ∈ Postua(xa) was
arbitrary, it follows that ua is a safe and non-deadlocking control decision from xa.
Since xa ∈ Xa and ua ∈ σ′a(Ha(xa)) were arbitrary, it follows that σ′a = σb→a(σ′b) is
safe and non-deadlocking.
It is obvious from the definition of σb→a that σ′b ⊇ σb ⇒ σb→a(σ′b) ⊇ σb→a(σb) = σa.
Thus, if there exists a safe and non-deadlocking supervisor σ′b ⊇ σb then it follows
that σa is not maximally permissive, a contradiction.
The above theorem shows that it is possible to compute a supervisor for a system
with a large or infinite state space by abstracting that system to one with a finite
state space, computing a supervisor for the reduced system, and translating back.
Furthermore, this process conserves not only safety and non-deadlockingness in the
translation, but also maximal permissiveness.
Remark III.13. The above theorem characterizes a controller σ as safe and non-
deadlocking for system S = (X,U,→, Y,H), safety specification Safe, and marking
specification Xm if and only if ∀x ∈ X, ∀u ∈ σ(H(x)), ∀x′ ∈ Postu(x), we have that
(x, u, x′) ∈ Safe ∧ (σ(H(x′)) 6= ∅ ∨ x′ ∈ Xm). This is a sufficient condition for a
system to be safe and non-deadlocking, but it is not necessary if the supervisor can
use initial state information, even if we restrict attention to memoryless supervisors.
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For an example of such a situation, see Example III.14.
Example III.14. Figure 3.4 shows an example of a system (left) and its correspond-
ing state reduction (right). If we assume that there is only a marking specification
and no safety specification, then the maximally permissive supervisor σ1 for the state
reduction would enable {a, b} from state {1, 2}, {a} from state {3, 4, 5}, and {a, b, c}
from state {7}. It can be seen that this would indeed be a maximally permissive
memoryless solution for the left system if there were no initial state information. If,
however, the initial state is known a priori to be one of {1, 2}, then there exists a
strictly more permissive memoryless supervisor σ2 for the left system which also en-
ables b from states {3, 4, 5}. It is possible to be more permissive from states {3, 4, 5}
by making use of the fact that the initial states are {1, 2} and event c was disabled
from states {1, 2}, making state 5 unreachable. Another safe memoryless supervi-
sor σ3 enables {a} from states {1, 2}, {a, b, c} from states {3, 4, 5} and {a, b, c} from
states {7}. Thus, it is possible to enable more from states {3, 4, 5} by enabling less
from states {1, 2}. Consistent with the discussion of Remark III.13, both of these
supervisors violate the property that ∀x ∈ X, ∀u ∈ σ(H(x)), ∀x′ ∈ Postu(x), we
have that (x, u, x′) ∈ Safe∧ (σ(H(x′)) 6= ∅∨x′ ∈ Xm). In particular, σ2 and σ3 both
allow b from state 5, despite the fact that this allows (5, b, 8), and state 8 is dead-
locked. Furthermore, the union of σ2 and σ3 is blocking, since it allows the string bc,
which leads to blocking state 8. Thus, there does not exist a maximally permissive
safe and non-blocking supervisor which uses the initial state information in this case.
Note that the system on the left is accessible, deterministic, and has both initial and
marked states which respect the partition of states determined by the output map.
This example is very closely related to the problem of obtaining maximally permissive
supervisors of the form S : XG → 2E for a discrete event system G, subject to specifi-
cation automaton H, which would normally require the supervisor to be defined over
the state space of the product automaton G×H.
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Figure 3.4: A system and its corresponding state reduction. States of the left system
with the same output are placed in a common box. We use the usual DES
convention of denoting marked states with a double circle and initial states
with an incoming arrow that has no source state.
3.6.3 The Exact State Reduction
Definition III.15 (Exact State Reduction (2)). Given two systems Sa and Sb with
Ya = Yb = Y , we say that Sa is an exact state reduction of Sb with state relation
R ⊆ Xa × Xb and control relation C : Y → 2Ua×Ub if Sa is a state reduction of Sb
with state and control relations R and C and:
6. ∀(xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a, ∀x′b ∈ Xb : (x′a, x′b) ∈ R, ∃(xb, ub, x′b) ∈→b such that (xa, xb) ∈
R and (ua, ub) ∈ C(Ha(xa)).
The above condition is akin to a time-reversed alternating similarity condition, in
the sense that it requires that every transition of Sa have a corresponding transition
in Sb, for every pair of related target states, rather than for every pair of related
source states. Lemma III.17 demonstrates its usefulness.
Remark III.16. The exact state reduction was first defined in (Dallal et al., 2013b),
where we used a normal (i.e., non time-reversed) alternating similarity condition. We
have added the “(2)” in this work to differentiate between these.
Lemma III.17. Suppose that system Sb has an exact state reduction (2) Sa. Then,
for any history θb for system Sb and any xb ∈ Xb such that H(xb) = tgt(θb), there
exists a run ρb such that θb = θ(ρb) and xb = tgt(ρb).
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of θb. The base case is trivially true.
Assume that the lemma holds up to histories of length n and consider a pair of
histories θb ∈ Θn(Sb) and θ′b ∈ Θn+1(Sb) such that θb is a prefix of θ′b. Also define
y = tgt(θb), y
′ = tgt(θ′b), and let ρ
′
b = (x
0
b , . . . , x
n
b , u
n
b , x
n+1
b ) ∈ Rn+1(Sb) be such that
θ′b = θ(ρ
′
b). Note that, in particular, this implies Hb(x
n
b ) = y and Hb(x
n+1
b ) = y
′. Since
(xnb , u
n
b , x
n+1
b ) ∈→b, we have from property (5) that ∃(xna , una , xn+1a ) ∈→a such that
(xna , x
n
b ) ∈ R, (una , unb ) ∈ C(Hb(xnb )) = C(y) and (xn+1a , xn+1b ) ∈ R. From property
(3), we have Ha(x
n
a) = Hb(x
n
b ) = y and Ha(x
n+1
a ) = Hb(x
n+1
b ) = y
′. Now consider
any x′b ∈ Xb such that H(x′b) = tgt(θ′b) = y′. Using property (3) again, we have
that (xn+1a , x
′
b) ∈ R. From property (6) we therefore have that ∃(xb, ub, x′b) ∈→b such
that (xna , xb) ∈ R and (una , ub) ∈ C(Ha(xna)) = C(y). From property (3), we have
that Hb(xb) = Ha(x
n
a) = y and from property (2) we have that ub = u
n
b . From the
induction hypothesis, there exists a run ρb such that θb = θ(ρb) and tgt(ρb) = xb.
Thus we can form the run ρ′′b := ρb.ub.x
′
b satisfying θ
′
b = θ(ρ
′′
b ) and tgt(ρ
′′
b ) = x
′
b, which
completes the proof.
In words, the above lemma implies that, when there exists an exact state reduction
(2) for system Sb, a history θb gives no more information about the current state of
Sb than does the last output tgt(θb). The following theorem follows immediately from
this observation.
Theorem III.18. Suppose that system Sa is an exact state reduction (2) of system Sb
and that all other conditions of Thm. III.12 are satisfied. Then the obtained supervisor
σb will be safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally permissive among supervisors of the
form σb : Θ→ 2Ub.
Remark III.19. As in the case of (non-exact) state reductions, the obtained supervi-
sor will not generally be maximally permissive if the supervisor can use initial state
information. In particular, if the set of initial states X0,b gives more information
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(a) A State Reduction (b) An Exact State Reduction
Figure 3.5: A depiction of the state reduction (left) and exact state reduction (right)
for a simple system Sb = ({1, . . . , 8}, {u},→b, {A,B}, Hb), where Hb(x) =
A for x ∈ {1, . . . , 4} and Hb(x) = B for x ∈ {5, . . . , 8}. In both the left
and right cases, there is a transition (x, u, x′) ∈→b with x ∈ H−1b (A) and
x′ ∈ H−1b (B), and hence a transition from A to B in the correspond-
ing state reduction. The system on the right contains some transition
(x, u, x′) ∈→b with x ∈ H−1b (A), for every x′ ∈ H−1b (B). For the system
on the left, the occurrence of a transition from A to B in the state re-
duction allows us to determine that Sb is in state 7. For the system on
the right, this transition only allows to determine that the system is some
state in the set H−1b (B).
than the initial output y0, then there may exist more permissive supervisors. Note
however that, if H(xb,1) = H(xb,2) ⇒ [xb,1 ∈ X0,b ⇔ xb,2 ∈ X0,b], then X0,b gives no
more information than the initial output y0, and hence the resulting supervisor will
still be maximally permissive. This is contrary to the case of non-exact state reduc-
tions, in which case the above condition is still not sufficient to guarantee maximal
permissiveness of the supervisor σ2 obtained in Thm. III.12, as is demonstrated in
Ex. III.14.
Figure 3.5 depicts an example of a state reduction and an example of an exact
state reduction.
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3.7 Supervisor Computation and Relations Between the Time-
discretized and Discrete Event Systems
In this section, we describe the supervisory control problem of DES, prove that
G is a state reduction of the time-discretized system of equation 3.2, and use this to
show how we can solve Prob. III.1. Readers familiar with supervisory control theory
of DES may skip Subsec. 3.7.1.
3.7.1 Supervisory Control Theory of DES
Given a set of events E, E∗ denotes the set of finite strings of events in E. A set
of strings K ⊆ E∗ is called a language. The prefix-closure of a language K ⊆ E∗,
denoted by K, is defined by K = {s ∈ E∗ : ∃t ∈ E∗ ∧ st ∈ K}. Recall that a
deterministic DES G is defined as a tuple G = (X,E, f, x0, Xm), where X is a set of
states, E is a set of events, f : X ×E → X is a (partial) transition function, x0 ∈ X
is the initial state, and Xm ⊆ X is a set of marked or accepting states. The transition
function f is extended from events to strings through f(x, se) = f(f(x, s), e). The
language generated by G, denoted by L(G), is defined as L(G) := {s ∈ E∗ : f(x0, s)!},
where ! means “is defined”. The marked language of G, denoted by Lm(G) ⊆ L(G)
is defined by Lm(G) := {s ∈ L(G) : f(x0, s) ∈ Xm}.
Obtaining a safe, non-blocking, and maximally permissive supervisor for a dis-
crete event system consists of solving the basic supervisory control problem in the
non-blocking case, or BSCP-NB, as described in (Ramadge and Wonham, 1987), (Cas-
sandras and Lafortune, 2008). Specifically, problem BSCP-NB computes the supre-
mal controllable sublanguage of a specification Lm(H) with respect to L(G), where
G is a system automaton and H is a specification automaton satisfying L(H) ⊆ L(G)
and Lm(H) ⊆ Lm(G). The set L(H) represents the legal sublanguage of L(G), rep-
resenting safe system behavior. The set Lm(H) is usually assumed to satisfy the
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property Lm(H) = L(H) ∩ Lm(G) (called Lm(G)-closure).
In general, the event set of G and H, denoted by E is partitioned into control-
lable events Ec and uncontrollable events Euc. The solution to problem BSCP-NB
is the language (Lm(H))↑C , where ↑ C denotes the supremal controllable sublan-
guage operation. This is the largest sublanguage K ⊆ Lm(H) satisfying the property
KEuc ∩ L(G) ⊆ K, which means that there exist no strings in K that can be ex-
tended by an uncontrollable event to a string in L(G) \K. The standard algorithm
which solves this problem is given in (Wonham and Ramadge, 1987) and constructs
a supervisor S such that Lm(S/G) = (Lm(H))↑C and L(S/G) = (Lm(H))↑C , where
S/G is the system G controlled by S.
3.7.2 Translating Between Transition Systems and Discrete Event Sys-
tems
In Thm. III.12, we compute the maximally permissive, safe, and non-deadlocking
supervisor of a system Sa = (Xa, Ua,→a, Ya, Ha) with respect to a safety specification
Safea ⊆→a and set of marked states Xm,a ⊆ Xa. In practice, this would be done
by translating the transition system Sa into an automaton Ga, the specification into
an automaton Ha, and solving BSCP-NB to obtain the supervisor S described in
the preceding subsection. Consistent with the above description of BSCP-NB, we
need two automata, denoted by Ga and Ha, to capture the system behavior →a and
the legal behavior given by Safea and Xm,a. The automaton Ga := (Xa ∪ Za, Ec ∪
Euc, ψGa , xa,0, Xm,a) must satisfy the following conditions:
Ec = Ua (3.9)
ψGa ⊆ (Xa × Ec × Za) ∪ (Za × Euc × (Xa ∪ Za)) (3.10)
ψGa(xa, ua)!⇔ ∃x′a ∈ Xa : (xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a (3.11)
∃t ∈ E∗uc : ψGa(xa, uat) = x′a ⇔ (xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a, (3.12)
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where Za is some set of intermediate states (such as QI1 and QI2 of DES G in Sec. 3.5).
In words, Eq. (3.9) signifies that the controllable events of Ga are the control inputs
of Sa, whereas Eq. (3.10) signifies that controllable (resp. uncontrollable) events
are defined only from states in Xa (resp. Za) and lead only to states in Za (resp.
Xa ∪ Za). Eqs. (3.11) and (3.12) signify that, for every (xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a, event ua is
defined from state xa of Ga and there exists some uncontrollable sequence of events
following ua that takes Ga from ψGa(xa, ua) to x
′
a. Thus, we use uncontrollable events
to model any non-determinism in the transition relation →a. Thus, there is a true
1-1 equivalence between a system in the form of definition III.4 and a discrete-event
system in the form above. Given Ga, Safea and Xm,a, we construct subautomaton
Ha v Ga (G1 is a subautomaton of G2 if ψ1(x01, s) = ψ2(x02, s) for all s ∈ L(G1),
where x01 and x02 are the initial states of G1 and G2, see (Cassandras and Lafortune,
2008)) such that Xm,a ⊆ Xa is the set of marked states and with transition function
ψHa satisfying conditions (3.11) and (3.12), but with Safea instead of →a. We solve
BSCP-NB for Ha and Ga. Because Ha v Ga, S is of the form S : Xa → 2Uc .
To unify notation between systems as in Def. III.4 and discrete event systems as
described above, we will use the notation U(x) := {u ∈ Ec : ψ(x, u)!} and Postu(x) :=
{x′ ∈ Xa : (∃t ∈ E∗uc)(x′ = ψ(x, ut))} for x ∈ Xa and (in an abuse of notation) will
write (x, u, x′) ∈ ψ if x ∈ Xa and x′ ∈ Postu(x). This notation allows us to work with
DES of the above form in the context of state reductions and exact state reductions.
3.7.3 Relations Between the Time-discretized and Discrete Event Sys-
tems
Proposition III.20. Define the observation maps HQ˜(q) := q, HX(x) := `(x), the
relation R := {(q, x) ∈ Q˜×X : `(x) = q}, and the control relation C(q) := {(uc, vc) :
vcτ = uc ∈ Uc}, for all q ∈ Q˜. Then DES G of Sec. 3.5 is a state reduction of system
(3.2).
107
Proof. Properties (1), (2), and (3) follow immediately from the definitions of HX ,
HQ, `, R, and C.
Property (4): Consider any q ∈ Q˜, uc ∈ Uc, uuc ∈ Uuc, and w ∈ W , with q′ =
ψ(q, uc, uuc, w) = q + u + w (where u = (uc, uuc)). We construct x ∈ X, x′ ∈ X
and δ ∈ ∆ such that `(x) = q, `(x′) = q′, and x + u + δ = x′ by considering each
co-ordinate in turn. There are three cases, depending on where wi lies with respect
to the interval [δmin, δmax] (recall from Eq. (3.4) that wi may be smaller than δmin or
larger than δmax when these values are not integer multiples of µτ , because of the
floor and ceiling operations).
Case 1: δmin ≤ wi ≤ δmax. Take xi = qi, δi = wi, and x′i = q′i.
Case 2: wi > δmax. Take xi = qi + µτ/2, δi = δmax, and x
′
i = xi + ui + δmax. From
the definition of `, we have that `i(xi) = qi. With these values, we obtain
q′i − x′i = qi − xi + wi − δmax = wi − δmax − µτ/2. From the definition of W ,
we know that δmax < wi < δmax + µτ , or equivalently that 0 < wi − δmax < µτ .
From this and the previous statement, we obtain −µτ/2 < q′i−x′i < µτ/2, from
which it follows that `(x′i) = q
′
i.
Case 3: wi < δmin. Take x
′
i = q
′
i + µτ/2, δi = δmin, and xi = x
′
i − ui − δmin. The
same reasoning as in the previous case shows that `(x) = q and that `(x′) = q′.
Property (5): Consider any x ∈ X, uc ∈ Uc, uuc ∈ Uuc, and δ ∈ ∆, with x′ = x+u+δ
(where u = (uc, uuc)). Take q = `(x), q
′ = `(x′), and w = q′ − q − u. It suffices to
show that w ∈ W . From q = `(x) and q′ = `(x′), we have −µτ/2 < x − q ≤ µτ/2
and −µτ/2 < x′ − q′ ≤ µτ/2 (component-wise). Combining these inequalities with
w = q′ − q − u and x′ = x+ u+ δ, we obtain w = δ + (x− q)− (x′ − q′) and hence:
−τµ+ δ < w < δ + τµ.
108
It follows that w is a vector whose components are all integer multiples of τµ and in
the interval (δmin − µτ, δmax + µτ). But from Eq. 3.4, this set of vectors is precisely
equal to W , proving that w ∈ W .
Proposition III.21. Define HX(·), HQ˜(·), R, and C as in Prop. III.20. If δmin
and δmax are both integer multiples of τµ, then DES G of Sec. 3.5 is an exact state
reduction (2) of system (3.2).
Proof. Property (6): Consider any q ∈ Q˜, uc ∈ Uc, uuc ∈ Uuc, w ∈ W , and x′ such
that q′ = q + u + w = `(x′), where u = (uc, uuc). We construct x ∈ X and δ ∈ ∆
such that q = `(x) and x′ = x + u + δ. Simply take δ = w and x = x′ − u − δ.
As remarked in the proof of Prop. III.20, w must be a vector whose components are
integer multiples of τµ and in the interval (δmin−µτ, δmax+µτ). If δmin and δmax are
multiples of τµ, then it follows that the components of w are in the (closed) interval
[δmin, δmax]. Thus δ ∈ ∆. Furthermore, x′−x = q′−q = u+w, so that x−q = x′−q′,
from which it follows that q′ = `(x′)⇒ q = `(x).
Given the above results, we can solve Prob. III.1.
Theorem III.22. Define the automaton H := (Q,EQ∪Uc∪Uuc∪W,ψsafe, q0, Qm) v
G, where ψsafe ⊆ ψ is defined by:
(q, uc, q
′) ∈ ψsafe ⇔
x ∈ `−1(q) ∧ vuc ∈ Vuc ∧ d ∈ D[0,τ ] ∧ x′ ∈ `−1(q′)
∧x′ = x+ vτ + ∫ τ
0
d(t)dt
⇒ x(t) = x+ vt+ ∫ t
0
d(t′)dt′ /∈ B, ∀t ∈ [0, τ ]
, (3.13)
where v = (uc/τ, vuc). Solve for the supremal controllable sublanguage (Lm(H))↑C of
Lm(H) with respect to L(G) and uncontrollable event set Euc = Uuc ∪W , obtaining
a maximally permissive safe and non-blocking supervisor S : Q˜ → 2Uc. Then the su-
pervisor σ : X/`→ 2Vc defined by vc ∈ σ(x)⇔ uc = τvc ∈ S(`(x)) solves Prob. III.1.
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Proof. Solving Prob. III.1 requires finding the maximally permissive safe and non-
deadlocking supervisor σ for System Sb = (X, Vc,→b, Q˜, `) subject to safety specifi-
cation Safeb and marking Xm,b, where:
(x, vc, x
′) ∈→b⇔ (∃vuc ∈ Vuc)(∃δ ∈ ∆) : x+ τv + δ = x′, v = (vc, vuc), (3.14)
(x, vc, x
′) ∈ Safeb ⇔
vuc ∈ Vuc ∧ d ∈ D[0,τ ]
∧x′ = x+ vτ + ∫ τ
0
d(t)dt
⇒ x(t) = x+ vt+ ∫ t
0
d(t′)dt′ /∈ B, ∀t ∈ [0, τ ]
, (3.15)
and Xm,b = `
−1(qm). Thus, it suffices to apply Thm. III.12, and we proceed to verify
its conditions. Proposition III.20 shows that G is a state reduction of Sb, with the
state and control relations R = {(q, x) ∈ Q˜ × X : q = `(x)} and C(q) = {(uc, vc) ∈
Uc × Vc : uc = vcτ}. The safety specification Safea defined by equation (3.13) does
indeed satisfy the condition (q, uc, q
′) ∈ Safea if and only if, for all (x, vc, x′) ∈→b
such that (q, x) ∈ R, (uc, vc) ∈ C(q) and (q′, x′) ∈ R, we have that (x, vc, x′) ∈ Safeb.
Finally, the set Qm of marked states for G and H obviously satisfies the condition
q ∈ Qm if and only if x ∈ Xm,b for all x ∈ Xb such that (q, x) ∈ R, since Qm = {qm},
Xm,b = `
−1(qm), and (q, x) ∈ R ⇔ q = `(x). Thus, G is a state reduction of Sb,
and Safea and Xm,a = Qm are induced specifications, satisfying the conditions of
Thm. III.12.
Theorem III.23. If δmin and δmax are both integer multiples of τµ, then the supervi-
sor σ of Thm. III.22 solves Prob. III.1, and is maximally permissive among the class
of all supervisors, not merely memoryless ones.
Proof. Immediate from Prop. III.21, Thm. III.18, and the proof of Thm. III.22.
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3.8 Algorithmic Implementation
In this section, we provide an algorithm for computing the DES supervisor S of
Thm. III.22 that is based on a depth-first search (DFS) and has a lower asymptotic
complexity than the standard algorithm. The customized algorithm of this section
is based on the following three observations: the vehicle’s velocities are bounded by
µ > 0; the specification automaton H is a sub-automaton of G; and each pair of
events uucw ∈ UucW is feasible after each event Uc from each state q ∈ Q˜. The
first observation implies that the system is acyclic, and hence livelock-free. This
allows for solving problem BSCP-NB in time linear in the size of G×H, rather than
quadratic (see, e.g. (Hadj-Alouane et al., 1994)). The second observation implies
that the product automaton H×G is isomorphic to H which, combined with the first
observation, allows for the problem to be solved through a DFS on G. Finally, the
third observation implies that there is no need to determine the safety of each string
ucuucw ∈ UcUucW from each state q. Instead, a single test of safety for each uc ∈ Uc
and state q ∈ Q˜ suffices. This is formalized below.
Definition III.24. Given q ∈ Q˜, u ∈ U , w ∈ W , and t ∈ [0, τ ], let the set Aq,u,w(t) ⊆
X denote the set of points xt such that there exist x ∈ `−1(q), d : [0, τ ]→ D, and x′ ∈
`−1(ψ(q, ucuucw)) satisfying x′ = x+u+
∫ τ
0
d(t′)dt′ and xt = x+u(t/τ) +
∫ t
0
d(t′)dt′.
In words, Aq,u,w(t) represents the set of possible vehicle positions xt such that it
is possible for x(kτ + t) = xt when `(x(kτ)) = q, DE control decision uc is issued at
time kτ , the uncontrolled vehicles take action uuc, and the disturbance event is w.
Given the above definition, we can say that the transition corresponding to initial
state q ∈ Q˜, action of the controlled vehicles uc, action of the uncontrolled vehicles
uuc and disturbance event w is safe if and only if Aq,u,w(t) ∩B = ∅ for all t ∈ [0, τ ].
Now remark that, since uuc ∈ Uuc and w ∈ W cannot be chosen, control action uc
can only be allowed from state q ∈ Q˜ if Aq,u,w(t)∩B = ∅ for all uuc ∈ Uuc, w ∈ W , and
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t ∈ [0, τ ]. Thus, we can define a second set Aq,uc(t) representing the set of possible
vehicle positions xt such that it is possible for x(kτ + t) = xt when `(x(kτ)) = q
and DE control decision uc is issued at time kτ , as is done below. In the following
definition, we use 1 ∈ Rn to denote the vector (1, . . . , 1), where n is the number of
vehicles. For any two vectors a = (a1, . . . , an) and b = (b1, . . . , bn), we write a < b if
ai < bi for i = 1, . . . , n, and similarly for >, ≤, and ≥. Finally, for a, b ∈ Rn, let (a, b]
denote the box {c ∈ Rn : a < c ≤ b}.
Definition III.25. Given t ∈ [0, τ ], let the set Aq,uc(t) ⊆ X denote the set of
points xt such that there exist x ∈ `−1(q), uuc ∈ Uuc, and d : [0, τ ] → D satisfying
xt = x+ u(t/τ) +
∫ t
0
d(t′)dt′, where u = (uc, uuc). This set is given by
Aq,uc(t) = (q − 1µτ/2 + vuct, q + 1µτ/2 + vuct], (3.16)
where:
vuc,i =
 uc,i/τ + dmin, vehicle i is controlledvmin + dmin, vehicle i is uncontrolled (3.17)
vuc,i =
 uc,i/τ + dmax, vehicle i is controlledvmax + dmax, vehicle i is uncontrolled (3.18)
From the above definitions, it follows that Aq,uc(t) =
⋃
uuc∈Uuc,w∈W Aq,u,w(t), and
hence that the safety of control action uc from state q ∈ Q˜ can be determined by
checking if Aq,uc(t) ∩ B = ∅ for all t ∈ [0, τ ]. Equations for verifying this condition
are give in the appendix. The general idea is to check intersection with the bad set
for each pair of vehicles, so that the test takes O(n2) time.
The following proposition provides the basis for our algorithm:
Proposition III.26. Let S be the supervisor that solves problem BSCP-NB for sys-
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tem automaton G of Sec. 3.5, specification automaton H of Thm. III.22, and event
partition E = Ec ∪ Euc with Ec = EQ ∪ Uc and Euc = Uuc ∪W . Then S is uniquely
defined by:
∀q ∈ Q˜,
uc ∈ S(q)⇔
 Aq,uc(t) ∩B = ∅
∧[(S(q′) 6= ∅ ∨ q′ = qm), ∀q′ ∈ Postuc(q)]

 (3.19)
eq ∈ S(q0)⇔ S(q) 6= ∅ (3.20)
Proof. First, H v G, so that S does indeed have the form S : Q → 2Uc , rather
than the more general form S : L(G) → 2Uc . Furthermore, there are no controllable
events defined from QI1 or QI2, so what remains is only to define S for q0 and Q˜.
Consider any q ∈ Q˜. Comparing Eq. (3.13) and Def. III.25 shows that [Aq,uc(t)∩B =
∅]⇔ [(q, uc, q′) ∈ ψsafe, ∀q′ ∈ Postuc(q)]. Thus allowing uc from q satisfies the safety
specification ofH if and only ifAq,uc(t)∩B = ∅, from which it follows that uc ∈ S(q)⇒
Aq,uc(t) ∩ B = ∅. Furthermore, the condition S(q′) 6= ∅ ∨ q′ = qm means that q′ is
not deadlocked, from which it follows that uc ∈ S(q)⇒ (S(q′) 6= ∅ ∨ q′ = qm), ∀q′ ∈
Postuc(q). Because G is acyclic, non-blockingness is equivalent to non-deadlockness,
which proves the ⇒ portion of Eq. (3.19). The other direction follows from maximal
permissiveness. A similar argument establishes the correctness of Eq. (3.20). Finally,
S is uniquely defined by Equations (3.19) and (3.20) since G is acyclic, which implies
that the recursive equations do not have cyclic dependencies.
The above proposition provides the basis for the following algorithm.
It is assumed that, for every state q ∈ Q˜, there exists a boolean variable Done(q)
that is initialized to false, and that S(q) is initialized to the empty set.
Theorem III.27. Algorithms 1 and 2 correctly compute the supervisor S of Prop. III.26.
113
Algorithm 1 Computation of S(q0)
1: procedure DoInit(G)
2: S(q0)← EQ
3: for all eq ∈ EQ do
4: if not DoDFS(G, q) then
5: S(q0)← S(q) \ {eq}
6: end if
7: end for
8: end procedure
Algorithm 2 DFS Computation of S
1: procedure DoDFS(G, q)
2: if q = qm then
3: return true
4: else if Done(q) then
5: return [S(q) 6= ∅]
6: end if
7: S(q)← Uc
8: for all uc ∈ Uc do
9: if [Aq,uc(t) ∩B 6= ∅] then
10: S(q)← S(q) \ {uc}
11: continue
12: end if
13: for all q′ ∈ Postuc(q) do
14: if not DoDFS(G, q′) then
15: S(q)← S(q) \ {uc}
16: break
17: end if
18: end for
19: end for
20: Done(q)← true
21: return [S(q) 6= ∅]
22: end procedure
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Proof. From lines 2-6 and 21, it follows that Algorithm 2 returns the boolean value
of the expression S(q) 6= ∅ ∨ q = qm. From this, Eq. (3.20), and Algorithm 1, it
follows that S(q0) is correctly computed. From lines 7-19 of Algorithm 2, it follows
that uc ∈ S(q) ⇔ [Aq,uc(t) ∩ B 6= ∅] ∧ [(S(q′) 6= ∅ ∨ q′ = qm), ∀q′ ∈ Postuc(q)]. It
therefore follows from Eq. (3.19) that S(q) is correctly computed. Finally, the DFS
of Algorithm 2 ensures that the values will be correctly computed for all q ∈ Q˜ that
are reachable under S.
Proposition III.28. The running time of Algorithms 1 and 2 is in
O
(
|Q˜||Uc| [|Postuc(q)|+ n2]
)
.
Proof. Algorithm 2 is executed at most |Q˜| times, once for each encountered q ∈ Q˜.
The outer for loop (lines 8-19) is executed |Uc| times and consists of verifying the
condition [Aq,uc(t)∩B 6= ∅] and executing the inner for loop. Verifying the condition
[Aq,uc(t)∩B 6= ∅] (line 9) takes O(n2) time (see Appendix). The inner for loop (lines
13-18) is executed |Postuc(q)| times, each of which takes O(1) time beyond that of the
recursive call. The total running time is therefore O(|Q˜||Uc| [|Postuc(q)|+ n2]).
Remark III.29. Because the particular state q ∈ Q˜ and control action uc ∈ Uc do
not restrict the set of possible actions of the uncontrolled vehicles Uuc or the set of
possible disturbance events W , the value |Postuc(q)| is independent of the particular
q ∈ Q˜ and uc ∈ Uc. This value is, however, dependent on the number of vectors of
actions of the uncontrolled vehicles (which determines |Uuc|), as well as on the bounds
of the disturbance (which determines |W |).
3.9 Simulation Results
3.9.1 Simulation Descriptions
In this section, we present results from simulations run in C++. In each case, we
used µ = τ = 1 for the time and space discretization. We consider three different
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scenarios: the first has no disturbance and no uncontrolled vehicles; the second has
uncontrolled vehicles but no disturbance; the third has no uncontrolled vehicles but
has a disturbance. We do not present a scenario which includes both uncontrolled
vehicles and a disturbance, since these often result in empty solutions. Each scenario
consists of an intersection with six vehicles, one on each of six roads arranged in a
regular hexagonal pattern. Vehicles cross from one road to the road opposite their
starting road. Specifically, if the set of vehicles is N = {1, . . . , 6}, then vehicle i ∈ N
starts on road ri,1 = i and ends on road ri,2 = 1 + [(i + 2) mod 6]. Thus, the three
pairs of vehicles (1, 4), (2, 5), and (3, 6) can occupy the intersection simultaneously,
but vehicles from different pairs cannot (see Fig. 3.6). Each of the three scenarios
consisted of three “sub-scenarios”. In each one, the length of the intersection was
identical for all roads, but this length was changed for different sub-scenarios, with all
other parameters remaining the same. For each sub-scenario, two simulations were
run, one with the algorithm as described in Sec. 3.8, and one with this algorithm
augmented with an optimization described in detail in the appendix. Briefly, this
optimization consists of computing the capture set for each pair of vehicles that
cannot simultaneously be inside the intersection. This can be done easily for such
pairs of vehicles, since the bad set is bounded and convex in this case. We describe
each scenario in more detail below.
Figure 3.6: The intersection and vehicle paths used in each of the simulations of this
section. Blue lines are drawn for each vehicle indicating starting road and
ending road.
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Scenario 1: In each of the three sub-scenarios, all vehicles’ starting positions are at
a distance of 26 from the end of the intersection and the vehicles have available
velocities {1, 2}. The parameters for the first sub-scenario are such that the ve-
hicles have just enough space to get through the intersection safely. Specifically,
one pair of vehicles must travel at maximal velocity until they have crossed the
intersection, a second pair of vehicles must enter the intersection as the first
pair leaves and travel at maximal velocity while in the intersection, and the
last pair of vehicles must travel at minimal velocity until they enter the inter-
section, which again occurs as the previous pair leaves the intersection. The
second and third sub-scenarios have shorter intersection lengths, resulting in a
strictly larger set of solutions over the same state space.
Scenario 2: In each of the three sub-scenarios, vehicles 1 and 4 are uncontrolled
whereas the other four vehicles are controlled. The controlled and uncontrolled
vehicles start at a distance of 26 and 15, respectively, from the end of the inter-
section and all vehicles have available velocities {1, 2}. The parameters for the
first sub-scenario are again such that the vehicles have just enough space to get
through the intersection safely. Because the uncontrolled vehicles start closer to
the intersection, and have the same set of available controls, they must cross the
intersection first in any safe solution. The “worst-case scenario” therefore occurs
when the uncontrolled vehicles maintain minimal velocity throughout the sim-
ulation, in which case one pair of controlled vehicles must enter the intersection
as the uncontrolled vehicles leave and must travel at maximal velocity while
inside the intersection. In this case, the last pair of controlled vehicles must
maintain minimal velocity until entering the intersection, which again occurs
as the previous pair leaves the intersection. Once again, the second and third
sub-scenarios have shorter intersection lengths, resulting in a strictly larger set
of solutions over the same state space.
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Scenario 3: This scenario uses a disturbance in the range [−1, 1]. In each of the
three sub-scenarios, vehicles 1 and 4 start at a distance of 12 from the end of
the intersection, vehicles 2 and 5 at a distance of 8, and vehicles 3 and 6 at a
distance of 4. All vehicles have available velocities {2, 3, 4, 5}. The parameters
for the first sub-scenario are again such that the vehicles have just enough space
to get through the intersection safely. The safe solutions in this case consist of
allowing vehicles 3 and 6 to cross the intersection first, followed by vehicles 2
and 5, and then finally vehicles 1 and 4. Because of the disturbance, no control
action can ensure a velocity of less than 3 or more than 4. Thus, the “worst-case
scenario” occurs when vehicles 3 and 6 travel at velocity 4 and vehicles 1 and
4 travel at velocity 3, leaving vehicles 2 and 5 to navigate in between. As was
the case in scenarios 1 and 2, the second and third sub-scenarios have shorter
intersection lengths, resulting in a strictly larger set of solutions over the same
state space.
3.9.2 Results & Analysis
For each simulation, we provide the number of states examined by the algorithm,
the subset of those states that were safe, the product of the number of examined states
with |Uc||Postuc(q)|, and the running time in seconds. For each sub-scenario, we give
the ratio of unsafe examined states for the simulation with optimization compared to
that without optimization. This data is presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.
A comparison of the last two rows shows that the algorithm can compute max-
imally permissive solutions in approximately one minute for systems with over 200
million accessible transitions in the absence of a disturbance, and with over 50 billion
accessible transitions in the presence of a disturbance. There are two reasons why the
algorithm can deal with systems with larger numbers of accessible transitions in the
presence of a disturbance. First, the fact that there is only one safety test for each
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Table 3.1: Scenario 1: No uncontrolled vehicles, no disturbance.
Int. Range α = 3 α = 2 α = 1
Optimization? × √ × √ × √
Examined States 877886 37901 1815045 438432 3187418 2030613
Safe States 754 146097 1752458
(Ex. States)|Uc||Postuc (q)| 5.62× 107 2.43× 106 1.16× 108 2.81× 107 2.04× 108 1.30× 108
Time (s) 6.61 0.37 16.32 5.55 44.75 38.59
Unsafe Ratio 0.0424 0.175 0.194
uc ∈ Uc, rather than for each combination of uc ∈ Uc, uuc ∈ Uuc, and w ∈ W signif-
icantly reduces the number of safety tests. In simulation 3, |Postuc(q)| = 36 = 729.
Second, although the asymptotic complexity has a term of O(|Q˜||Uc||Postuc(q)|), this
term derives from verifying if q′ is deadlocked, for each successor q′ ∈ Postuc(q). Be-
cause uc is unsafe from q if there exists any such deadlocked q
′, the algorithm ceases
to examine further members of Postuc(q) as soon as it finds any deadlocked successor
(line 16 of Algorithm 2). This also explains why the running time increases more
quickly in going from sub-scenario 1 to sub-scenario 3 in the presence of a distur-
bance: as the proportion of examined states that are safe increases, a larger number
of control actions become safe, and the average number of successor states that must
be examined on line 14 of Algorithm 2 increases more rapidly when |Postuc(q)| is
large.
The results of all sub-scenarios show that the majority of unsafe states examined
through the depth-first search without the optimization are states which are unsafe
because there exists no solution for a particular pair of vehicles (at least 79% in all
sub-scenarios). Nonetheless, the optimization does incur some overhead, so that the
computational savings are greatest when there is a large portion of the reachable state
space that consists of unsafe states. Because of this overhead, the running time is
actually greater with optimization than without in sub-scenario 3 of scenario 2.
Remark III.30. In scenario 3, the number of safe examined states differs when com-
paring simulations with and without the optimization. This is due to safe states
that are reached through non-determinism but which become unreachable in the final
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Table 3.2: Scenario 2: Uncontrolled vehicles, no disturbance.
Int. Range α = 3 α = 2 α = 1
Optimization? × √ × √ × √
Examined 1044346 360067 1680685 891391 2130800 1515525
Safe 229581 735974 1420771
(Ex. States)|Uc||Postuc (q)| 6.68× 107 2.30× 107 1.08× 108 5.70× 107 1.36× 108 9.70× 107
Time (s) 5.74 3.39 12.76 11.66 20.36 22.87
Unsafe Ratio 0.160 0.165 0.133
Table 3.3: Scenario 3: Disturbance, no uncontrolled vehicles.
Int. Range α = 3/2 α = 1 α = 1/2
Optimization? × √ × √ × √
Examined 3385 1630 9850 5329 22866 16745
Safe 1575 1575 5623 5030 15179 15133
(Ex. States)|Uc||Postuc (q)| 1.01× 1010 4.87× 109 2.94× 1010 1.59× 1010 6.83× 1010 5.00× 1010
Time (s) 1.06 0.75 12.03 9.15 76.83 58.37
Unsafe Ratio 0.030 0.071 0.210
supervised system. As an example, suppose that q′, q′′ ∈ Postuc(q) and that q′ is
found to be safe, whereas q′′ is found to be unsafe. Then uc /∈ S(q), and q′ could
become unreachable, after having been examined by the algorithm. In some cases,
these states will not be examined by the algorithm using the capture set optimization,
resulting in a smaller number of examined safe states.
3.10 Conclusion
We considered the problem of supervising a set of vehicles approaching an intersec-
tion so as to avoid collisions, in the presence of environmental uncertainty in the form
of uncontrolled vehicles and a disturbance. We solved this problem by constructing a
DES abstraction and leveraging supervisory control methods of DES, a natural for-
mulation for problems involving uncontrolled elements in which it is desired to obtain
maximally permissive safe and non-deadlocking supervisors. We described the state
reduction and exact state reduction relations between systems and abstractions, and
used these to show that translating the supervisor for the abstraction back to the
original problem domain preserves not only safety and non-deadlockingness, but also
maximal permissiveness. Finally, we presented a customized algorithm for solving
this supervisory control problem, and demonstrated its scalability through simula-
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tion. This works extends the range of applications of DES. Moreover, to the best of
our knowledge, it is the first DES application where the discrete event model is ob-
tained by building a state reduction abstraction of the underlying continuous system
model. Future work includes the extension of this work to the case of measurement
uncertainty, second order dynamics, and stochastic problem formulations.
Appendix : Equations for Checking Safety
This appendix provides the equations that were used in the simulations of Sec. 3.9
for verifying the safety of a DES transitions (Part 1), and the equations for the pair-
wise capture sets for vehicles that cannot simultaneously be inside the intersection
(Part 2).
Part 1: Verifying if Aq,uc(t) ∩B = ∅ for all t ∈ [0, τ ].
In part 1 of this appendix, we prove the equations used for verifying the safety of
transitions. As stated in Sec. 3.8, there are equations for each pair of vehicles i, j ∈ N ,
and verifying the safety of a DES transition for some initial state q ∈ Q˜ and uc ∈ Uc is
done by verifying the corresponding equations for each pair of vehicles. We consider
three cases (see Sec. 3.4): xi, xj ≤ 0, |xi − xj| < γ (case 1a), xi, xj ≥ 0, |xi − xj| < γ
(case 1b), and [−αri,1 < xi < αri,2 ] ∧ [−αrj,1 < xj < αrj,2 ] (case 2). The equations for
these cases are provided in Props. (III.33)-(III.35), respectively. Note that there is
no “case 1c” when xi ≤ 0 and xj ≥ 0, since the vehicles would then be on different
roads.
We begin by defining the set Aq,uc([0, τ ]) :=
⋃
t∈[0,τ ] Aq,uc(t). Because the bad set is
defined as a union of sets of linear inequalities, with one set for each pair of vehicles,
we verify Aq,uc([0, τ ]) ∩ B = ∅ by considering each pair of vehicles in turn. For any
vehicle i ∈ N and any set P ⊆ X, let pii(P ) denote the projection of P onto the i
axis. Similarly, for any pair of vehicles i, j ∈ N and a set P ⊆ X, let pii,j(P ) denote
the projection of P onto the i− j plane.
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Proposition III.31. (xi, xj) ∈ pii,j(Aq,uc([0, τ ])) iff all of the following inequalities
hold:
xi > qi − µτ/2 (3.21)
xj > qj − µτ/2 (3.22)
xi ≤ qi + µτ/2 + vuc,iτ (3.23)
xj ≤ qj + µτ/2 + vuc,jτ (3.24)
vuc,i(xj − qj + µτ/2)− vuc,j(xi − qi − µτ/2) > 0 (3.25)
vuc,j(xi − qi + µτ/2)− vuc,i(xj − qj − µτ/2) > 0 (3.26)
Proof. From Eqs. (3.17), (3.18) and the assumption that vmin + dmin ≥ µ > 0, we
have that pii(Aq,uc(t)) = (qi − µτ/2 + vuc,it, qi + µτ/2 + vuc,it] is an interval whose
lower and upper bounds are increasing in time, for every i ∈ N . It follows that the
set {t ∈ R : xi ∈ pii(Aq,uc(t)} will have the form [ti,min, ti,max), where ti,min := inf{t ∈
R : xi ∈ pii(Aq,uc(t))} and ti,max := sup{t ∈ R : xi ∈ pii(Aq,uc(t))} are given by:
ti,min =
xi − qi − µτ/2
vuc,i
(3.27)
ti,max =
xi − qi + µτ/2
vuc,i
(3.28)
Now define tj,min and tj,max analogously to ti,min and ti,max. Then:
∃t ∈ [0, τ ] s.t. [xi ∈ pii(Aq,uc(t))] ∧ [xj ∈ pij(Aq,uc(t))]
⇔ [0, τ ] ∩ [ti,min, ti,max) ∩ [tj,min, tj,max) 6= ∅
⇔ [ti,max > 0] ∧ [tj,max > 0] ∧ [ti,min ≤ τ ] ∧ [tj,min ≤ τ ]
∧[tj,max > ti,min] ∧ [ti,max > tj,min]
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and these last six inequalities give Eqs. (3.21)-(3.26), in order.
As stated above, we can check if Aq,uc([0, τ ]) ∩ B = ∅ by considering each pair of
vehicles in turn. There are three types of constraints to consider:
Case 1a: xi, xj ≤ 0, |xi − xj| < γ.
Lemma III.32. Consider any xi, xi, xj, xj ∈ R. Then:
(∃xi ∈ (xi, xi])(∃xj ∈ (xj, xj])(xi ≤ 0 ∧ xj ≤ 0 ∧ |xi − xj| < γ)
⇔ [xi < xi ∧ xi < 0 ∧ xj < xj ∧ xj < 0 ∧ xi − xj < γ ∧ xj − xi < γ]
(3.29)
Proof. (⇒):
xi ∈ (xi, xi]⇒ xi < xi ≤ xi ⇒ xi < xi
xi < xi ∧ xi ≤ 0 ⇒ xi < 0
xj ∈ (xj, xj]⇒ xj < xj ≤ xj ⇒ xj < xj
xj < xj ∧ xj ≤ 0 ⇒ xj < 0
xi − xj < γ ∧ xi < xi ∧ xj ≤ xj ⇒ xi − xj < γ
xj − xi < γ ∧ xj < xj ∧ xi ≤ xi ⇒ xj − xi < γ
(⇐) It cannot be that both xi − xj ≥ γ and xj − xi ≥ γ, as this would imply
0 ≥ 2γ > 0. Thus, at least one of xi−xj < γ, or xj−xi < γ holds. If they both hold,
we may take xi = xi +  and xj = xj +  for some sufficiently small  > 0 and we are
done. Suppose without loss of generality then that xi − xj < γ but xj − xi ≥ γ. Let
xi = xj − γ. Thus, xj − xi = γ, xi − xj = −γ < γ and xi < 0 (since xj < 0). We
may therefore take xi = xi +  and xj = xj +  for some sufficiently small  > 0 and
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we are done.
Proposition III.33. The set {(xi, xj) ∈ pii,j(Aq,uc([0, τ ])) : xi, xj ≤ 0∧ |xi−xj| < γ}
is non-empty iff all of the following inequalities hold:
qi < µτ/2 (3.30)
qj < µτ/2 (3.31)
vuc,j(qi + µτ/2 + γ)−max{vuc,i, vuc,j}(qj − µτ/2) > 0 (3.32)
vuc,i(qj + µτ/2 + γ)−max{vuc,j, vuc,i}(qi − µτ/2) > 0 (3.33)
[qi + µτ/2 + γ + τ max{vuc,i, vuc,j}]− [qj − µτ/2 + τvuc,j] > 0 (3.34)
[qj + µτ/2 + γ + τ max{vuc,j, vuc,i}]− [qi − µτ/2 + τvuc,i] > 0 (3.35)
Proof. Let pii(Aq,uc(t)) = (xi(t), xi(t)] and pij(Aq,uc(t)) = (xj(t), xj(t)]. By Lemma
III.32, it is necessary and sufficient to find some t ∈ [0, τ ] such that xi(t) < 0,
xj(t) < 0, xi(t)− xj(t) < γ, and xj(t)− xi(t) < γ. Now define ti,max, tj,max, ti−j, and
tj−i by xi(ti,max) = 0, xj(tj,max) = 0, xi(ti−j)−xj(ti−j) = γ, and xj(tj−i)−xi(tj−i) = γ.
These are given by:
ti,max = −qi − µτ/2
vuc,i
(3.36)
tj,max = −qj − µτ/2
vuc,j
(3.37)
ti−j =
(qi − µτ/2)− (qj + µτ/2 + γ)
vuc,j − vuc,i
(3.38)
tj−i =
(qj − µτ/2)− (qi + µτ/2 + γ)
vuc,i − vuc,j
(3.39)
Obviously, ti−j is only well defined when vuc,j 6= vuc,i and tj−i is only well defined
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when vuc,i 6= vuc,j. Because xi(t) and xj(t) are increasing in time, we have that:
xi(t) < 0 ⇔ t < ti,max (3.40)
xj(t) < 0 ⇔ t < tj,max (3.41)
On the other hand, xi(t) − xj(t) is increasing in time if vuc,j < vuc,i, decreasing in
time if vuc,j > vuc,i, and constant if vuc,j = vuc,i. It therefore follows that:
xi(t)− xj(t) < γ ⇔

t < ti−j, vuc,j < vuc,i
t > ti−j, vuc,j > vuc,i
(qj + µτ/2 + γ) > (qi − µτ/2), vuc,j = vuc,i
(3.42)
Similarly,
xj(t)− xi(t) < γ ⇔

t < tj−i, vuc,i < vuc,j
t > tj−i, vuc,i > vuc,j
(qi + µτ/2 + γ) > (qj − µτ/2), vuc,i = vuc,j
(3.43)
This would give nine cases to consider, but three are impossible, since vuc,j < vuc,i ⇒
vuc,j ≤ vuc,j < vuc,i ≤ vuc,i ⇒ vuc,j < vuc,i and similarly, vuc,i < vuc,j ⇒ vuc,i < vuc,j.
We will consider each of the six remaining cases in turn, but first prove the following
claims:
tj−i < tj,max ∧ ti,max > 0 ⇒ tj−i < ti,max (3.44)
ti−j < ti,max ∧ tj,max > 0 ⇒ ti−j < tj,max (3.45)
ti−j > 0 ∧ vuc,j < vuc,i ⇒ tj−i < ti−j (3.46)
tj−i > 0 ∧ vuc,i < vuc,j ⇒ ti−j < tj−i (3.47)
Clearly, Eq. (3.44) holds if tj−i ≤ 0. If tj−i > 0, then xi(tj−i) < xi(tj−i) =
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xj(tj−i) − γ < xj(tj−i). From Eq. (3.41), we have that tj−i < tj,max ⇔ xj(tj−i) < 0.
Hence, xi(tj−i) < xj(tj−i) < 0 and therefore tj−i < ti,max follows from Eq. (3.40),
proving Eq. (3.44). Eq. (3.45) is proven similarly. To prove Eq. (3.46), suppose to
the contrary that tj−i ≥ ti−j > 0. As before, tj−i > 0 ⇒ xi(tj−i) < xj(tj−i). From
vuc,j < vuc,i, tj−i ≥ ti−j, and Eq. (3.42), we have that xi(tj−i) ≥ xj(tj−i)+γ > xj(tj−i).
Thus we have xj(tj−i) > xi(tj−i) > xj(tj−i), which is a contradiction since it cannot
be that xj(tj−i) > xj(tj−i) for tj−i > 0, proving Eq. (3.46). Eq. (3.47) is proven
similarly. We now proceed with the six cases. In what follows, note that Eqs. (3.32)
and (3.34) both reduce to (qi + µτ/2 + γ) > (qj − µτ/2) when vuc,i ≤ vuc,j and that
Eqs. (3.33) and (3.35) similarly both reduce to (qj + µτ/2 + γ) > (qi − µτ/2) when
vuc,j ≤ vuc,i.
Case (i): vuc,j = vuc,i and vuc,i = vuc,j.
∃t ∈ [0, τ ] s.t. [xi(t) < 0] ∧ [xj(t) < 0]
∧[xi(t)− xj(t) < γ] ∧ [xj(t)− xi(t) < γ]
⇔
[0, τ ] ∩ (−∞, ti,max) ∩ (−∞, tj,max) 6= ∅
∧[(qj + µτ/2 + γ) > (qi − µτ/2)]
∧[(qi + µτ/2 + γ) > (qj − µτ/2)]
(Eqs. (3.40)-(3.43))
⇔
[0 < ti,max] ∧ [0 < tj,max]
∧[(qj + µτ/2 + γ) > (qi − µτ/2)]
∧[(qi + µτ/2 + γ) > (qj − µτ/2)]
⇔ [(3.30)] ∧ [(3.31)] ∧ [(3.33) ∧ (3.35)] ∧ [(3.32) ∧ (3.34)]
Case (ii): vuc,j > vuc,i and vuc,i = vuc,j.
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∃t ∈ [0, τ ] s.t. [xi(t) < 0] ∧ [xj(t) < 0]
∧[xi(t)− xj(t) < γ] ∧ [xj(t)− xi(t) < γ]
⇔ [0, τ ] ∩ (−∞, ti,max) ∩ (−∞, tj,max) ∩ (ti−j,∞) 6= ∅
∧[(qi + µτ/2 + γ) > (qj − µτ/2)]
(Eqs. (3.40)-(3.43))
⇔ [0 < ti,max] ∧ [0 < tj,max] ∧ [ti−j < τ ] ∧ [ti−j < ti,max]
∧[ti−j < tj,max] ∧ [(qi + µτ/2 + γ) > (qj − µτ/2)]
⇔ [0 < ti,max] ∧ [0 < tj,max] ∧ [ti−j < τ ] ∧ [ti−j < ti,max]
∧[(qi + µτ/2 + γ) > (qj − µτ/2)]
(Eq. (3.45))
⇔ [(3.30)] ∧ [(3.31)] ∧ [(3.35)] ∧ [(3.33)] ∧ [(3.32) ∧ (3.34)]
Case (iii): vuc,j = vuc,i and vuc,i > vuc,j.
This is case is symmetrical to Case (ii).
Case (iv): vuc,j < vuc,i and vuc,i > vuc,j.
∃t ∈ [0, τ ] s.t. [xi(t) < 0] ∧ [xj(t) < 0]
∧[xi(t)− xj(t) < γ] ∧ [xj(t)− xi(t) < γ]
⇔ [0, τ ] ∩ (−∞, ti,max) ∩ (−∞, tj,max) ∩ (−∞, ti−j) ∩ (tj−i,∞) 6= ∅ (Eqs. (3.40)-(3.43))
⇔ [0 < ti,max] ∧ [0 < tj,max] ∧ [0 < ti−j] ∧ [tj−i < τ ]
∧[tj−i < ti,max] ∧ [tj−i < tj,max] ∧ [tj−i < ti−j]
⇔ [0 < ti,max] ∧ [0 < tj,max] ∧ [0 < ti−j] ∧ [tj−i < τ ] ∧ [tj−i < tj,max] (Eqs. (3.44), (3.46))
⇔ [(3.30)] ∧ [(3.31)] ∧ [(3.33) ∧ (3.35)] ∧ [(3.34)] ∧ [(3.32)]
Case (v): vuc,j > vuc,i and vuc,i < vuc,j.
This is case is symmetrical to Case (iv).
Case (vi): vuc,j > vuc,i and vuc,i > vuc,j.
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∃t ∈ [0, τ ] s.t. [xi(t) < 0] ∧ [xj(t) < 0]
∧[xi(t)− xj(t) < γ] ∧ [xj(t)− xi(t) < γ]
⇔ [0, τ ] ∩ (−∞, ti,max) ∩ (−∞, tj,max) ∩ (ti−j,∞) ∩ (tj−i,∞) 6= ∅ (Eqs. (3.40)-(3.43))
⇔
[0 < ti,max] ∧ [0 < tj,max]
∧[tj−i < τ ] ∧ [tj−i < ti,max] ∧ [tj−i < tj,max]
∧[ti−j < τ ] ∧ [ti−j < ti,max] ∧ [ti−j < tj,max]
⇔
[0 < ti,max] ∧ [0 < tj,max]
∧[tj−i < τ ] ∧ [tj−i < tj,max]
∧[ti−j < τ ] ∧ [ti−j < ti,max]
(Eqs. (3.44), (3.45))
⇔ [(3.30)] ∧ [(3.31)] ∧ [(3.34)] ∧ [(3.32)] ∧ [(3.35)] ∧ [(3.33)]
Case 1b: xi, xj ≥ 0, |xi − xj| < γ.
Proposition III.34. The set {(xi, xj) ∈ pii,j(Aq,uc([0, τ ])) : xi, xj ≥ 0∧ |xi−xj| < γ}
is non-empty iff all of the following inequalities hold:
qi ≥ −µτ/2− vuc,iτ (3.48)
qj ≥ −µτ/2− vuc,jτ (3.49)
max{vuc,i, vuc,j}(qi + µτ/2 + τvuc,i)
−vuc,i(qj − µτ/2− γ + τvuc,j) > 0
(3.50)
max{vuc,j, vuc,i}(qj + µτ/2 + τvuc,j)
−vuc,j(qi − µτ/2− γ + τvuc,i) > 0
(3.51)
(qi + µτ/2 + τ max{vuc,j, vuc,i})
−(qj − µτ/2− γ + τvuc,j) > 0
(3.52)
(qj + µτ/2 + τ max{vuc,i, vuc,j})
−(qi − µτ/2− γ + τvuc,i) > 0
(3.53)
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Proof. The proof is similar to that of Prop. III.33, and is omitted.
Case 2: [−αri,1 < xi < αri,2 ] ∧ [−αrj,1 < xj < αrj,2 ].
Proposition III.35. The set {(xi, xj) ∈ pii,j(Aq,uc([0, τ ])) : [−αri,1 < xi < αri,2 ] ∧
[−αrj,1 < xj < αrj,2 ]} is non-empty iff all of the following inequalities hold:
qi < αri,2 + µτ/2 (3.54)
qj < αrj,2 + µτ/2 (3.55)
qi > −αri,1 − µτ/2− vuc,iτ (3.56)
qj > −αrj,1 − µτ/2− vuc,jτ (3.57)
vuc,j(qi + µτ/2 + αri,1)− vuc,i(qj − µτ/2− αrj,2) > 0 (3.58)
vuc,i(qj + µτ/2 + αrj,1)− vuc,j(qi − µτ/2− αri,2) > 0 (3.59)
Proof. We proceed similarly to the proof of Prop. III.31. From Eqs. (3.17), (3.18) and
the assumption that vmin + dmin ≥ µ > 0, we have that pii(Aq,uc(t)) = (qi − µτ/2 +
vuc,it, qi + µτ/2 + vuc,it] is an interval whose lower and upper bounds are increasing
in time, for every i ∈ N . It follows that the set {t ∈ R : (−αri,1 , αri,2)∩pii(Aq,uc(t)) 6=
∅} will have the form (t2i,min, t2i,max), where t2i,min := inf{t ∈ R : (−αri,1 , αri,2) ∩
pii(Aq,uc(t)) 6= ∅} and t2i,max := sup{t ∈ R : (−αri,1 , αri,2) ∩ pii(Aq,uc(t)) 6= ∅} are given
by:
t2i,min =
−qi − αri,1 − µτ/2
vuc,i
(3.60)
t2i,max =
−qi + αri,2 + µτ/2
vuc,i
(3.61)
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Now define t2j,min and t
2
j,max analogously to t
2
i,min and t
2
i,max. Then:
∃t ∈ [0, τ ] s.t. [(−αri,1 , αri,2) ∩ pii(Aq,uc(t))] ∧ [(−αrj,1 , αrj,2) ∩ pij(Aq,uc(t))]
⇔ [0, τ ] ∩ (t2i,min, t2i,max) ∩ (t2j,min, t2j,max) 6= ∅
⇔ [t
2
i,max > 0] ∧ [t2j,max > 0] ∧ [t2i,min < τ ] ∧ [t2j,min < τ ]
∧t2j,max > t2i,min ∧ t2i,max > t2j,min
and these last six inequalities give Eqs. (3.54)-(3.59), in order.
Part 2: The Capture Set Optimization
Here we describe an optimization which allows for a substantial reduction of the num-
ber of unsafe examined states in Alg. 2. The optimization is based on the observation
that the bad set is convex (rectangular) for a pair of vehicles which cannot simul-
taneously be inside the intersection (Case 2 of Part 1). Thus it is straight-forward
to compute the capture set of states from which no supervisor can ensure avoidance
of the bad set for such a pair of vehicles. Before stating the theorem, we define the
minimal and maximal velocities which can be forced by the supervisor, given that it
does not control the uncontrolled vehicles or the disturbance:
vci =
 vmin + dmax, vehicle i is controlledvmax + dmax, vehicle i is uncontrolled (3.62)
vci =
 vmax + dmin, vehicle i is controlledvmin + dmin, vehicle i is uncontrolled (3.63)
Proposition III.36. Given two vehicles i and j on different roads, there does not
exist any safe and non-deadlocking supervisor σ : Q˜ → 2Uc with σ(q) 6= ∅, for any
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q ∈ Q˜ such that ∃x ∈ `−1(q) satisfying all of the following equations:
xi < αri,2 (3.64)
xj < αrj,2 (3.65)
vci(xj + αrj,1)− vcj(xi − αri,2) > 0 (3.66)
vcj(xi + αri,1)− vci(xj − αrj,2) > 0 (3.67)
Proof. First, it follows from the definitions of vci and v
c
i that, for any x satisfying
Eqs. (3.64)-(3.67) and uc ∈ Uc, there exists some uuc ∈ Uuc and d : [0, τ ] → D such
that x(t) = x+ u(t/τ) + d(t) either remains inside the set given by Eqs. (3.64)-(3.67)
for t ∈ [0, τ ], or enters the bad set for some t ∈ [0, τ ] (see Fig. 3.7). Second, it follows
from vmin+dmin > 0 that no control strategy can prevent the vehicles from eventually
leaving the set given by Eqs (3.64)-(3.67). Thus either the system eventually reaches
some state q′ ∈ Q˜ such that σ(q′) = ∅, or σ allows the system to enter the bad set.
We can obtain the set of set of states q for which there exists some x ∈ `−1(q)
satisfying Eqs. (3.64)-(3.67) by taking this set and “inflating it” by µτ/2, to capture
the effect of the discretization. This gives one of two possibilities, depending on
whether the set of Eqs. (3.64)-(3.67) is open or closed. Then set will be open if
vcj
vci
≤ vcj
vci
and closed if
vcj
vci
>
vcj
vci
. If the set is open, the equations become:
qi < αri,2 + µτ/2 (3.68)
qj < αrj,2 + µτ/2 (3.69)
vci(qj + αrj,1 + µτ/2)− vcj(qj − αri,2 − µτ/2) > 0 (3.70)
vcj(qi + αri,1 + µτ/2)− vci(qi − αrj,2 − µτ/2) > 0 (3.71)
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If the set is closed, then two more equations must be added in general (see Fig. 3.7)
qi >
vciv
c
jαri,1 + v
c
iv
c
iαrj,2 + v
c
iv
c
iαrj,1 + v
c
iv
c
jαri,2
vciv
c
j − vcivcj
− µτ/2 (3.72)
qj >
vciv
c
jαrj,1 + v
c
jv
c
jαri,2 + v
c
jv
c
jαri,1 + v
c
iv
c
jαrj,2
vciv
c
j − vcivcj
− µτ/2 (3.73)
If dmin and dmax are integer multiples of µ, then it can be shown these last two
equations become unnecessary. We first prove a lemma.
Lemma III.37. If dmin and dmax are integer multiples of µ,
vcj
vci
>
vcj
vci
, and q ∈ Q˜
satisfies Eqs. (3.70) and (3.71) then, for any uc ∈ Uc, there exists q′ ∈ Postuc(q) that
also satisfies Eqs. (3.70) and (3.71).
Proof. First note from Eqs. (3.62) and (3.63) that, if either vehicle is uncontrolled,
then
vcj
vci
≤ 1 and vcj
vci
≥ 1, violating vcj
vci
>
vcj
vci
. It follows that both vehicles are controlled,
and that vci = v
c
j > v
c
i = v
c
j. We prove the following claim:
Claim: For any uc ∈ Uc, there exists some di ∈ [dmin, dmax] such that uc,i/τ + di ∈
[vci , v
c
i ] and uc,i/τ + di is an integer multiple of µ.
It suffices to prove that, for any uc ∈ Uc, [vci−uc,i/τ, vci−uc,i/τ ]∩ [dmin, dmax] contains
some integral multiple of µ, since we may then take such a value as di. Clearly, uc,i/τ ∈
[vmin, vmax], from which it follows that v
c
i − uc,i/τ = vmin + dmax − uc,i/τ ≤ dmax and
that vci−uc,i/τ = vmax+dmin−uc,i/τ ≥ dmin. Thus, [vci−uc,i/τ, vci−uc,i/τ ]∩[dmin, dmax]
is non-empty. Since it is non-empty, there must be at least one of dmin and v
c
i −uc,i/τ
in the intersection of the two sets. Since both dmin and v
c
i − uc,i/τ are multiples of µ,
the claim is proven.
Constructing di and dj as in the claim, we obtain
vcj
vci
≥ uc,j/τ + dj
uc,i/τ + di
≥ v
c
j
vci
.
It follows that we can take w ∈ W such that wi = diτ and wj = djτ , obtaining q′
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with q′i = qi+uc,i+wi, q
′
j = qj +uc,j +wj such that q
′ ∈ Postuc(q) satisfies Eqs. (3.70)
and (3.71).
Corollary III.38. If dmin and dmax are integer multiples of µ then, given two vehicles
i and j on different roads, there does not exist any safe and non-deadlocking supervisor
σ : Q˜ → 2Uc with σ(q) 6= ∅, for any q ∈ Q˜ satisfying Eqs. (3.68)-(3.71) only (i.e.,
without satisfying Eqs. (3.72) and (3.73)), even when
vcj
vci
>
vcj
vci
.
Proof. We have already shown that the result holds if
vcj
vci
≤ vcj
vci
, or
vcj
vci
>
vcj
vci
and q
satisfies Eqs. (3.68)-(3.73). It remains to be shown that the result also holds if dmin
and dmax are integer multiples of µ,
vcj
vci
>
vcj
vci
, and q satisfies Eqs. (3.68)-(3.71), but
not Eqs. (3.72) and (3.73). Consider any uc ∈ Uc. By Lemma III.37, there exists
q′ ∈ Postuc(q) that also satisfies Eqs. (3.70) and (3.71). There are now three cases
to consider:
Case 1: q′ satisfies Eqs. (3.68)-(3.73).
We have shown in this case there exists no safe and non-deadlocking supervisor from
q′.
Case 2: q′ satisfies Eqs. (3.68)-(3.71), but not both of Eqs. (3.72) and (3.73).
Because dmin+vmin > 0, Lemma III.37 can be applied repeatedly, until a q
′ is obtained
which satisfies Eqs. (3.72) and (3.73).
Case 3: q′ does not satisfy both of Eqs. (3.68) and (3.69).
In this case, the line segment from q to q′ either crosses the bad set, or comes within
a distance of µτ/2 of it (see Fig. 3.7). In the latter case, we can find some pair
x ∈ `−1(q) and x′ ∈ `−1(q′) such that the line segment from x to x′ crosses the bad
set.
Figure 3.7 depicts the set described by Eqs. (3.64)-(3.67) of Prop. III.36, the
inflated set of Eqs. (3.68)-(3.73), and the special case of Cor. III.38. The simulations
of Sec. 3.9 satisfied the property that dmin and dmax were integer multiples of µ, and
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(3.66)
(3.64)
(3.65)
(3.67)
(3.70)
(3.68)
(3.69)
(3.71)
(a) Open Case
(3.66)
(3.64)
(3.65)
(3.67)
(3.73)
(3.70)
(3.68)
(3.69)
(3.71)
(3.72)
(b) Closed Case
Figure 3.7: The capture sets of Eqs. (3.64)-(3.73) in the open (left) and closed (right)
cases. The blue square denotes the bad set. The set of Eqs. (3.64)-(3.67)
is depicted with solid lines, and its inflation by µτ/2 is depicted in dashed
lines. Right: If dmin and dmax are integer multiples of µ, then Eqs. (3.72)
and (3.73) are unnecessary, which is shown by the dotted lines.
hence the code used Eqs. (3.68)-(3.71) only.
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CHAPTER IV
Vehicle Control : The case of imperfect
measurement
4.1 Abstract
We consider the problem of supervising a set of vehicles through an intersection,
in the presence of uncontrolled vehicles, bounded disturbances, and measurement
uncertainty. In real time, an estimate of the system’s state is updated through a
prediction-correction scheme, based on the actions of the controlled vehicles and the
obtained imperfect measurements. The corrected estimates are mapped to a set of
discrete states and sent to a supervisor, which outputs a set of allowable velocities
for the controlled vehicles. The supervisor must be safe (i.e., collision-free), non-
deadlocking (i.e., the vehicles must eventually cross the intersection), and maximally
permissive with respect to the chosen discretization. We show how to construct a
suitable Discrete Event System (DES) model of the prediction-correction estimator
of the continuous system and associated specifications such that solving for the max-
imally permissive supervisor of the DES yields a supervisor for the original system
that is safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally permissive. Building on previous work,
we present two new types of system abstractions: the state estimate reduction and
the exact state estimate reduction. We show that, when the DES model is a state
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estimate reduction of the prediction-correction estimator, the supervisor constructed
through the above procedure will be maximally permissive among memoryless super-
visors. In the case of an exact state estimate reduction, the obtained supervisor will
be maximally permissive among all supervisors, not merely memoryless ones.
4.2 Introduction
We consider the problem of supervising a set of vehicles through an intersection,
in the presence of uncontrolled vehicles, bounded disturbances, and measurement
uncertainty. Rather than choosing a particular control action from every state, the
supervisor outputs a set of allowable control actions for the vehicles. The goal of this
work is to construct such a supervisor that is safe (i.e., the vehicles do not collide),
non-deadlocking (i.e., the vehicles eventually cross the intersection and do not reach
states where the set of allowable actions by the supervisor is empty), and maximally
permissive.
Approaches to the problem of controlling vehicles at an intersection generally
fall into one of three categories: computation of maximally controlled invariant sets;
scheduling techniques; and abstraction. Methods in the first category naturally re-
sult in supervisors that are safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally permissive, since a
control action can be allowed if and only if it keeps the system inside the maximally
controlled invariant set. Work in this category includes: Hafner and Del Vecchio
(2011); Verma and Del Vecchio (2011). These methods can also handle disturbances,
uncontrollability, and measurement uncertainty, but typically make assumptions such
as convexity or order preserving dynamics, without which they do not scale well to
systems with multiple dimensions.
Scheduling techniques work by treating the intersection as an indivisible resource
to be allocated to different vehicles at different times. The general version of the deci-
sion problem is NP-hard, but takes polynomial time when each job (vehicle) requires
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the resource (the intersection) for the same amount of time. Mapping the vehicle con-
trol problem to the polynomial time scheduling problem therefore amounts to either:
assuming symmetries in the problem; or a problem relaxation when such symmetries
are not satisfied. Work in this category includes: Colombo and Del Vecchio (2012),
its extension to the case of dynamics with disturbances, Bruni et al. (2013), and
its extension to the case of uncontrolled vehicles, Ahn et al. (2014). To our knowl-
edge, these methods have not been extended to the case of measurement uncertainty.
Furthermore, the assumption of mutual exclusiveness of the intersection’s use is re-
strictive, as it precludes vehicles on common or non-intersecting trajectories (e.g., in
the case of right turns) from utilizing the intersection simultaneously.
Our approach falls in the category of abstraction. This approach generally con-
sists of the following three steps: mapping the original, large (usually infinite), state
space of a problem instance to a smaller, finite, set of states and defining the transi-
tions over the smaller space to model the possible behaviors of the original system;
computing a controller or supervisor for the finite model; and refining this controller
or supervisor to one for the original system. The type of relation ((bi)simulation,
alternating (bi)simulation, and various approximate variations of these) between the
original and abstracted system determines what kind of guarantees can be made on
the refined controller or supervisor. Work in this category includes: Colombo and
Del Vecchio (2011a,b); Colombo and Girard (2013), which use differential flatness to
guarantee bounds on the distance between safe trajectories and trajectories allowed
by the obtained supervisor. These methods have not been extended to the case of
measurement uncertainty, as the presence of measurement uncertainty typically re-
sult in a loss of the aforementioned guaranteed bounds. Our work is most similar to
that of Girard et al. (2010); Pola and Tabuada (2009); Zamani et al. (2012); Camara
et al. (2011), which construct abstract models satisfying simulation or alternating
simulation relations with the original system models. This work defines new types
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of relations between systems and their abstractions, based on alternating simulation
relations.
In this work, we show how to construct suitable DES abstractions of systems
with safety and non-deadlocking specifications under the presence of measurement
uncertainty. We then obtain a maximally permissive safe and non-deadlocking super-
visor for the abstracted system by solving the basic supervisory control problem in
the non-blocking case (BSCP-NB), Ramadge and Wonham (1987); Cassandras and
Lafortune (2008). This supervisor, when applied to the continuous system, preserves
safety and non-deadlockingness, as well as maximal permissiveness, with respect to
the discretization of the abstraction. Given any control system with imperfect mea-
surements, one can define a prediction-correction estimator for the system. Given an
initial state estimate and a control action, this estimator predicts the possible sets of
states after some duration τ , and then corrects this estimate upon a new measure-
ment. In this work, we define two types of relations between these estimators and
their abstractions: the state estimate reduction and the exact state estimate reduc-
tion. We show that, when an abstraction is a state estimate reduction of the estimator
of the original system, the supervisor obtained through the procedure described at the
beginning of this paragraph will be maximally permissive among memoryless super-
visors. On the other hand, when the abstraction is an exact state estimate reduction
of the estimator of the original system, the obtained supervisor will be maximally
permissive among all supervisors, not merely memoryless ones.
This work extends our previous work in Dallal et al. (2014) in which we considered
systems with perfect measurement. In that work, we defined the state reduction and
exact state reduction relations between systems and abstractions and showed how to
construct a DES abstraction G that is a state reduction of the system under consid-
eration in the vehicle control problem (but in the case of perfect measurement), by
discretizing the system in time and in space using a lattice. We also proved conditions
138
under which G would be an exact state reduction of the vehicle control system. The
system G used controllable events to model the actions of the controlled vehicles and
uncontrollable events to model the uncontrolled vehicles and the disturbance. In this
work, we define a set of equivalence classes for the set of measurements, given the
chosen discretization of the abstraction. These equivalence classes then constitute a
new set of “measurement events” which are observable but uncontrollable, whereas
the events modelling the uncontrolled vehicles and the disturbance are defined as
unobservable and uncontrollable. This yields a new DES abstraction G′ containing a
mix of uncontrollable and unobservable events. We show in this work that the dis-
cretization parameters can be chosen so that the observer G of G′ is a state estimate
reduction of the prediction-correction estimator of the imperfectly measured vehicle
control system. Furthermore, we show that when G is an exact state reduction of
the perfectly measured vehicle control systems, then G will be an exact state esti-
mate reduction of the prediction-correction estimator of the imperfectly measured
vehicle control system. It is also important note that, for this system, state estimates
will always be boxes (products of intervals), so that the determinization step in the
construction of the observer only increases the state space quadratically, rather than
exponentially.
The contributions of this work are, first, in the leveraging of supervisory control
theory of DES, which is particularly well suited to finding maximally permissive so-
lutions to control problems over finite state spaces subject to safety and non-blocking
specifications. Second, the definitions of state estimate reduction and exact state es-
timate reduction are general concepts which allow for the construction of maximally
permissive memoryless supervisors in the presence of measurement uncertainty. Pre-
liminary versions of some of the results presented here have appeared in Dallal et al.
(2013a), Dallal et al. (2013b).
The organization of this work is as follows. In section 4.3, we define the vehicle
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control system and present the supervisory control problem to be solved. In section
4.4, we recall results from our previous work in Dallal et al. (2014), including the
DES abstraction G of the perfectly measured case, the definitions of state reduction
and exact state reduction, and the associated theorems. In section 4.5, we define the
modified abstraction G′ for the system with measurement uncertainty and proceed
to define the notions of partially observed systems and estimator systems. Using
these notions, we define the state estimate reduction and the exact state estimate
reduction and prove associated theorems. In section 4.6, we prove results relating
the (in)exact state reduction of the perfectly measured case to the (in)exact state
estimate reduction of the imperfectly measured case. Finally, we conclude in section
4.7.
4.3 Model
Consider a set of vehicles N = {1, . . . , n} with dynamics
x˙ = v + d, (4.1)
where x ∈ X is the vehicles’ position, v ∈ V is the control input, and d ∈ D is a
disturbance input. It is assumed that X is compact, that D = [dmin, dmax]
n for some
dmin, dmax ∈ R satisfying dmin ≤ 0 ≤ dmax, and that V is the set of vectors whose
elements are in the set {aµ, (a + 1)µ, . . . , bµ}, for some a, b ∈ N. Denote values aµ
and bµ by vmin and vmax, respectively. Let the set of vehicles be partitioned as N =
Nc ∪Nuc, where Nc is the set of controlled vehicles and Nuc is the set of uncontrolled
vehicles (an uncontrolled vehicle is one whose actions cannot be constrained by the
supervisor). With this partition, we write V = Vc × Vuc and v = (vc, vuc), for any
v ∈ V .
We begin by discretizing system (4.1) in time with parameter τ ∈ R+. Thus,
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control actions are chosen at times 0, τ, 2τ, . . . and kept constant for the following
interval of duration τ . This gives the discrete-time system:
xk+1 = xk + uk + δk, (4.2)
where xk = x(kτ), uk = v(kτ)τ , and δk =
∫ (k+1)τ
kτ
d(t)dt. If we define U := V τ and
∆ := Dτ , then we obtain u ∈ U and δ ∈ ∆. As we did with V , we write U = Uc×Uuc
and u = (uc, uuc), where uc ∈ Uc denotes the discrete action of the controlled vehicles
and uuc ∈ Uuc denotes the discrete action of the uncontrolled vehicles.
We proceed to discretize the system in space by defining a set Q˜ of discrete states
and a mapping ` : X → Q˜ as follows:
`i(xi) :=

cτµ, for c ∈ Z s.t.
cτµ− τµ/2 < xi ≤ cτµ+ τµ/2,
if xi ≤ αri,2
qi,m, if xi > αri,2
(4.3)
where ri,2 is the road on which vehicle i leaves the intersection, αri,2 is the location
of the end of the intersection on that road, and qi,m is a “special” state denoting
that a vehicle has crossed the intersection. The function `(x) is then defined as
`(x) := (`1(x1), . . . , `n(xn)). In words, `(·) maps continuous states to a lattice of
discrete states with a spacing of τµ for vehicles before the end of the intersection.
We denote by qm = (q1,m, . . . , qn,m) the unique discrete state where all vehicles have
crossed the intersection. Assume that, for all q ∈ Q˜, there exists some x ∈ X such
that `(x) = q. Additionally, we define `−1 and extend both ` and `−1 to sets as follows:
for any q ∈ Q˜, `−1(q) = {x ∈ X : `(x) = q}; for any I ⊆ X, `(I) = ⋃x∈X `(x); and
for any ι ⊆ Q˜, `−1(ι) = ⋃q∈ι `−1(q).
We assume that the inputs of the uncontrolled vehicles and the disturbance are
not directly observable. Instead, we obtain information about these through a state
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measurement χ ∈ X satisfying x ∈ L(χ), where L : X → 2X defines the set of states
consistent with measurement χ. Given some maximal error emax ∈ R+, L is defined
by:
L(χ) = [χ− 1emax, χ+ 1emax], (4.4)
where 1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn and, for any a, b ∈ Rn, [a, b] := {x ∈ Rn : ai ≤ xi ≤ bi, i =
1, . . . , n} denotes a box in Rn. With these definitions we can define a prediction-
correction estimator for the discrete-time system of Eq. (4.2), consisting of the two
functions Ip : 2X × Vc → 2X and Ic : 2X ×X → 2X defined by:
Ip(I, vc) =
⋃
x∈I,vuc∈Vuc,δ∈∆
(x+ vτ + δ) (4.5)
Ic(I, χ) = I ∩ L(χ) (4.6)
This prediction-correction estimator correctly computes the smallest state estimate
compatible with the sequence of control inputs and measurements seen thus far (see
e.g., LaValle (2006)). Additionally, we define L−1 and extend both L and L−1 to
sets as follows: for any x ∈ X, L−1(x) = {χ ∈ X : x ∈ L(χ)}; for any I ⊆ X,
L(I) =
⋃
χ∈I L(χ); and for any I ⊆ X, L−1(I) =
⋃
x∈I L
−1(x).
Finally, assume that there is some set B of bad states (representing collision
points) and that we would like to define a supervisor so that x(t) /∈ B, ∀ t ≥ 0. Let
the set of roads be R = {1, . . . ,m}. We assume that vehicle i travels on road ri,1 ∈ R
for xi ≤ 0, and on road ri,2 ∈ R for xi ≥ 0 (i.e., vehicle i turns from road ri,1 to
road ri,2 when xi = 0). For road r, we take the intersection region to be of size αr,
so that vehicle i entering the intersection on road r is inside the intersection when
xi ∈ (−αr, 0] and vehicle j exiting the intersection on road r is inside the intersection
when xj ∈ [0, αr). We assume that the bad set has the form B =
⋃
i,j∈N ,i≤j Bij, where
Bij has one of three forms:
• Bij = ∅, if vehicles i and j are on non-intersecting paths.
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• Bij = {x ∈ X : xi, xj ≤ 0 ∧ |xi − xj| < γ} or Bij = {x ∈ X : xi, xj ≥
0∧ |xi − xj| < γ}, if vehicles i and j enter the intersection on the same road or
exit the intersection on the same road, respectively. Here γ ∈ R is a parameter
defining the minimal separation distance between vehicles while on the same
road.
• Bij = {x ∈ X : xi ∈ (−αri,1 , αri,2) ∧ xj ∈ (−αrj,1 , αrj,2)}, if vehicles i and j’s
paths could result in a collision as the vehicles turn.
We wish to solve the following problem:
Problem IV.1. Let 2X/` denote the quotient set of 2X with respect to the equiva-
lence relation E ⊆ 2X × 2X defined by (I1, I2) ∈ E ⇔ `(I1) = `(I2). Given Q˜, define
a supervisor σ : 2X/`→ 2Vc that associates to each I(kτ) ⊆ X a set of inputs vc ∈ Vc
allowed for the interval [kτ, (k + 1)τ ] and constant over this time interval, with the
following properties:
• if vc(t) ∈ σ(I(bt/τcτ)) for t ∈ [kτ, (k + 1)τ ], then x(t) /∈ B in the same time
interval (safety)
• if σ(I(kτ)) 6= ∅, vc(t) ∈ σ(I(bt/τcτ)) for t ∈ [kτ, (k+ 1)τ ], and `(I((k+ 1)τ)) 6=
{qm}, then σ(I((k + 1)τ)) 6= ∅ (non-deadlockingness)
• if σ˜ 6= σ and σ˜ satisfies the two properties above, then σ˜(I(kτ)) ⊆ σ(I(kτ)) for
all k ≥ 0 (maximal permissiveness),
where I(kτ) is a state estimate after the correction step of Eq. (4.6) and I((k+1)τ) =
Ic(Ip(I(kτ), vc), χ).
See Fig. 4.1 for a graphical depiction of Prob. IV.1.
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Figure 4.1: The system process in real time. At times 0, τ, 2τ, . . ., a measurement
χ ∈ X is obtained. This measurement is used to correct the previous state
estimate Ipred through I = Ic(Ipred, χ) = Ipred∩L(χ). The corrected state
estimate I is then discretized to a lattice with spacing τµ as `(I), and
`(I) is sent to the supervisor. The controlled vehicles then choose some
control action vc allowed by the supervisor, and this control action, along
with the state estimate I and knowledge of the bounds on the actions of
the disturbance and the uncontrolled vehicles (shown with dashed lines
because they are not observed) are used to predict a new state estimate
of possible positions at the next time instant that is a multiple of τ , given
by Ipred = Ip(I, vc), where I
p is the function of Eq. (4.5).
4.4 Results from the Case of Perfect Measurement
This section provides a summary of results from the case of perfect measure-
ment. We begin by defining the initial discrete event system (DES) abstraction G. In
Sec. 4.5, we will modify this abstraction to include a finite set of measurement events
to model measurement uncertainty, resulting in a new abstraction G′. We then pro-
ceed to recall results about state reductions and exact state reductions, which are
types of relations between systems and abstractions, using alternating similarity as a
basis. The definitions of state reductions and exact state reductions will be adapted
to the case of imperfect measurement in Sec. 4.5, yielding the state estimate reduction
and exact state estimate reduction, which are relations between prediction-correction
estimators and abstractions.
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4.4.1 The Initial Abstraction
Definition IV.2 (Discrete Event System Automaton). A (deterministic) discrete
event system is a tuple G = (Q,E, ψ, q0, Qm) where Q is a set of states, E is a set
of events, ψ : Q× E → Q is a partial transition function, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state,
and Qm ⊆ Q is a set of marked states indicating the completion of some behavior of
interest.
We model the discrete time system of Eq. (4.2) by constructing a DES abstraction
with three types of events: Uc, to model the actions of the controlled vehicles; Uuc
to model the actions of the uncontrolled vehicles; and W , to model the effect of the
disturbance. The sets Uc and Uuc were already described in Section 4.3. The set W
consists of a set of “discretized disturbances” and is defined by W = {kτµ : k ∈
Z ∧ bδmin/(τµ)c ≤ k ≤ dδmax/(τµ)e}n. It can be shown that this set W satisfies the
following property: For any q, q′ ∈ Q˜ and u ∈ U , there exist x ∈ `−1(q), x′ ∈ `−1(q′),
and δ ∈ ∆ such that x+ u+ δ = x′ if and only if ∃w ∈ W such that q + u+ w = q′.
Each of the three event types constitutes one layer of a three layer DES automaton
transition function ψ. In order to have a well defined DES automaton, this requires
the introduction of two sets of intermediate states QI1 and QI2. More specifically,
we have ψ ⊆ (Q˜ × Uc × QI1) ∪ (QI1 × Uuc × QI2) ∪ (QI2 × W × Q˜), satisfying
ψ(q, ucuucw) = q + u+ w, for all q ∈ Q˜, uc ∈ Uc, uuc ∈ Uuc and w ∈ W . See Fig. 4.2
for a depiction of the transition function ψ.
In order to allow for the possibility of multiple initial states, we define a set Q0
of possible initial states, which we model through a dummy initial state q0 and a set
of events EQ := {eq : q ∈ Q0} with ψ(q0, eq) = q. The final DES abstraction is then
defined as:
G := (Q,E, ψ, q0, Qm), (4.7)
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Figure 4.2: The transition function ψ of DES automaton G, consisting of three lay-
ers, one for each of the event categories Uc, Uuc, W , and separated by
intermediate states.
where Q = q0 ∪ Q˜∪QI1 ∪QI2, E = EQ ∪Uc ∪Uuc ∪W , and Qm = {qm}. The events
in Uc are defined to be controllable, whereas the events in Uuc and W are defined to
be uncontrollable.
4.4.2 State Reductions & Exact State Reductions
This section presents definitions and theorems about state reductions and exact
state reductions found in Dallal et al. (2014). With the exceptions of Props. IV.11
and IV.15, the results are generic and hence the notation X and U in the following
definitions need not be the same as in this work’s vehicle control problem.
4.4.2.1 Preliminaries
Definition IV.3 (System, Dallal et al. (2014)). A system S is defined as a tuple
S = (X,U,→, Y,H), where X is the set of states, U is a set of control inputs,
→⊆ X × U ×X is a transition relation, Y is an output set, and H : X → Y is the
output function.
For a system S = (X,U,→, Y,H), we will use the notation Postu(x) := {x′ ∈ X :
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(x, u, x′) ∈→} and U(x) := {u ∈ U : Postu(x) 6= ∅}. In the remainder of this work,
it will be assumed that all systems satisfy the property H(x1) = H(x2) ⇒ U(x1) =
U(x2), for all x1, x2 ∈ X. In words, this means that any two states with the same
output should not be distinguishable by their available set of inputs. In the context
of the vehicle control application, the system is defined by Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3).
Definition IV.4 (Run, Dallal et al. (2014)). A run ρ of length n for a system
S = (X,U,→, Y,H) is a sequence of past states and inputs (x0, u0, . . . , xn−1, un−1, xn),
such that ui ∈ U(xi) and xi+1 ∈ Postui(xi) for i = 0, . . . , n − 1. The set of runs of
length n is denoted by Rn(S) and the set of runs is R(S) =
⋃∞
i=0 Rn(S). Given
run ρ = (x0, u0, . . . , xn−1, un−1, xn), we define the notation tgt(ρ) := xn and ρ(k) :=
(x0, u0, . . . , xk−1, uk−1, xk), called a prefix of ρ.
Definition IV.5 (History, Dallal et al. (2014)). A history θ of length n for a system
S = (X,U,→, Y,H) is a sequence of past outputs and inputs (y0, u0, . . . , yn−1, un−1, yn),
such that there exists a run ρ = (x0, u0, . . . , xn−1, un−1, xn) ∈ Rn(S) that is consistent
with θ, in the sense that yi = H(xi) for i = 0, . . . , n. The set of histories of length
n is denoted by Θn(S) and the set of histories is Θ(S) =
⋃∞
i=0 Θn. We will also
write θ(ρ) to mean the unique history produced by a run ρ ∈ R. Given history θ =
(y0, u0, . . . , yn−1, un−1, yn), we define the notation θ(k) := (y0, u0, . . . , yk−1, uk−1, yk)
and tgt(θ) := yn, as was the case with runs.
Definition IV.6 (Supervisor, Dallal et al. (2014)). A supervisor σ for a system
S = (X,U,→, Y,H) is a function σ : Θ → 2U that chooses which control inputs to
enable/disable after each history. A supervisor is called memoryless if it is of the form
σ : Y → 2U . A run ρ = (x0, u0, . . . , xn−1, un−1, xn) ∈ Rn(S) is allowed by supervisor
σ if ui ∈ σ(θ(ρ(i))), for i = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Definition IV.7 (Specification, Dallal et al. (2014)). A safety specification for a
system S = (X,U,→, Y,H) is a subset Safe ⊆→ of transitions that we would like
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the system S to be restricted to. A marking specification for S is a set Xm ⊆ X of
“special” or marked states. We say that S is deadlocking if there exists a run ρ such
that U(tgt(ρ)) = ∅ and tgt(ρ) /∈ Xm.
4.4.2.2 The State Reduction
Definition IV.8 (State Reduction, Dallal et al. (2014)). Given two systems Sa and
Sb with Ya = Yb := Y , we say that Sa is a state reduction of Sb with state relation
R ⊆ Xa × Xb and output dependent control relation C : Y → 2Ua×Ub (hereafter
referred to only as control relation) if:
1. R−1 = {(xb, xa) ⊆ Xb ×Xa : (xa, xb) ∈ R} is a function.
2. For every y ∈ Y , the relation C(y) ⊆ Ua × Ub is a bijection relation.
3. Ha(xa) = Hb(xb) if and only if (xa, xb) ∈ R.
4. ∀(xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a, ∃(xb, ub, x′b) ∈→b such that (xa, xb) ∈ R, (ua, ub) ∈ C(Ha(xa)),
and (x′a, x
′
b) ∈ R.
5. ∀(xb, ub, x′b) ∈→b, ∃(xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a such that (xa, xb) ∈ R, (ua, ub) ∈ C(Hb(xb)),
and (x′a, x
′
b) ∈ R.
Definition IV.9 (Induced Specification, Dallal et al. (2014)). Given system Sb with
state reduction Sa, along with safety and marking specifications Safeb ⊆→b and
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Xm,b ⊆ Xb on system Sb, define the induced specification on Sa as follows:
(xa, ua, x
′
a) ∈ Safea ⊆→a
⇔

(xb, ub, x
′
b) ∈→b s.t.
(xa, xb) ∈ R
∧(ua, ub) ∈ C(Ha(xa))
∧(x′a, x′b) ∈ R

⊆ Safeb (4.8)
Xa ∈ Xm,a ⊆ Xa
⇔ {xb ∈ Xb s.t. (xa, xb) ∈ R} ⊆ Xm,b (4.9)
Theorem IV.10. (from Dallal et al. (2014)) Suppose that system Sa is a state re-
duction of system Sb with state relation R and control relation C and that we are
given safety and marking specifications Safeb ⊆→b and Xm,b ⊆ Xb for system Sb.
Let Safea and Xm,a be the corresponding induced specifications for system Sa and
suppose that we have a maximally permissive, safe, and non-deadlocking supervi-
sor σa : Y → 2Ua, where Y is the (common) output space. Define the supervisor
σb : Y → 2Ub by ub ∈ σb(y) iff ∃ua ∈ σa(y) such that (ua, ub) ∈ C(y). Then σb
is safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally permissive among supervisors of the form
σb : Y → 2Ub.
Proposition IV.11. (from Dallal et al. (2014)) Define the output maps HX(x) :=
`(x), HQ˜(q) := q, the relation R := {(x, q) ∈ X × Q˜ : `(x) = q}, and the control
relation C(q) := {(vc, uc) : vcτ = uc ∈ Uc}, for all q ∈ Q˜. Then DES abstraction G
of Sec. 4.4.1 is a state reduction of system (4.2).
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4.4.2.3 The Exact State Reduction
Definition IV.12 (Exact State Reduction, Dallal et al. (2014)). Given two systems
Sa and Sb with Ya = Yb = Y , we say that Sa is an exact state reduction of Sb with
state relation R ⊆ Xa × Xb and control relation C : Y → 2Ua×Ub if Sa is a state
reduction of Sb with state and control relations R and C and:
6. ∀(xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a, ∀x′b ∈ Xb : (x′a, x′b) ∈ R, ∃(xb, ub, x′b) ∈→b such that (xa, xb) ∈
R and (ua, ub) ∈ C(Ha(xa)).
Lemma IV.13. (from Dallal et al. (2014)) Suppose that system Sb has an exact
state reduction Sa. Then, for any history θb for system Sb and any xb ∈ Xb such that
H(xb) = tgt(θb), there exists a run ρb such that θb = θ(ρb) and xb = tgt(ρb).
In words, the above lemma implies that, when there exists an exact state reduction
for system Sb, a history θb gives no more information about the current state of Sb
than does the last output tgt(θb). The following theorem follows immediately from
this observation.
Theorem IV.14. (from Dallal et al. (2014)) Suppose that system Sa is an exact
state reduction (2) of system Sb and that all other conditions of Thm. IV.10 are sat-
isfied. Then the obtained supervisor σb will be safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally
permissive among supervisors of the form σb : Θ→ 2Ub.
Proposition IV.15. (from Dallal et al. (2014)) Define HX(·), HQ˜(·), R, and C as in
Prop. IV.11. If δmin and δmax are both integer multiples of τµ, then DES abstraction
G of Sec. 4.4.1 is an exact state reduction of system (4.2).
4.5 Observers and State Estimation
In this section, we show how to modify the DES abstraction G of Sec. 4.4.1 to
deal with measurement uncertainty. Specifically, we accomplish this by obtaining
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a finite set of equivalence classes for the measurements, given the discretization of
Eq. (4.3). This set of equivalence classes will then be used as a fourth type of event in
our DES abstraction, resulting in a modified DES abstraction G′. We then proceed
to define two new relations between estimators of partially observed systems and
abstractions, the state estimate reduction and exact state estimate reduction, which
are modified versions of the state reduction and exact state reduction. We then show
that analogous versions of Thms. IV.10 and IV.14 hold with these two new relations.
4.5.1 The modified abstraction
Given the discretization function ` : X → Q˜ of Eq. (4.3) and the observation
function L : X → 2X of Eq. (4.4), define the equivalence relation ≡o⊆ X × X over
measurements by:
χ1 ≡o χ2 ⇔ `(L(χ1)) = `(L(χ2)). (4.10)
For any χ ∈ X, let [χ] denote the equivalence class of χ under relation ≡o and let
Λ denote the set of equivalence classes. These equivalence classes will constitute the
set of discrete measurement events. Now define the discrete observation function
LΛ : Λ→ 2Q˜ by:
LΛ(λ) = {q ∈ Q˜ : (∃χ ∈ X : [χ] = λ)[L(χ) ∩ `−1(q) 6= ∅]}, (4.11)
for any λ ∈ Λ.
We now define ψc : Q˜ × Λ → Q˜, the analogue of the correction operator of
Eq. (4.17) in the DES domain:
ψc(q, λ) =
 q, if q ∈ L
Λ(λ)
undefined, else
(4.12)
In words, ψc(q, λ) is defined if there exists measurement χ satisfying [χ] = λ and state
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x satisfying `(x) = q such that x is consistent with measurement χ.
We then use ψc as a fourth layer in the transition function ψ of DES abstraction
G defined in Sec. 4.4.1 in order to obtain a new DES abstraction G′. Whereas the
language of G satisfied L(G) ⊆ EQ(UcUucW )∗, the language of G′ should satisfy
L(G′) ⊆ EQ(ΛUcUucW )∗. We therefore create a new layer of states Q˜′ that is a
copy of Q˜ and precedes Q˜. This yields a set of states Q′ = Q ∪ Q˜′, a set of events
E ′ = E ∪ Λ, and a transition function ψ′ : Q′ × E ′ → Q′ defined by:
ψ′(q, e) =

q′ ∈ Q˜′, if q = q0 ∧ e = eq′ ∈ EQ
ψc(q, e), if q ∈ Q˜′ ∧ e ∈ Λ
ψ(q, e), else
(4.13)
The DES automaton G′ is defined as G′ := (Q′, E ′, ψ′, q0, Qm). Finally, we take
the events of Uuc and W to be uncontrollable and unobservable, the events of Uc to be
observable and controllable, and the events of Λ to be observable but uncontrollable.
Now consider the observer Obs(G′) of this modified abstraction, in the terminology
of supervisory control theory of DES (see Sec. 2.5.2 of Cassandras and Lafortune
(2008)). Let Eo = Uc ∪ Λ and Euo = EQ ∪ Uuc ∪W be the sets of observable and
unobservable events of G′, respectively. Define UR : Q′ → 2Q′ by UR(q) = {q′ ∈ Q′ :
∃s ∈ E∗uo s.t. q′ = ψ′(q, s)} (called the Unobservable Reach) and extend this definition
to sets by UR(ι) = ∪q∈ιUR(q), for any ι ⊆ Q′. Also define OR : 2Q′ × Eo → 2Q′
by OR(ι, e) = ∪q∈ιψ′(q, e). Then Obs(G′) is defined as the accessible part of the
automaton (2Q
′
, Eo, ψ, UR(q0), ιm), where ψ and ιm are defined by
ψ(ι, eo) =
 undefined, OR(ι, eo) = ∅UR(OR(ι, eo)), else
ιm = {ι ⊆ Qm}
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The observer Obs(G′) is therefore defined over state estimates of G′. Furthermore,
for any string s ∈ (ΛUc)∗, ψ(UR(q0), s) will consist of the set of states of G′ that are
consistent with the sequence s of measurements and control actions. More specifically,
we can define prediction and correction functions ψ
p
: 2Q˜×Uc → 2Q˜ and ψc : 2Q˜×Λ→
2Q˜ similar to Ip and Ic of Eqs. (4.5) and (4.6), but for state estimates ι ⊆ Q˜:
ψ
p
(ι, uc) =
⋃
q∈ι
⋃
uuc∈Uuc
⋃
w∈W
ψ(q, ucuucw) (4.14)
ψ
c
(ι, λ) = ι ∩ LΛ(λ) (4.15)
With these definitions, it can be shown that ψ is closely related to ψ
p
and ψ
c
. We
will return to this issue in Sec. 4.6.1.3.
It should be noted that the above definition of the set of marked states ιm of the
observer is not standard. The usual definition would be ιm = {ι ⊆ Q′ : ι ∩Qm 6= ∅}.
We use ιm = {ι ⊆ Qm} here because we will use this observer in a supervisory control
problem and we wish to be certain that all vehicles have crossed the intersection when
the observer reaches a marked state.
4.5.2 State Estimate Reductions & Exact State Estimate Reductions
As was the case in Sec. 4.4.2, the results of this section are generic and hence the
notation X and U in the following definitions need not be the same as in this work’s
vehicle control problem.
Definition IV.16 (Partially Observed System). A partially observer system is a
tuple S = (X,U,→, Y,H,O, L), where the first five elements have the same interpre-
tation as in Def. IV.3, O is a set of observations, and L : O → 2X defines the set of
states that are consistent with any given observation.
In the above definition, we differentiate between outputs and observations. Out-
puts should be thought of as states corresponding to a discretization, whereas ob-
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servations should be thought of as physical measurements. For every state of the
system, there is a single output, but many possible consistent observations. In the
context of the vehicle control application, the partially observed system is defined by
Eqs. (4.2)-(4.4).
Definition IV.17 (Estimator System). Given a partially observed system S =
(X,U,→, Y,H,O, L), define the prediction and correction functions Ip : 2X×U → 2X
and Ic : 2X ×O → 2X by
Ip(I, u) =
⋃
x∈I
{x′ ∈ X : (x, u, x′) ∈→} (4.16)
Ic(I, o) = I ∩ L(o) (4.17)
With these definitions, we denote S’s estimator system by S = (I(S), U,→, 2Y , H)
where
I(S) = {I ′ ∈ 2X \ {∅} : (∃I ⊆ X)(∃o ∈ O) s.t. I ′ = Ic(I, o)} (4.18)
and, for any (I, u, I ′) ∈ I(S)× U × 2X \ {∅},
(I, u, I ′) ∈ → ⇔ ∃o ∈ O s.t. I ′ = Ic(Ip(I, u), o). (4.19)
Note that, from Eqs. (4.18) and (4.19), it will indeed be the case that (I, u, I ′) ∈ →
yields I ′ ∈ I(S), so that we do in fact have that → ⊆ I(S)× U × I(S).
In the above definition, we use I(S) rather than simply 2X because the estimator
system is meant to model only state estimates reached after correction steps (as in
Eq. (4.17)), and not those reached after prediction steps (as in Eq. (4.16)). This is
because we will again define a supervisor for the estimator system and new control
actions occur only after observations.
Remark IV.18 (Systems Defined over State Estimates). In the definitions that fol-
low, we will refer to “systems defined over state estimates”. These are systems of the
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form: S = (I(S), U,→, 2Y , H), where I(S) ⊆ 2X for some set X. Thus, any estimator
system is a system defined over state estimates. However, a system defined over state
estimates need not be the estimator system of any partially observed system. In par-
ticular, a system defined over state estimates can be obtained directly by abstraction
of some estimator system (or of any other system defined over state estimates). In
order to avoid differentiating between the cases where S is or is not the estimator of
some partially observed system S, we will abuse notation and use I(S) in both cases
as the set of state estimates over which S is defined.
Definition IV.19 (State Estimate Reduction). Given partially observed system Sb
with corresponding estimator system Sb and system Sa defined over state estimates
and sharing the same set of outputs 2Y , we say that Sa is a state estimate reduction of
Sb with state relation R ⊆ 2Xa×2Xb and control relation C : Ha(I(Sa))∪Hb(I(Sb))→
2Ua×Ub if:
0. Ha(I(Sa)) = Hb(I(Sb)) := Y .
1. R
−1
is a function.
2. For every y ∈ Y , the relation C(y) ⊆ Ua × Ub is a bijection.
3. Ha(Ia) = Hb(Ib) if and only if (Ia, Ib) ∈ R.
4. ∀(Ia, ua, I ′a) ∈ →a, ∃(Ib, ub, I ′b) ∈ →b such that (Ia, Ib) ∈ R, (ua, ub) ∈ C(Ha(Ia)),
and (I ′a, I
′
b) ∈ R.
5. ∀(Ib, ub, I ′b) ∈ →b, ∃(Ia, ua, I ′a) ∈ →a such that (Ia, Ib) ∈ R, (ua, ub) ∈ C(Hb(Ib)),
and (I ′′a , I
′
b) ∈ R, for some I ′′a ⊆ I ′a.
This is almost identical to a state reduction, with the main difference being
property 5. Given two transitions (Ib,1, ub, I
′
b,1) and (Ib,2, ub, I
′
b,2), both in →b with
Hb(Ib,1) = Hb(Ib,2) but Hb(I
′
b,1) ⊆ Hb(I ′b,2), the state estimate reduction requires the
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existence of some (Ia,2, ua, I
′
a,2) ∈ →a satisfying (Ia,2, Ib,2) ∈ R, (ua, ub) ∈ C(Hb(Ib,2)),
and (I ′a,2, I
′
b,2) ∈ R, but does not require the existence of some (Ia,1, ua, I ′a,1) ∈ →a
satisfying (Ia,1, Ib,1) ∈ R, (ua, ub) ∈ C(Hb(Ib,1)), and (I ′a,1, I ′b,1) ∈ R. The intuition for
this definition is as follows. A memoryless supervisor σ (for either the a or b system)
with domain Y must satisfy σ(H(I1)) = σ(H(I2)) if H(I1) = H(I2). If H(I
′
1) ⊆ H(I ′2)
then we will logically have σ(H(I ′1)) ⊇ σ(H(I ′2)), since a supervisor cannot be more
permissive with less information. Hence, the existence of transition (I1, u, I
′
1) will not
place any further restrictions on σ(H(I1)) = σ(H(I2)) than those restrictions placed
by the existence of transition (I2, u, I
′
2).
Definition IV.20 (Specifications for Partially Observed Systems). Given a partially
observed system S with corresponding estimator system S, along with safety and
marking specifications Safe ⊆→ and Xm ⊆ X, define the safety and marking speci-
fications Safe and Im on S as follows:
(I, u, I ′) ∈ Safe ⊆ →
⇔ {(x, u, x′) ∈→ s.t. x ∈ I ∧ x′ ∈ I ′} ⊆ Safe (4.20)
I ∈ Im ∈ I(S)⇔ I ⊆ Xm (4.21)
Definition IV.21 (Induced Specification for Partially Observed Systems). Given
partially observed system Sb with corresponding estimator system Sb and system Sa
defined over state estimates such that Sa is a state estimate reduction of system Sb,
along with safety and marking specifications Safeb and Im,b on Sb, the safety and
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marking specifications Safea and Im,a on system Sa are obtained as follows:
(Ia, ua, I
′
a) ∈ Safea ⊆ →a
⇔

(Ib, ub, I
′
b) ∈ →b s.t.
(Ia, Ib) ∈ R
∧(ua, ub) ∈ C(Ha(Ia))
∧∃I ′′a ⊆ I ′a : (I ′′a , I ′b) ∈ R

⊆ Safeb (4.22)
Ia ∈ Im,a ∈ I(Sa)
⇔ {Ib ∈ I(Sb) s.t. (Ia, Ib) ∈ R} ⊆ Im,b (4.23)
This definition is almost precisely analogous to Def. IV.9, with the exception that
we must use ∃I ′′a ⊆ I ′a : (I ′′a , I ′b) ∈ R rather than simply (I ′a, I ′b) ∈ R in Eq. (4.22).
This is due to Property 5 of Def. IV.19.
Theorem IV.22. Given partially observed system Sb with corresponding estimator
system Sb and system Sa defined over state estimates, suppose that Sa is a state
estimate reduction of system Sb with state relation R and control relation C. Suppose
that both systems Sa and Sb satisfy the property that x1, x2 ∈ I ∈ I(S) ⇒ U(x1) =
U(x2) and that we are given safety and marking specifications Safeb ⊆→b and Xm,b ⊆
Xb for system Sb. Let Safea and Im,a be the corresponding induced specifications
for system Sa and suppose that we have a maximally permissive, safe, and non-
deadlocking supervisor σa : Y → 2Ua, where Y is the (common) output space. Define
the supervisor σb : Y → 2Ub by ub ∈ σb(y) iff ∃ua ∈ σa(y) such that (ua, ub) ∈ C(y).
Then σb is safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally permissive among supervisors of the
form σb : Y → 2Ub.
Proof. We proceed in three claims.
Claim 1: (Ia, Ib) ∈ R ∧ (σa(Ha(Ia)) 6= ∅ ∨ Ia ∈ Im,a)⇒ (σb(Hb(Ib)) 6= ∅ ∨ Ib ∈ Im,b).
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By definition of Im,a, Ia ∈ Im,a ⇔ Ib ∈ Im,b, for all Ib : (Ia, Ib) ∈ R, so that (Ia, Ib) ∈
R ∧ Ia ∈ Im,a ⇒ Ib ∈ Im,b. By definition of σb, ub ∈ σb(y) iff ∃ua ∈ σa(y) such
that (ua, ub) ∈ C(y). But (Ia, Ib) ∈ R ⇒ Ha(Ia) = Hb(Ib), so that (Ia, Ib) ∈ R ∧
σa(Ha(Ia)) 6= ∅ ⇒ σb(Hb(Ib)) 6= ∅.
By assumption, xb,1, xb,2 ∈ Ib ⇒ Ub(xb,1) = Ub(xb,2), from which it follows that, if
σb(Hb(Ib)) 6= ∅, then any xb ∈ Ib is not deadlocked under σb.
Claim 2: ∀Ib ∈ I(Sb), ub ∈ σb(Hb(Ib)) ⇒ ∀I ′b ∈ Postub(Ib), (Ib, ub, I ′b) ∈ Safeb ∧
[σb(Hb(I
′
b)) 6= ∅ ∨ I ′b ∈ Im,b].
Consider any Ib ∈ I(Sb) and any ub ∈ σb(Hb(Ib)). By property (1) of Def. IV.19, R−1
is a function. Therefore let Ia be the unique member of I(Sa) such that (Ia, Ib) ∈ R.
By property (3) of Def. IV.19, Ha(Ia) = Hb(Ib) = y for some y ∈ Y . By property (2)
of Def. IV.19, C(y) is a bijection. Therefore let ua be the unique member of Ua such
that (ua, ub) ∈ C(y). From the definition of σb, it follows that ua ∈ σa(Ha(Ia)). Thus,
∀I ′a ∈ Postua(Ia), (Ia, ua, I ′a) ∈ Safea ∧ [σa(Ha(I ′a)) 6= ∅ ∨ I ′a ∈ Im,a]. From the way
that Safea was defined, this implies that (Ib, ub, I
′
b) ∈ Safeb, for all I ′b ∈ Postub(Ib)
such that there exist I ′a ∈ Postua(Ia) and I ′′a ⊆ I ′a with (I ′′a , I ′b) ∈ R. But property (5)
of Def. IV.19 states that ∀I ′b ∈ Postub(Ib), ∃I ′a ∈ Postua(Ia) satisfying (I ′′a , I ′b) ∈ R,
for some I ′′a ⊆ I ′a. From this and the previous statement, it follows that (Ib, ub, I ′b) ∈
Safeb, for all I
′
b ∈ Postub(Ib). It similarly follows from property (5) of Def. IV.19
along with Claim 1 that σb(Hb(I
′
b)) 6= ∅ ∨ I ′b ∈ Im,b, for all I ′b ∈ Postub(Ib).
Thus σb is safe and non-deadlocking. Given any supervisor σ
′
b : Y → 2Ub , let σ′a :
Y → 2Ua be defined by ua ∈ σ′a(y) iff ∃ub ∈ σ′b(y) such that (ua, ub) ∈ C(y) and let
the function σb→a be the mapping which takes a supervisor σ′b for system b to the
supervisor σ′a for system a in this way.
Claim 3: If σ′b is safe and non-deadlocking then so is σ
′
a = σb→a(σ
′
b).
Suppose that σ′b is safe and non-deadlocking and take σ
′
a = σb→a(σ
′
b). Consider
any Ia ∈ I(Sa), any ua ∈ σ′a(Ha(Ia)), and any I ′a ∈ Postua(Ia). By property (4)
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of Def. IV.19, there exists (Ib,1, ub, I
′
b,1) ∈ →b such that (Ia, Ib,1) ∈ R, (ua, ub) ∈
C(Ha(Ia)), and (I
′
a, I
′
b,1) ∈ R. From the definition of σb→a(σ′b), it must be that
ub ∈ σ′b(Hb(Ib,1)). By property (3) of Def. IV.19, any Ib,2 such that (Ia, Ib,2) ∈ R must
satisfyHb(Ib,1) = Ha(Ia) = Hb(Ib,2). It follows that ub ∈ σ′b(Hb(Ib)), for any Ib ∈ I(Sb)
such that (Ia, Ib) ∈ R. Since σ′b is safe and non-deadlocking, it follows that, for all
(Ib, ub, I
′
b) ∈ →b such that (Ia, Ib) ∈ R, we have that (Ib, ub, I ′b) ∈ Safeb∧[σ′b(Hb(I ′b)) 6=
∅ ∨ I ′b ∈ Im,b]. It follows from the definition of Safea that (Ia, ua, I ′a) ∈ Safea and
from the definitions of σb→a(σ′b) and Im,a that σ
′
a(Ha(I
′
a)) 6= ∅ ∨ I ′a ∈ Im,a. Since
I ′a ∈ Postua(Ia) was arbitrary, it follows that ua is a safe and non-deadlocking control
decision from Ia. Since Ia ∈ I(Sa) and ua ∈ σ′a(Ha(Ia)) were arbitrary, it follows that
σ′a = σb→a(σ
′
b) is safe and non-deadlocking.
It is obvious from the definition of σb→a that σ′b ⊇ σb ⇒ σb→a(σ′b) ⊇ σb→a(σb). Thus,
if there exists a safe and non-deadlocking supervisor σ′b ⊇ σb then it follows that σa
is not maximally permissive, a contradiction.
We next define the exact state estimate reduction. As in the case of the state
estimate reduction, the definition of the exact state estimate reduction is not directly
analogous to the corresponding definition in the perfectly measured case, for reasons
that will be explained shortly. We begin by defining a notion of “reachable” state
estimates and work with those in the definition of an exact state estimate reduction.
Definition IV.23 (Reachable State Estimates). Given a system defined over state
estimates S, let I ′(S) ⊆ I(S) be some subset of state estimates, hereafter referred
to as the set of reachable state estimates and let →′b be the transition function →b,
restricted to the domain of such states. Mathematically,
→′b =→b ∩ I ′(S)× Ub × I ′(S) (4.24)
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Definition IV.24 (Exact State Estimate Reduction). Given partially observed sys-
tem Sb with corresponding estimator system Sb and system Sa defined over state esti-
mates and sharing the same set of outputs 2Y , we say that Sa is an exact state estimate
reduction of Sb with state relation R ⊆ 2Xa × 2Xb , control relation C : Y → 2Ua×Ub ,
and reachable set of state estimates I ′(Sb) if Sa is a state estimate reduction of Sb
with state and control relations R and C and:
5. ∀(Ib, ub, I ′b) ∈ →b, ∃(Ia, ua, I ′a) ∈ →a such that (Ia, Ib) ∈ R, (ua, ub) ∈ C(Hb(Ib)),
and (I ′a, I
′
b) ∈ R.
6. ∀(Ia, ua, I ′a) ∈ →a, [∀I ′b ∈ I ′(Sb) : (I ′a, I ′b) ∈ R], ∃(Ib, ub, I ′b) ∈ →′b such that
(Ia, Ib) ∈ R, and (ua, ub) ∈ C(Ha(Ia)).
7. ∀y ∈ Y , ∀xb ∈ Xb : Hb(xb) ∈ y, ∃Ib ∈ I ′(Sb) such that Hb(Ib) = y and xb ∈ Ib.
Note that Property 5 here replaces (strengthens) Property 5 of Def. IV.19.
Thus, the exact state estimate reduction (unlike the state estimate reduction) uses
the direct analogue of Property 5 of Def. IV.8. Property 6 of this definition, however,
is not directly analogous to Property 6 of Def. IV.12. The analogous condition would
require the existence of some (Ib, ub, I
′
b) ∈ →b, for every I ′b ⊆ Xb such that (I ′a, I ′b) ∈ R.
This would constitute an unreasonable requirement since, in particular, it would
require reachability of state estimates that are not connected sets or even of “stranger”
sets like the set of points in a region whose coordinates are all irrational. What is
required here is a property that would yield the equivalent of Lemma IV.13. Lemma
IV.25 below shows that properties 6 and 7 above suffice.
Lemma IV.25. Given partially observed system Sb with corresponding estimator
system Sb and system Sa defined over state estimates, suppose that Sa is an exact
state estimate reduction of system Sb with state relation R and control relation C.
Then, for any history θb for system Sb and any xb ∈ Xb such that Hb(xb) ∈ tgt(θb),
there exists a run ρb such that θb = θ(ρb) and xb ∈ tgt(ρb).
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Proof. We first claim that, for any history θb ∈ Θ(Sb) and any I ′b ∈ I ′(Sb) such
that Hb(I
′
b) = tgt(θb), there exists a run ρb such that θ(ρb) = θb and tgt(ρb) = I
′
b.
We proceed by induction. The base case is trivially true, so assume that the claim
holds up to histories of length k and consider a pair of histories θb ∈ Θk(Sb) and
θ
′
b ∈ Θk+1(Sb) such that θb is a prefix of θ
′
b. Let ρ
′
b = (I
0
b , . . . , I
k
b , u
k
b , I
k+1
b ) ∈ Rk+1(Sb)
be such that θ
′
b = θ(ρ
′
b) and consider any I
′
b ∈ I ′(Sb) such that Hb(I ′b) = tgt(θ
′
b). Since
(Ikb , u
k
b , I
k+1
b ) ∈ →b, it follows from Property 5 that there exists (Ika , uka, Ik+1a ) ∈ →a
such that (Ika , I
k
b ) ∈ R, (uka, ukb ) ∈ C(Hb(Ikb )), and (Ik+1a , Ik+1b ) ∈ R. By Property
3, Hb(I
′
b) = Hb(I
k+1
b ) = Ha(I
k+1
a ) and hence (I
k+1
a , I
′
b) ∈ R. It therefore follows by
Property 6 that there exists (Ib, ub, I
′
b) ∈ →′b such that (Ika , Ib) ∈ R, and (uka, ub) ∈
C(Ha(I
k
a )). Since (I
k
a , I
k
b ) ∈ R and (Ika , Ib) ∈ R, we have by Property 3 that Ha(Ika ) =
Hb(I
k
b ) = Hb(Ib) and hence that C(Ha(I
k
a )) = C(Hb(I
k
b )). By Property 2, C(·) is a
bijection and hence it follows from (uka, u
k
b ) ∈ C(Hb(Ikb )) and (uka, ub) ∈ C(Ha(Ika )) that
ub = u
k
b . By the induction hypothesis, there exists some run ρb such that θ(ρb) = θb
and tgt(ρb) = Ib. Then the run ρb.ub.I
′
b satisfies θ(ρb.ub.I
′
b) = θ
′
b and tgt(ρb.ub.I
′
b) = I
′
b,
which completes the proof of the claim.
Now consider any history θb for system Sb and any xb ∈ Xb such that H(xb) ∈
tgt(θb) := y. By Property 7, there exists some Ib ∈ I ′(Sb) such that Hb(Ib) = y and
xb ∈ Ib. By the claim, we can find ρb such that θ(ρb) = θb and xb ∈ Ib = tgt(ρb),
which completes the proof.
As was the case with Lemma IV.13, the above lemma implies that, when esti-
mator system Sb has an exact state estimate reduction, a history θb gives no more
information about the current state of Sb than does the last output tgt(θb). Once
again, the following theorem follows immediately from this observation.
Theorem IV.26. Given partially observed system Sb with corresponding estimator
system Sb, suppose that system Sa defined over state estimates is an exact state esti-
mate reduction of Sb and that all other conditions of Thm. IV.22 are satisfied. Then
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the obtained supervisor σb will be safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally permissive
among supervisors of the form σb : Θ(Sb)→ 2Ub.
We next turn our attention to finding conditions under which it is possible to
obtain a state estimate reduction, using a state reduction as a basis. Specifically,
suppose we have a system Sb with observations given by Ob and Lb yielding partially
observed system S ′b, along with a state reduction Sa of system Sb. Procedure IV.27
shows how to construct an associated partially observed system S ′a and Thm. IV.28
shows that the estimator Sa of S
′
a will “almost” be a state estimate reduction of
estimator Sb of S
′
b.
Procedure IV.27. Given partially observed system S ′b = (Xb, Ub,→b, Y,Hb, Ob, Lb),
let Sb be the system Sb = (Xb, Ub,→b, Y,Hb) and suppose that Sa = (Xa, Ua,→a
, Y,Ha) is a state reduction of Sb with state relation R ⊆ Xa × Xb and control
relation C : Y → 2Xa × 2Xb . Define the partially observed system S ′a = (Xa, Ua,→a
, Y,Ha, Oa, La) as follows:
1. Let the equivalence relation ≡o,b⊆ Ob × Ob be defined by ob,1 ≡o,b ob,2 ⇔
Hb(Lb(ob,1)) = Hb(Lb(ob,2)). Then let [ob] denote the equivalence class of ob ∈ Ob
under ≡o,b and define Oa as the set of such equivalence classes.
2. Define La : Oa → 2Xa by La(oa) = {xa ∈ Xa : (∃ob ∈ Ob : oa = [ob])(∃xb ∈
Lb(ob) : (xa, xb) ∈ R)}.
Theorem IV.28. Given partially observed system S ′b = (Xb, Ub,→b, Y,Hb, Ob, Lb), let
Sb be the system Sb = (Xb, Ub,→b, Y,Hb) and suppose that Sa = (Xa, Ua,→a, Y,Ha)
is a state reduction of Sb with state relation R ⊆ Xa × Xb and control relation C :
Y → 2Xa × 2Xb. Obtain partially observed system S ′a = (Xa, Ua,→a, Y,Ha, Oa, La) as
in Procedure IV.27 and let Sa and Sb be the estimator systems corresponding to S
′
a
and S ′b, respectively. Suppose that C satisfies the property that y1, y2 ∈ y ⇒ C(y1) =
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C(y2), for all y ∈ Ha(I(S ′a)) ∪ Hb(I(S ′b)). Define the state and control relations
R ⊆ 2Xa × 2Xb and C : Ha(I(S ′a)) ∪Hb(I(S ′b))→ 2Ua × 2Ub by:
(Ia, Ib) ∈ R⇔ Ha(Ia) = Hb(Ib) (4.25)
C(y) = C(y) for any y ∈ y (4.26)
Then Sa satisfies properties 0, 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the state estimate reduction (w.r.t.
Sb).
Proof.
Claim 1: For any partially observed system S = (X,U,→, Y,H,O, L),
I(S) = {I ⊆ X : ∃o ∈ O s.t. I ⊆ L(o)}. (4.27)
From Eq. (4.18), we have that I ∈ I(S) ⇒ I ⊆ L(o), for some o ∈ O. Furthermore,
if I ⊆ L(o) for some o ∈ O, then I = I ∩ L(o), and hence I ∈ I(S) follows from
Eq. (4.18), which proves the claim.
Claim 2:
oa = [ob]⇔ Ha(La(oa)) = Hb(Lb(ob)). (4.28)
Ha(La(oa))
=

y ∈ Y : (∃xa ∈ Xa : Ha(xa) = y)
(∃ob ∈ Ob : oa = [ob])
(∃xb ∈ Lb(ob) : (xa, xb) ∈ R)

=
 y ∈ Y : (∃ob ∈ Ob : oa = [ob])(∃xb ∈ Lb(ob) : Hb(xb) = y)

= Hb(Lb(ob)),
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for any ob ∈ Ob such that oa = [ob], proving the claim.
From Claim 1, it follows that:
H(I(S)) =
 y ∈ 2
Y : (∃I ⊆ X)(∃o ∈ O)
s.t. y = H(I) ∧ I ⊆ L(o)

= {y ∈ 2Y : (∃o ∈ O) s.t. y ⊆ H(L(o))} (4.29)
Clearly, for every ob ∈ Ob, there exists oa ∈ Oa such that oa = [ob], and vice versa.
It follows from this and Claim 2 that {y ∈ 2Y : (∃oa ∈ Oa) s.t. y = Ha(La(oa))} =
{y ∈ 2Y : (∃ob ∈ Ob) s.t. y = Hb(Lb(ob))}. From Eq. (4.29), we therefore have that
Ha(I(Sa)) = Hb(I(Sb)), which is Property 0. Property 3 follows immediately from
Eq. (4.25), and Property 1 follows from this and the fact that R−1 is a function.
Property 2 follows from Eq. (4.26) and the fact that C(y) is a bijection for all y ∈ Y .
Claim 3: If Hb(Ib) ⊆ Ha(Ia) and oa = [ob], then Hb(Ib ∩ Lb(ob)) ⊆ Ha(Ia ∩ La(oa)).
Since Hb is a function, Hb(Ib ∩Lb(ob)) ⊆ Hb(Ib)∩Hb(Lb(ob)). Since Ha is one-to-one,
Ha(Ia∩La(oa)) = Ha(Ia)∩Ha(La(oa)). From Claim 2, oa = [ob] implies Hb(Lb(ob)) =
Ha(La(oa)). Thus, Hb(Ib ∩ Lb(ob)) ⊆ Hb(Ib) ∩ Hb(Lb(ob)) ⊆ Ha(Ia) ∩ Ha(La(oa)) =
Ha(Ia ∩ La(oa)), proving the claim.
To prove Property 5, consider any (Ib, ub, I
′
b) ∈ →b. From Properties 0 and 3, we
have that there exists Ia ∈ I(Sa) such that (Ia, Ib) ∈ R. From Property 2, we have
that there exists ua ∈ Ua such that (ua, ub) ∈ C(Hb(Ib)). From the definition of
→b in Eq. (4.19), we have that there exists ob ∈ Ob such that I ′b = ∪xb∈Ib{x′b :
(xb, ub, x
′
b) ∈→b} ∩ Lb(ob). Now let Ipb = ∪xb∈Ib{x′b : (xb, ub, x′b) ∈→b}, oa = [ob], I ′a =
∪xa∈Ia{x′a : (xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a} ∩ La(oa), and Ipa = ∪xa∈Ia{x′a : (xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a}, so
that I ′b = I
p
b ∩Lb(ob) and I ′a = Ipa ∩La(oa). From Property 5 of the state reduction, we
have that, for all (xb, ub, x
′
b) ∈→b, there exists (xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a such that (xa, xb) ∈ R
and (x′a, x
′
b) ∈ R. It therefore follows from Property 3 of the state reduction that
Hb(I
p
b ) ⊆ Ha(Ipa). From Claim 3, it then follows that Hb(I ′b) = Hb(Ipb ∩ Lb(ob)) ⊆
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Ha(I
p
a ∩La(oa)) = Ha(I ′a). Now remark that, from the definition of I ′a and Eq. (4.19),
we have that (Ia, ua, I
′
a) ∈ →a. From Property 0, we have that there exists I ′′a ∈ I(Sa)
such that Ha(I
′′
a ) = Hb(I
′
b) ⊆ Ha(I ′a). Property 3 then gives (I ′′a , I ′b) ∈ R and the fact
that Ha is one-to-one gives I
′′
a ⊆ I ′a, completing the proof.
Note, however, that Proc. IV.27 is not guaranteed to produce a state estimate
reduction when Sa is a state reduction of Sb, since Property 4 may fail to hold between
Sa and Sb. Moreover, if Sa is an exact state reduction of Sb, then all of properties 4-7 of
the exact state estimate reduction may fail to hold between Sa and Sb. See Ex. IV.29
for an example where Property 4 of the state estimate reduction and Property 5 of
the exact state estimate reduction fail to hold.
Example IV.29. Consider the system Sb of Fig. 4.3. It can be verified that system
Sa of Fig. 4.4 is an exact state reduction of Sb. Now define S
′
b as the partially
observed system Sb, with the set of observations Ob = {ob,1, ob,2, ob,3} and observation
function Lb : Ob → 2Xb given by Lb(ob,1) = {1}, Lb(ob,2) = {2, 3}, and Lb(ob,3) =
{4, 5, 6}. Following Proc. IV.27, we find that Hb(Lb(ob,1)) = Hb(Lb(ob,2)) = {y1} and
Hb(Lb(ob,3)) = {y2, y3} and hence we define Oa = {oa,1, oa,2} with [ob,1] = [ob,2] = oa,1,
[ob,3] = oa,2, La(oa,1) = {y1}, and La(oa,2) = {y2, y3}. From Eqs. (4.18) and (4.19),
we obtain →b = {({1}, u, {4}), ({2}, u, {5}), ({3}, u, {6}), ({2, 3}, u, {5, 6})}. On the
other hand,→a = {({y1}, u, {y2, y3})}. This violates Property 4 of the state estimate
reduction, since there does not exist (Ib, ub, I
′
b) ∈ →b such that Hb(I ′b) = {y2, y3}.
Furthermore, it also violates Property 5 of the exact state estimate reduction, since
there doesn’t exist (Ia, ua, I
′
a) ∈ →a satisfying either Ha(I ′a) = {y2} or Ha(I ′a) = {y3}.
In fact, there does not exist any set of observations Oa and observation function
La : Oa → 2Xa for partially observed system S ′a such that the estimator system
of S ′a will be a state estimate reduction of Sb. Because Hb(Lb(ob,3)) = {y2, y3},
satisfaction of Property 0 requires that there exist some oa ∈ Oa with Ha(La(oa)) ⊇
{y2, y3}. But Hb(Lb(ob,1)) = {y1}, so that satisfaction of Property 0 also requires
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Figure 4.3: An example system Sb. Rectangles are used to denote states with the
same output.
Figure 4.4: The system Sa that is an exact state reduction of system Sb of Fig. 4.3.
that there exist some Ia ∈ I(Sa) such that y1 ∈ Ha(Ia). For this Ia and oa, we have
∪xa∈Ia{x′a ∈ Xa : (xa, u, x′a) ∈→a} ∩ La(oa) = {y2, y3}, yielding (Ia, u, {y2, y3}) ∈ →a
and hence the same violation of Property 4 as before. As previously noted, it is
still possible to construct a state estimate reduction of Sb in such cases, but this
must be accomplished by directly abstracting Sb, rather than by abstracting Sb and
constructing the estimator of this abstraction.
4.6 Conditions for State Estimate Reductions and Exact State
Estimate Reductions
We next turn attention to the vehicle control problem of Prob. IV.1. Denote by
Sb the time-discretized system of Eq. (4.2) and by S
′
b the partially observed system
Sb with observations given by Eq. (4.4). We show in this section that, when the
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discretization parameters µ and τ are chosen so that emax = kµτ/2 for some k ∈ N,
then Obs(G′) is a state estimate reduction of the estimator Sb of S ′b. Furthermore,
when G is an exact state reduction of Sb, we show that Obs(G
′) is an exact state
estimate reduction of Sb. To prove these results, we would like to treat G as a
transition system as in Def. IV.3, G′ as a partially observed transition system as in
Def. IV.16, and Obs(G′) as an estimator system as in Def. IV.17. This will require
defining a translation between the various types of transition systems used in this
work and the automata models used in supervisory control theory of DES, as well
as some unification of notation. This translation is described in Sec. 4.6.1, parts of
which are recalled from Dallal et al. (2014).
4.6.1 Translating Between Transition Systems and Discrete Event Sys-
tems
In Thm. IV.10, we obtain the maximally permissive, safe, and non-deadlocking su-
pervisor σb of a system Sb = (Xb, Ub,→b, Yb, Hb) with respect to a safety specification
Safeb ⊆→b and set of marked states Xm,b ⊆ Xb, which is done by first constructing
the maximally permissive, safe, and non-deadlocking supervisor σa of the abstracted
system Sa = (Xa, Ua,→a, Ya, Ha) with respect to the induced safety and marking
specifications Safea ⊆→a and Xm,a ⊆ Xa, and then using state and control relations
to obtain σb from σa. In Thm. IV.22, we do the same, but with a system and its
specifications defined over state estimates. In either of the above cases, the super-
visor computation is achieved by constructing two DES automata G and H, where
G (the system automaton) models the possible system behavior and H (the spec-
ification automaton) models the restricted system behavior that we wish to allow.
In the fully observed case (or in the case of systems defined over state estimates),
the supervisor is produced by solving the basic supervisory control problem in the
non-blocking case (BSCP-NB). See Cassandras and Lafortune (2008); Ramadge and
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Wonham (1987); Wonham and Ramadge (1987) for a description of this problem and
associated algorithms for obtaining the supervisor.
We describe here how to construct equivalent automata for systems (as in Def. IV.3),
partially observed systems (as in Def. IV.16), and estimator systems (as in Def. IV.17).
4.6.1.1 Translating Systems
Given system Sa = (Xa, Ua,→a, Ya, Ha) along with safety and marking specifica-
tions Safea and Xm,a, the equivalent DES system automaton is G := (Xa ∪ Za, Ec ∪
Euc, ψG, xa,0, Xm,a), where:
Ec = Ua (4.30)
ψG ⊆ (Xa × Ec × Za) ∪ (Za × Euc × (Xa ∪ Za)) (4.31)
ψG(xa, ua)!⇔ ua ∈ Ua(xa) (4.32)
∃t ∈ E∗uc : ψG(xa, uat) = x′a ⇔ (xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a . (4.33)
The sets Ec and Euc are, respectively, the sets of controllable and uncontrollable
events of G and the set Za is a set of intermediate states. All events are taken to be
observable. Eq. (4.30) signifies that the set of controllable events of G is simply the
set of control inputs of Sa. Eq. (4.31) signifies that controllable events are defined
only from the states of Xa and lead only to states in Za, whereas uncontrollable
events are defined only from states in Za and may lead either to states in Xa or
to other states in Za. Eq. (4.32) signifies that controllable event ua is defined from
state xa if and only if Postua(xa) is non-empty (recall the definition of Ua(xa) from
Def. IV.3). Finally, Eq. (4.33) signifies that there exists a sequence of uncontrollable
events following controllable event ua from state xa leading to state x
′
a if and only if
(xa, ua, x
′
a) is a transition of Sa.
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The initial state xa,0 may be a single fixed initial state or a dummy initial state
with transitions to each of some set of states Xa,0. In the absence of any initial state
information, it is assumed that any state can be an initial state and hence that there
are transitions from xa,0 to each state in Xa.
Constructing the specification automaton H is achieved through the same process
as constructing G, but with the system (Xa, Ua, Safea, Ya, Ha) instead. With H and
G defined, problem BSCP-NB is solved, yielding the desired supervisor. Because
H is a sub-automaton of G and controllable events are defined only from Xa, the
supervisor will have the form S : Xa → 2Ua , rather than a more general language
based form (see, e.g. (Hadj-Alouane et al., 1994)).
In order to have the same notation when working with systems as in Def. IV.3
and DES as above, we use the notation U(x) := {u ∈ Ec : ψ(x, u)!} and Postu(x) :=
{x′ ∈ Xa : (∃t ∈ E∗uc)(x′ = ψ(x, ut))} for x ∈ Xa and (in an abuse of notation) will
write (x, u, x′) ∈ ψ if x ∈ Xa and x′ ∈ Postu(x).
4.6.1.2 Translating Partially Observed Systems
Given partially observed system S ′a = (Xa, Ua,→a, Ya, Ha, Oa, La) along with
safety and marking specifications Safea and Xm,a, the equivalent DES system au-
tomaton is G := (Xa ∪ Xpa ∪ Za, Ec ∪ Euc, ψG, xa,0, Xm,a), where Xpa is a copy of Xa
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with xa ≡ xpa used to denote that xpa ∈ Xpa is the copy of xa ∈ Xa and:
Ec = Ua (4.34)
Euc = Oa ∪ Euc,uo (4.35)
ψG ⊆
(Xpa ×Oa ×Xa) ∪ (Xa × Ec × Za)
∪(Za × Euc,uo × (Xpa ∪ Za))
(4.36)
ψG(x
p
a, oa)!⇔ ∃xa ∈ La(oa) : xa ≡ xpa (4.37)
ψG(x
p
a, oa) = xa ⇔ xa ∈ La(oa) : xa ≡ xpa (4.38)
ψG(xa, ua)!⇔ ua ∈ Ua(xa) (4.39)
∃t ∈ E∗uc,uo : ψG(xa, uat) = xpa ∈ Xpa
⇔ (xa, ua, x′a) ∈→a: x′a ≡ xpa.
(4.40)
As before, the sets Ec and Euc are, respectively, the sets of controllable and uncon-
trollable events of G and the set Za is a set of intermediate states. The observable
events are Ec ∪ Oa and the unobservable events are Euc,uo. Eq. (4.36) signifies that
observation events in Oa are defined only from states in X
p
a and lead to states in Xa,
controllable events in Ua are defined only from states in Xa and lead to states in Za,
whereas the events of Euc,uo are defined only from states in Za and lead to states in
either Za or X
p
a . Eqs. (4.37) and (4.38) signify that event oa ∈ Oa is defined from
xpa ∈ Xpa if and only if xpa is the copy of some state xa ∈ Xa such that xa ∈ L(oa),
in which case the transition leads to xa. This constitutes the correction step for the
partially observed system. Finally, Eqs. (4.39) and (4.40) have the same interpreta-
tion as Eqs. (4.32) and (4.33), with the exception that the string t ∈ E∗uc,uo takes the
system to a state in Xpa rather than a state in Xa.
Initial states are dealt with in the same way as in the fully observed case, except
that any transitions from a dummy initial state should lead to states in Xpa , rather
than to states in Xa.
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4.6.1.3 Translating Estimator Systems
Given system defined over state estimates Sa = (I(Sa), Ua,→a, 2Ya , Ha) along
with safety and marking specifications Safea and Im,a, the equivalent DES system
automaton is G := (I(Sa) ∪ Ip(Sa), Ec ∪ Euc, ψG, Ia,0, Im,a), where:
Ec = Ua (4.41)
ψG ⊆
(I(Sa)× Ec × Ip(Sa))
∪(Ip(Sa)× Euc × I(Sa))
(4.42)
ψG(Ia, ua)!⇔ ∃(Ia, ua, I ′a) ∈ →a (4.43)
∃euc ∈ Euc : ψG(Ia, uaeuc) = I ′a
⇔ (Ia, ua, I ′a) ∈ →a
. (4.44)
The sets Ec and Euc are, respectively, the sets of controllable and uncontrollable
events of G and the set Ip(Sa) is a set of intermediate states. All events are taken to
be observable. Eqs. (4.41)-(4.44) have the same interpretations as Eqs. (4.30)-(4.33)
in the fully observed case, except for the fact that events in euc lead directly to states
in I(Sa), rather than leading to states in either I(Sa) or I
p(Sa).
It can be shown that, if G is obtained as Obs(G) for some DES abstraction G
representing a partially observed system, then G will indeed have the above form. In
this case, we will additionally have the following properties:
Euc = Oa (4.45)
(Ia, ua, I
p
a) ∈ ψG ⇔ Ipa ∩Xpa ≡ Ipa(Ia, ua) (4.46)
(Ipa , oa, I
′
a) ∈ ψG ⇔ I ′a = Ica(Ipa ∩Xpa , oa), (4.47)
where Ipa(·, ·) and Ica(·, ·) are the prediction and correction functions of Eqs. (4.16)
and (4.17). In words, the states of Ip(Sa) represent state estimates reached after
prediction steps, whereas states of I(Sa) represent state estimates reached after cor-
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rection steps. However, because the observer is constructed through the unobservable
reach operation, the states of Ip(Sa) will be subsets of Za ∪Xpa , which is why we use
Ipa ∩Xpa rather than just Ipa in Eqs. (4.46) and (4.47). Thus, constructing the observer
of a DES automaton representing a partially observed system yields a DES automaton
representing the estimator of the partially observed system.
The initial state Ia,0 may be a single fixed initial state or a dummy initial state.
In the latter case, there are observable transitions from the dummy initial state to
each state of some subset of I(Sa). In the absence of any initial state information, it
is assumed that any state can be an initial state and hence that there are transitions
from Ia,0 to each state in I(Sa). Constructing the specification automaton H and
solving for the desired supervisor is not done by taking the observer of any system.
Instead, it must be constructed from G, by pruning the transitions of ψ, in accordance
with Defs. IV.20 and IV.21.
In order to have the same notation when working with systems as in Def. IV.17
and DES as above, we will abuse notation and write (I, u, I ′) ∈ ψ if Ia ∈ I(Sa) and
there exists some euc ∈ Euc such that I ′ = ψ(Ia, ueuc).
4.6.2 Proofs of state estimate reductions between the observer and the
continuous estimator
We now prove the results relating state reductions to state estimate reductions
and exact state reductions to exact state estimate reductions, as discussed at the
beginning of this section.
Remark IV.30. In the theorems that follows, we will limit attention to state estimates
that are boxes (i.e., products of intervals). This is justified by the fact that both
the prediction and correction functions of Eqs. (4.5) and (4.6) map boxes to boxes.
Thus, if the initial state estimate is a box, then all future state estimates will be
boxes as well. Furthermore, because both dynamics and estimation are uncoupled
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(estimation is uncoupled in the sense that a measurement χi of vehicle i’s position
tells us nothing about vehicle j 6= i’s position), we can establish the existence of some
transition (I, u, I ′) by examining each vehicle in turn.
Before proceeding, we define notation for the following proofs. For any two vectors
a, b ∈ Rn, define [a, b] := {x ∈ Rn : ai ≤ xi ≤ bi, i = 1, . . . , n}. For any qi,lo, qi,hi ∈ Q˜i,
we will use {[qi,lo, qi,hi]} to denote the set {qi,lo, qi,lo + µτ, . . . , qi,hi}. Next, let wmin =
µτbδmin/(µτ)c, wmax = µτdδmax/(µτ)e, min = δmin − wmin, and max = wmax − δmax,
so that 0 ≤ min, max < µτ . Additionally, note that we will generally use I to denote
state estimates for the continuous system and ι to denote state estimates for the
abstracted system. The notation Ib and Ia will continue to be used only for general
results (i.e., not specific to the vehicle control problem under consideration). Finally,
take Sb to be the system of Eq. (4.2) with the output map of Eq. (4.3), S
′
b to be the
partially observed system Sb with observations given by Eq. (4.4), Sa to be the state
reduction G of Sb, and S
′
a to be G
′. Then, Xb = X, Xa = Ya = Yb = Q˜, Ub = Vc,
Ua = Uc, Hb = `, Ha is the identity map, Ob = X, Lb = L, Oa = Λ, La = L
Λ, Ipb = I
p,
Icb = I
c, Ipa = ψ
p
, and Ica = ψ
c
.
Proposition IV.31. Let Sb be the estimator system of the system of Eq. (4.2) with
the output map of Eq. (4.3) and observations of Eq. (4.4). If emax = kµτ/2 for
some k ∈ N, then Obs(G′) is a state estimate reduction of Sb, with state and control
relations R and C given by Eqs. (4.25) and (4.26).
The proof is contained in the appendix.
Theorem IV.32. Suppose that emax = kµτ/2 for some k ∈ N, let G = Obs(G′),
as described in Sec. 4.5.1, and let H be the specification automation obtained by
pruning the transitions of G, in accordance with Defs. IV.20 and IV.21. Solve for
the supremal controllable sublanguage (Lm(H))↑C of Lm(H) with respect to L(G) and
uncontrollable event set Euc = Λ, obtaining a maximally permissive safe and non-
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blocking supervisor S : 2Q˜ → 2Uc. Then the supervisor σ : 2X/` → 2Vc defined by
vc ∈ σ(I)⇔ uc = τvc ∈ S(`(I)) solves Prob. IV.1.
Proof. Immediate from Thm. IV.22 and Prop. IV.31.
Next, we prove the equivalent theorem for the case where G is an exact state
reduction of the system of Eq. (4.2) with the output map of Eq. (4.3). We first prove
the following lemma, however.
Lemma IV.33. For any two intervals I1 = [I1lo, I
1
hi] and I
2 = [I2lo, I
2
hi] such that
I1 ∩ I2 6= ∅, `i(I1 ∩ I2) = `i(I1) ∩ `i(I2).
Proof. Given any non-empty interval I = [Ilo, Ihi], we have `i(I) = {[`i(Ilo), `i(Ihi)]}.
Since `i is monotonic, we have min{`i(x1), `i(x2)} = `i(min{x1, x2}) and max{`i(x1), `i(x2)} =
`i(max{x1, x2}), for any x1, x2 ∈ R. It follows that I1∩I2 = [max{I1lo, I2lo},min{I1hi, I2hi}]
and, if I1 ∩ I2 6= ∅, then `i(I1 ∩ I2) = {[`i(max{I1lo, I2lo}), `i(min{I1hi, I2hi})]}
= {[max{`i(I1lo), `i(I2lo)},min{`i(I1hi), `i(I2hi)}]} = {[`i(I1lo), `i(I1hi)]}∩{[`i(I2lo), `i(I2hi)]} =
`i(I
1) ∩ `i(I2).
Proposition IV.34. Let Sb be the estimator system of the system of Eq. (4.2) with
the output map of Eq. (4.3) and observations of Eq. (4.4). If δmin and δmax are both
integer multiples of τµ and emax = kµτ/2 for some k ∈ N, then Obs(G′) is an exact
state estimate reduction of Sb, with state and control relations R and C given by
Eqs. (4.25) and (4.26), and set of reachable state estimates I ′(Sb) as follows:
I ′(Sb) =
∏
i∈N I
′
i(Sb)
I ′i(Sb) =
 [qi,lo + i, qi,hi + i] s.t.qi,lo, qi,hi ∈ Q˜i ∧ −µτ/2 < i ≤ µτ/2

(4.48)
Proof. Beyond what has been shown in Prop. IV.31, it remains to prove that Prop-
erties 5-7 of Def. IV.24 also hold. We begin with Property 5. Consider any transition
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(I, vc, I
′) ∈ →b and let χ be such that I ′ = Ic(Ip(I, vc), χ). We show that ι′ =
ψ
c
(ψ
p
(ι, uc), λ), for ι = `(I), uc = vcτ , ι
′ = `(I ′), and λ = [χ], from which it follows
that (ι, uc, ι
′) ∈ ψ, as required for Property 5. As in the proof of Prop. IV.31, we con-
sider one vehicle at a time. Let Ii = [xi,lo, xi,hi] and ιi = `i(Ii) = {[qi,lo, qi,hi]}. Since
δmin and δmax are both integer multiples of τµ, we have I
p
i (I, vc) = [xi,lo+ki,loµτ, xi,hi+
ki,hiµτ ] and ψ
p
(ι, uc) = {[qi,lo + ki,loµτ, qi,hi + ki,hiµτ ]} for some ki,lo, ki,hi ∈ N. Now,
for any xi ∈ R and ci ∈ Z, `i(xi + ciµτ) = `i(xi) + ciµτ . Since ιi = `i(Ii), it
therefore follows that ψ
p
i (ι, uc) = `i(I
p
i (I, vc)). Finally, L
Λ
i (λ) = `i(Li(χ)) and ι
′
i =
ψ
c
i(ψ
p
(ι, uc), λ) = ψ
p
i (ι, uc)∩LΛi (λ) = `i(Ipi (I, vc))∩ `i(Li(χ)) = `i(Ipi (I, vc)∩Li(χ)) =
`i(I
′), using Lemma IV.33.
We next prove Property 6. Consider any transition (ι, uc, ι
′) ∈ ψ and any box
I ′ = [I ′lo, I
′
hi] ∈ I ′(Sb) such that `(I ′) = ι′ and let λ ∈ Λ be such that ι′ =
ψ
c
(ψ
p
(ι, uc), λ). We construct I ∈ I ′(Sb), vc = uc/τ , and χ such that `(I) = ι,
and I ′ = Ic(Ip(I, vc), χ), from which it follows that (I, vc, I ′) ∈ →b, as required for
Property 6. As before, we consider a single vehicle at a time. Let ιi = {[qi,lo, qi,hi]},
ιpi = ψ
p
(ι, uc) = {[qpi,lo, qpi,hi]}, and LΛi (λ) = {[qoi,lo, qoi,hi]}, so that ι′i = ψ
c
i(ψ
p
(ι, uc), λ) =
ψ
p
i (ι, uc)∩LΛi (λ) = {[max{qpi,lo, qoi,lo},min{qpi,hi, qoi,hi}]}. Given Eq. (4.48), and the fact
that `(I ′) = ι′, it must be that I ′i = [q
′
i,lo + , q
′
i,hi + ] for some  ∈ (−µτ/2, µτ/2].
Take Ii = [qi,lo + , qi,hi + ] and χi = (q
o
i,lo + q
o
i,hi)/2 + , so that `i(Ii) = ιi,
Ipi (I, vc) = [q
p
i,lo + , q
p
i,hi + ], `i(I
p
i (I, vc)) = ι
p
i , and Li(χ) = [q
o
i,lo + , q
o
i,hi + ].
Thus, Ici (I
p
i (I, vc), χ) = [q
p
i,lo + , q
p
i,hi + ] ∩ [qoi,lo + , qoi,hi + ] = [max{qpi,lo, qoi,lo} +
,min{qpi,hi, qoi,hi}+ ], from which it follows that `i(Ici (Ipi (I, vc), χ)) = ι′i. This implies
that I ′i = I
c
i (I
p(I, vc), χ) (otherwise it could not be that `(I
′
i) = ι
′
i), which proves
Property 6.
Finally, we prove Property 7. By assumption, all state estimates are boxes, so that
any y ∈ Y has the form y = ∏i∈N{[qi,lo, qi,hi]}. Once again, we consider one ve-
hicle at a time. Since yi = {[qi,lo, qi,hi]}, `−1i (yi) = (qi,lo − µτ/2, qi,hi + µτ/2] =
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⋃
∈(−µτ/2,µτ/2][qi,lo + , qi,hi + ]. Since each of the intervals [qi,lo + , qi,hi + ] are in the
set I ′i(Sb), this proves Property 7.
Theorem IV.35. If emax = kµτ/2 for some k ∈ N and δmin and δmax are both
integer multiples of τµ, then the supervisor σ of Thm. IV.32 solves Prob. IV.1, and
is maximally permissive among the class of all supervisors, not merely memoryless
ones.
Proof. Immediate from Thm. IV.26 and Prop. IV.34.
The solution method presented in this work is depicted in Fig. 4.5. It should be
noted that for a DES automaton with m states, the observer of the DES automaton
can have up to 2m states. However, because state estimates in the system under
consideration will always be boxes, the number of states of G = Obs(G′) is quadratic
in |Q˜| (any box is uniquely parametrized by two states). Furthermore, because the
specification automaton H is a subautomaton of G and G is acyclic (by virtue of the
asumption that velocities are bounded below by µ), the computation of the supervisor
in Thm. IV.32 takes only time linear in the size of G (see, e.g. (Hadj-Alouane et al.,
1994)). See Dallal et al. (2014) for a more thorough discussion of running time.
4.7 Conclusion
We considered the problem of finding a safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally
permissive supervisor for a set of vehicles at an intersection, in the presence of un-
controlled vehicles, bounded disturbances, and measurement uncertainty. We showed
how to construct a suitable DES abstraction for this partially observed system, by
discretizing the system in space and time, grouping the set of possible measurements
into a finite set of equivalence classes, and using a combination of uncontrollable
and unobservable events to model the uncontrolled vehicles, the disturbance, and
the measurement uncertainty. We described a procedure for obtaining supervisors
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Figure 4.5: The solution method. Given the time discretized system of Eq. (4.2) with
the space discretization given by `(·) of Eq. (4.3), constituting system
Sb, we can construct DES abstraction G that is a state reduction of this
system. Given system Sb with measurement uncertainty given by L(·)
of Eq. (4.4), constituting partially observed system S ′b, we can construct
DES abstraction G′ that models the measurement uncertainty of L(·)
by partitioning the set of measurements X into equivalence classes Λ, in
accordance with Proc. IV.27. Given the estimator Sb of partially observed
system S ′b, we can construct DES abstraction G that is a state estimate
reduction of Sb. Furthermore, when emax = kµτ/2 for some k ∈ N, G
can be obtained as the observer of G′ (Props. IV.31 and IV.34). A DES
supervisor S is then computed by solving problem BSCP-NB, from which
a continuous domain supervisor σ is obtained which solves Prob. IV.1
(Thms. IV.32 and IV.35).
for partially observed systems, by abstracting the system and specifications, solving
for a supervisor in the abstracted domain, and translating this supervisor back to
the original problem domain. We presented the general notions of state estimate
reduction and exact state estimate reduction relating prediction-correction estimator
systems to abstractions and showed that the obtained supervisors will be maximally
permissive among the class of memoryless supervisors, in the case of a state estimate
reduction, or maximally permissive among the class of all supervisors, in the case of
an exact state estimate reduction. Finally, we showed that, when the discretization
parameters are properly chosen for the vehicle control problem under consideration,
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it is possible to obtain a state estimate reduction or an exact state estimate reduction.
Future work includes generalizing the methods presented here to systems with more
complex dynamics, and extensions to stochastic problem formulations.
Appendix: Proof of Prop. IV.31
Proof. First, note that Prop. IV.11 shows that G is a state reduction of the system
of Eq. (4.2) with the output map of Eq. (4.3). Furthermore, Prop. IV.11 defines the
control relation C of this state reduction by C(q) := {(uc, vc) : vcτ = uc ∈ Uc}, for
all q ∈ Q˜ and therefore C satisfies the property that q1, q2 ∈ y ⇒ C(q1) = C(q2),
for all y ∈ Ha(I(S ′a)) ∪ Hb(I(S ′b)). Finally, G′ is the DES automaton equivalent of
a partially observed system constructed in accordance with Proc. IV.27 and hence
Obs(G′) is the DES automaton equivalent of the corresponding estimator system,
as per the discussion of Sec. 4.6.1.3. Therefore, the conditions of Thm. IV.28 are
satisfied and it remains only to prove that Property 4 of the state estimate reduction
also holds. We begin by proving the following claim:
Claim 4: Consider any two systems Sa and Sb such that Sa is a state reduction of Sb.
For any Ia ⊆ Xa, ua ∈ Ua, and ub ∈ Ub : (ua, ub) ∈ C(Ha(Ia)), let Ib = {xb ∈ Xb :
∃xa ∈ Ia s.t. (xa, xb) ∈ R}. Then (Ipa(Ia, ua), Ipb (Ib, ub)) ∈ R.
Recall from Eq. (4.16) that Ip(I, u) = ∪x∈I{x′ ∈ X : ∃(x, u, x′) ∈→}. Consider any
(xb, ub, x
′
b) ∈→b with xb ∈ Ib and x′b ∈ Ipb (Ib, ub). By Property 1 of Def. IV.8, there
is a unique xa ∈ Xa such that (xa, xb) ∈ R and a unique x′a such that (x′a, x′b) ∈ R.
From the definitions of Ia and Ib above, xa ∈ Ia. From Property 5 of Def. IV.8,
it must be that (xa, ua, x
′
a) ∈→a, so that x′a ∈ Ipa(Ia, ua). Conversely, consider any
(xa, ua, x
′
a) ∈→a with xa ∈ Ia and x′a ∈ Ipa(Ia, ua). By Property 4 of Def. IV.8,
there must exist some (xb, ub, x
′
b) ∈→b with (xa, xb) ∈ R and (x′a, x′b) ∈ R. From the
definitions of Ia and Ib above, it follows that any such xb is in Ib, and hence that
x′b ∈ Ipb (Ib, ub), which completes the proof of the claim.
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The remaining property to be proven states that, for all (ι, uc, ι
′) ∈ ψ, there exists
(I, vc, I
′) ∈ →b such that (ι, I) ∈ R, (uc, vc) ∈ C(ι), and (ι′, I ′) ∈ R. As stated in
Remark IV.30, it is sufficient to consider each vehicle separately. Thus, we wish to
construct, for each vehicle i, an interval Ii = [xi,lo, xi,hi] such that: xi,hi−xi,lo ≤ 2emax;
`i(Ii) = ιi; and `i(I
′
i) = ι
′
i, for I
′
i = I
c
i (I
p
i (Ii)).
Suppose that emax = kτµ/2. Then, for any χ ∈ X, Li(χ) = [χi − kτµ/2, χi +
kτ/mu/2], which is an interval of size kτµ. It follows that `i(Li(χ)) has the form
{[qi, qi + kµτ ]}, for some qi ∈ Q˜i. From Claims 1 and 2 of the proof of Thm. IV.28,
it follows that any ι ∈ I(G′) has the form ι = ∏ni=1{[qi,lo, qi,hi]}, where qi,lo, qi,hi ∈ Q˜i
and 0 ≤ qi,hi − qi,lo ≤ kτµ, for all i = 1, . . . , n (i.e., the discrete version of a box).
Consider some transition (ι, uc, ι
′) ∈ ψ. For vehicle i, we have ιi = {[qi,lo, qi,hi]} and
ι′i = {[q′i,lo, q′i,hi]}. Let ιpi = ψ
p
(ι, uc) := {[qpi,lo, qpi,hi]}. For a controlled vehicle, this is
given by ιpi = {[qi,lo+uc,i+wmin, qi,hi+uc,i+wmax]} whereas for an uncontrolled vehicle
this is given by ιpi = {[qi,lo + umin + wmin, qi,hi + umax + wmax]}. For any λ ∈ Λ, we
have that LΛi (λ) = {[qoi,lo, qoi,hi]}, for some qoi,lo, qoi,hi ∈ Q˜i such that qoi,hi − qoi,lo = kµτ .
It follows that ι′i = ι
p
i ∩ LΛi (λ) = {[max{qoi,lo, qpi,lo},min{qoi,hi, qpi,hi}]}. Now remark
that `−1i (ιi) = (qi,lo − µτ/2, qi,hi + µτ/2] and that from Claim 4 we therefore have
(ιp, Ip((qi,lo − µτ/2, qi,hi + µτ/2], vc)) ∈ R. Since `−1i (qi) = (qi − µτ/2, qi + µτ/2], it
follows that Ipi ((qi,lo−µτ/2, qi,hi +µτ/2], vc) = (βi,lo, βi,hi] for some βi,lo and βi,hi such
that qpi,lo−µτ/2 < βi,lo ≤ qpi,lo +µτ/2 and qpi,hi−µτ/2 < βi,hi ≤ qpi,hi +µτ/2. This fact
will be used in the analysis of each of four cases separately:
Case 1: qoi,lo > q
p
i,lo and q
o
i,hi < q
p
i,hi.
This gives ι′i = {[qoi,lo, qoi,hi]}. Take Ii = [qi,lo, qi,hi] and χi = (qoi,lo + qoi,hi)/2 so that
Ipi (I, vc) = [βi,lo + µτ/2, βi,hi − µτ/2] := [xpi,lo, xpi,hi], `i(Ii) = {[qi,lo, qi,hi]} = ιi and
Li(χ) = [q
o
i,lo, q
o
i,hi]. Since q
o
i,lo > q
p
i,lo and q
o
i,hi < q
p
i,hi, it must be that q
o
i,lo ≥ qpi,lo + µτ
and qoi,hi ≤ qpi,hi − µτ . Thus, xpi,lo = βi,lo + µτ/2 ≤ qpi,lo + µτ ≤ qoi,lo and xpi,hi =
βi,hi − µτ/2 > qpi,hi − µτ ≥ qoi,hi, from which it follows that I ′i = Ici (Ip(I, vc), χ) =
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[xpi,lo, x
p
i,hi] ∩ [qoi,lo, qoi,hi] = [qoi,lo, qoi,hi], so that `i(I ′i) = {[qoi,lo, qoi,hi]} = ι′i.
Case 2: qoi,lo > q
p
i,lo and q
o
i,hi ≥ qpi,hi.
This gives ι′i = {[qoi,lo, qpi,hi]}. Consider some  such that 0 ≤ max <  < µτ and take
Ii = [qi,lo − µτ/2 + , qi,hi − µτ/2 + ] and χi = (qoi,lo + qoi,hi)/2, so that Ipi (I, vc) =
[βi,lo + , βi,hi − µτ + ] := [xpi,lo, xpi,hi] and Li(χ) = [qoi,lo, qoi,hi]. Since 0 <  < µτ ,
we have `i(Ii) = {[qi,lo, qi,hi]} = ιi. Since max = wmax − δmax <  < µτ , we have
wmax <  + δmax < µτ + δmax ≤ µτ + wmax. It follows that qi,hi − µτ/2 + wmax <
qi,hi−µτ/2++δmax < qi,hi+µτ/2+wmax, and hence that `i(qi,hi−µτ/2++δmax) =
qi,hi +wmax. The same reasoning shows that we must have `i(x
p
i,hi) = q
p
i,hi, and hence
that qpi,hi − µτ/2 < xpi,hi ≤ qpi,hi + µτ/2. Since qoi,lo > qpi,lo and qoi,hi ≥ qpi,hi, we have
that qoi,lo > q
p
i,lo + µτ and q
o
i,hi ≥ qpi,hi + µτ . Using this and 0 <  < µτ gives xpi,hi =
βi,hi − µτ +  < βi,hi ≤ qpi,hi + µτ/2 ≤ qoi,hi − µτ/2 < qoi,hi. Similarly, xpi,lo = βi,lo +  <
βi,lo + µτ ≤ qpi,lo + 3µτ/2 < qoi,lo + µτ/2. Hence, qoi,lo ≤ max{xpi,lo, qoi,lo} < qoi,lo + µτ/2.
Also, it follows from qoi,hi ≥ qpi,hi and qpi,hi−µτ/2 < xpi,hi ≤ qpi,hi+µτ/2 that qpi,hi−µτ/2 <
min{xpi,hi, qoi,hi} ≤ qpi,hi + µτ/2. Finally, this gives I ′i = Ici (Ip(I, vc), χ) = [xpi,lo, xpi,hi] ∩
[qoi,lo, q
o
i,hi] = [max{xpi,lo, qoi,lo},min{xpi,hi, qoi,hi}], so that `i(I ′i) = {[qoi,lo, qpi,hi]} = ι′i.
Case 3: qoi,lo ≤ qpi,lo and qoi,hi < qpi,hi.
This gives ι′i = {[qpi,lo, qoi,hi]}. Consider some  such that 0 ≤ min <  < µτ and take
Ii = [qi,lo + µτ/2 − , qi,hi + µτ/2 − ] and χi = (qoi,lo + qoi,hi)/2. The remainder is
symmetrical to Case 2.
Case 4: qoi,lo ≤ qpi,lo and qoi,hi ≥ qpi,hi.
This gives ι′i = {[qpi,lo, qpi,hi]}. Furthermore, since qoi,lo ≤ qpi,lo and qoi,hi ≥ qpi,hi, we have
that qpi,hi−qpi,lo ≤ qoi,hi−qoi,lo = kµτ . Also, it must always be that qi,hi−qi,lo ≤ qpi,hi−qpi,lo,
with equality possible only if i is a controlled vehicle and δmin = δmax = 0, so that
qi,hi − qi,lo ≤ kµτ .
Suppose first that qi,hi−qi,lo = kµτ . Then kµτ = qi,hi−qi,lo ≤ qpi,hi−qpi,lo ≤ qoi,hi−qoi,lo =
kµτ , and hence it follows that vehicle i is controlled and δmin = δmax = 0. Thus,
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qpi,lo = qi,lo+uc,i and q
p
i,hi = qi,hi+uc,i. Therefore, taking Ii = [qi,lo, qi,hi] and χi = (q
o
i,lo+
qoi,hi)/2 yields `i(Ii) = {[qi,lo, qi,hi]} = ιi, Li(χ) = [qoi,lo, qoi,hi], Ipi (I, vc) = [qpi,lo, qpi,hi], I ′i =
Ici (I
p(I, vc), χ) = [q
p
i,lo, q
p
i,hi]∩[qoi,lo, qoi,hi] = [qpi,lo, qpi,hi], and hence `i(I ′i) = {[qpi,lo, qpi,hi]} =
ι′i.
Now suppose instead that qi,hi− qi,lo < kµτ . Then qi,hi− qi,lo ≤ (k− 1)µτ and we can
take χi = (q
o
i,lo + q
o
i,hi)/2 and Ii = [qi,lo + µτ/2 − lo, qi,hi − µτ/2 + hi] := [xi,lo, xi,hi]
for lo and hi such that min < lo < µτ and max < hi < µτ , yielding xi,hi − xi,lo =
(qi,hi − µτ/2 + hi)− (qi,lo + µτ/2− lo) = qi,hi − qi,lo − µτ + lo + hi < qi,hi − qi,lo +
µτ ≤ kµτ . By the same reasoning as in Case 2, `i(Ii) = ιi, Li(χ) = [qoi,lo, qoi,hi]
and Ipi (I, vc) = [x
p
i,lo, x
p
i,hi], for some x
p
i,lo and x
p
i,hi such that q
p
i,lo − µτ/2 < xpi,lo ≤
qpi,lo + µτ/2 and q
p
i,hi − µτ/2 < xpi,hi ≤ qpi,hi + µτ/2. Since qoi,lo ≤ qpi,lo and qoi,hi ≥ qpi,hi,
it follows that qpi,lo − µτ/2 < max{xpi,lo, qoi,lo} ≤ qpi,lo + µτ/2 and that qpi,hi − µτ/2 <
min{xpi,hi, qoi,hi} ≤ qpi,hi + µτ/2. Thus, I ′i = Ici (Ip(I, vc), χ) = [xpi,lo, xpi,hi] ∩ [qoi,lo, qoi,hi] =
[max{xpi,lo, qoi,lo},min{xpi,hi, qoi,hi}], so that `i(I ′i) = {[qpi,lo, qpi,hi]} = ι′i.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion & Future Work
5.1 Dynamic Diagnosability
This work considered the problem of dynamic fault diagnosis under the constraint
of maintaining K-diagnosability. Using an appropriately defined information state,
we constructed a structure called the MPO that contains all the solutions to the
problem. Our contributions are as follows. By defining the information state as we
have, we reduce the space complexity of the MPO from O(2|X|
2·K·2|E|) in Cassez and
Tripakis (2008) to O(2|X|·(K+2)2|E|). Furthermore, the monotonicity property on the
extended specification and the resulting reduction of the information state reduces
this complexity to O(2|X|(K+2)|X|2|E|), yielding a complexity that is polynomial inK,
rather than exponential in K. Finally, the use of the extended specification allows for
an efficient quadratic time test for determining the safety of a control decision from
any given information state. This potentially allows for a minimal solution to be
computed on-line, simply by taking a minimal control decision from each information
state (all such controllers will be minimal but not all minimal controllers will have
this form).
Implementation of the results of this work on real world systems may require
further effort. In particular, the reduction of the size complexity of the MPO and
the efficient algorithmic implementation for its construction are unlikely to be able
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to deal with systems containing thousands of states, much less millions. Although we
have constructed MPOs with millions of states in minutes, those MPOs corresponded
to automata that had only a hundred states. The problem here is that the MPO
scales exponentially with the size of the automaton to diagnose and therefore its full
construction is impractical for real world systems. One way to deal with this issue is
to compute minimal solutions on-line, as discussed above. The running time of this
is exponential in the number of events, but only quadratic in the number of states
of the automaton to diagnose. Since the number of events is typically much smaller
than the number of states, this method should scale to much larger automata. A
second possible solution to the problem of computationally intractable MPOs is to
seek a single controller C that is optimal according to some cost criterion. Indeed,
both the works of Thorsley and Teneketzis (2007) and Cassez and Tripakis (2008)
use this approach. In Cassez and Tripakis (2008), the construction of the MPO is
used as a first step, however. In Thorsley and Teneketzis (2007), a dynamic program
is solved over a similarly sized structure (essentially an MPO without Z states). In
general, the optimal sensor activation policy from any given state depends on that
state’s successors (and so on...), so that a large portion of the state space must be
explored in order to determine the optimal policy. This could potentially be mitigated
by heuristics like alpha-beta pruning, since the optimization is of the min-max form.
A possible direction for future work is the extension of this work to the decentral-
ized case of co-diagnosability, in which a number of sites each have a distinct (but
possibly overlapping) set of sensors and must jointly diagnose the occurrence of a
fault. Specifically, co-diagnosability requires that any fault is eventually diagnosed
by at least one site. The problem may be analyzed with or without communication
between the various diagnosing sites. It should however be noted that maximally
permissive solutions will generally not exist in the decentralized setting, since one
site may be required to turn more sensors on if another turns fewer sensors on. Thus,
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a feasible solution concept would be either the construction of a minimal sensor acti-
vation policy, or the computation of an optimal policy.
5.2 Vehicle Control
We considered the problem of finding a safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally
permissive supervisor for a set of vehicles at an intersection, in the presence of un-
controlled vehicles, bounded disturbances, and measurement uncertainty. We showed
how to compute the desired supervisor by creating an abstraction, solving for the
maximally permissive supervisor in the abstracted domain, and translating back to
the original problem domain. Our contributions are threefold. First, in the domain
of modelling, we showed how to construct DES abstractions for systems with envi-
ronmental uncertainty by discretizing the state space, using uncontrollable events to
model sources of environmental uncertainty and, in the case of imperfect measure-
ment, using observable but uncontrollable events to model measurement uncertainty.
We also showed how to translate safety and marking specifications defined over a
continuous state space to the DES domain, yielding a language based specification.
Second, we defined new relations between systems and their DES abstractions, al-
lowing for supervisors to be computed using a “abstract-solve-translate” method and
characterizing the class of supervisors over which the result will be maximally permis-
sive. Finally, in the case of perfect measurement, we provided customized algorithms
for computing the desired supervisors and demonstrated their scalability through
simulations. Notably, these algorithms can be applied to the case of imperfect mea-
surement with little modification.
Whereas we have developed solution methods capable of dealing with environmen-
tal uncertainty and measurement uncertainty, there remains further work to be done
in order to implement these methods on real world systems. One significant issue is
that, because we make no assumptions on the behaviour of the uncontrolled vehicles,
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their presence severely restricts the set of problem instances that have non-empty
supervisors. A possible solution would be to model driver behaviour. Another prob-
lem characteristic which restricts the set of problem instances that have non-empty
supervisors is the requirement of absolute safety. A possible solution would be to
consider a stochastic model (especially for the disturbance) and to require only that
the supervisor prevent collisions with some probability 1− . Finally, a more realistic
model of the system dynamics would be as a second order differential equation.
Possible avenues for future work include extensions to a stochastic model or to
more complex dynamics, as described above. Another direction for future work is
the improvement of scalability. The simulations we have conducted in the case of
perfect measurement indicate that memory utilization is the bottle-neck, not running
time. Two possibilities to address this issue are the computation of a minimal set of
boundary states between safe and unsafe states and the use of dynamic discretization.
In this context, dynamic discretization would consist of computing an initial super-
visor at a coarse discretization, refining the discretization at states not known to be
safe, recomputing a supervisor, and so on... This method could be improved upon by
determining the set of safe, unsafe, and uncertain states at each discretization level.
Specifically, the supervisor synthesis problem can be thought of as a game against
an adversary: the winning states for the controller are safe; the winning states for
the adversary are unsafe; and the states that are losing to both controller and adver-
sary are uncertain. Refining the discretization would then be performed only on the
uncertain states.
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